From aa95b435584da3a0fbbc99e55223decea26aba7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:01:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 001/184] test(host): cover execution location reporting Add assertions for the execution_location accessor on the local and SSH hosts, and on the SSH host's inner host, so the new reporting behaviour is exercised for local, remote, and unknown cases. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod_tests.rs | 10 +++++++++- crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod_tests.rs index fce97621..682ac8a7 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod_tests.rs @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ use std::path::Path; -use tinybox_core::{Error, ExecRequest, Host, Result}; +use tinybox_core::{Error, ExecRequest, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result}; use super::{LocalHost, NAME}; @@ -16,6 +16,14 @@ fn it_reports_its_name() { assert_eq!(LocalHost.name(), NAME); } +#[test] +fn it_reports_local_execution_location() { + assert_eq!( + LocalHost::new().execution_location(), + HostExecutionLocation::Local + ); +} + #[tokio::test] async fn it_runs_a_command_and_captures_stdout() -> Result<()> { let output = LocalHost::new() diff --git a/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs index d4bdd39e..6848d529 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, PoisonError}; use async_trait::async_trait; -use tinybox_core::{Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, Result}; +use tinybox_core::{Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result}; use super::{NAME, SshHost, SshTarget}; @@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ fn it_reports_its_name() -> Result<()> { assert_eq!(host.name(), "ssh"); assert_eq!(host.name(), NAME); assert_eq!(host.target().destination(), "builder@example.invalid"); + assert_eq!(host.execution_location(), HostExecutionLocation::Remote); + assert_eq!(inner.execution_location(), HostExecutionLocation::Unknown); Ok(()) } From 0c53ae82397b0996663db586d10e10ea70e4abab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:02:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 002/184] feat(runtime): add HostExecutionLocation capability to Host Introduce a HostExecutionLocation enum and an execution_location method on the Host trait so security-sensitive controllers can determine whether a host runs commands locally or remotely instead of inferring it from the host's registration name. Custom hosts default to Unknown until they explicitly attest to their locality. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-core/src/lib.rs | 2 +- crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/mod.rs | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-core/src/lib.rs b/crates/tinybox-core/src/lib.rs index de0a0f2a..c3203ed6 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-core/src/lib.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-core/src/lib.rs @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ pub use identity::{BoxId, HostRef, ProcessId, SandboxRef, SnapshotId, TemplateNa pub use passthrough::PassthroughSandbox; pub use runtime::{ BoxInfo, BoxState, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, ExecutionObserver, Forward, ForwardGuard, Host, - OutputStream, Sandbox, WorkspaceFileReader, WorkspaceFileWriter, + HostExecutionLocation, OutputStream, Sandbox, WorkspaceFileReader, WorkspaceFileWriter, }; pub use spec::{ BoxSpec, EgressAllowlist, Lifecycle, NetworkPolicy, Placement, PortMapping, Resources, diff --git a/crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/mod.rs index 56e24d07..6fe8de95 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/mod.rs @@ -41,6 +41,21 @@ mod types; pub use forward::{Forward, ForwardGuard}; pub use types::{BoxInfo, BoxState, ExecOutput, ExecRequest}; +/// Where a host executes commands relative to the tinybox process. +/// +/// Security-sensitive controllers use this explicit capability instead of +/// guessing from a host's registration name. Custom hosts default to +/// [`Unknown`](Self::Unknown) until they can state their location. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum HostExecutionLocation { + /// Commands execute in this process's operating-system environment. + Local, + /// Commands execute on another machine. + Remote, + /// The host cannot make a trustworthy locality claim. + Unknown, +} + /// A readable file opened beneath a host- or sandbox-mounted workspace. #[async_trait] pub trait WorkspaceFileReader: std::fmt::Debug + Send + Sync { @@ -90,6 +105,15 @@ pub trait Host: std::fmt::Debug + Send + Sync + 'static { /// [`HostRef`](crate::identity::HostRef). fn name(&self) -> &str; + /// The machine on which commands run. + /// + /// This defaults to [`HostExecutionLocation::Unknown`]; a controller that + /// requires local machine access must refuse hosts that do not explicitly + /// attest to it. + fn execution_location(&self) -> HostExecutionLocation { + HostExecutionLocation::Unknown + } + /// Run a command to completion and collect its output. /// /// # Errors From d86fa6d712b243ec9efab68ed3b91a17475320e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:02:11 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 003/184] feat(local): report local execution location Implement execution_location on LocalHost so callers can tell that commands run on the local machine rather than a remote host. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs index b8b80231..5fbc5214 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs @@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ pub(crate) mod shell; use async_trait::async_trait; use std::path::Path; use tinybox_core::{ - Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Forward, Host, Result, WorkspaceFileReader, WorkspaceFileWriter, + Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Forward, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result, + WorkspaceFileReader, WorkspaceFileWriter, }; use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt as _; use tokio::process::Command; @@ -71,6 +72,10 @@ impl Host for LocalHost { NAME } + fn execution_location(&self) -> HostExecutionLocation { + HostExecutionLocation::Local + } + /// Run a command to completion and collect its output. /// /// Uses `tokio`'s `output()`, which reads both pipes concurrently. Reading From 6ef019d11fd633d6a4854c292380291cf8405e7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:02:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 004/184] feat(ssh): report remote execution location for ssh hosts SshHost now implements execution_location and returns Remote, so callers can tell that commands run on the far machine rather than locally. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs index ecd0fb6e..d4c906f6 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs @@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ use std::sync::Arc; use async_trait::async_trait; -use tinybox_core::{Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Forward, Host, Result}; +use tinybox_core::{ + Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Forward, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result, +}; mod forward; mod observed; @@ -187,6 +189,10 @@ impl Host for SshHost { NAME } + fn execution_location(&self) -> HostExecutionLocation { + HostExecutionLocation::Remote + } + /// Run a command on the far machine and collect its output. /// /// # Errors From 171879c36c978fd22dd235d5bd4d96b2fe7b5e14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:02:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 005/184] test(sandbox): cover egress controller prepare and cleanup ordering Add tests that verify the egress controller prepares the allowlist before the container starts and cleans up after destroy, and that a controller failure rolls back the box record before it is dropped. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 108 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 108 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index b0fcab67..87a4ff4f 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -23,6 +23,114 @@ use tinybox_core::{ use super::{DockerSandbox, NAME, args, cleanup_timeout_error, state}; +#[derive(Debug)] +struct RecordingEgressController; + +#[async_trait] +impl super::DockerEgressController for RecordingEgressController { + async fn prepare( + &self, + host: &dyn Host, + _namespace: &str, + _id: &BoxId, + _allowlist: &tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist, + ) -> Result { + host.run(&ExecRequest::new(["controller", "prepare"])) + .await?; + Ok("tinybox-allowlist-test".to_owned()) + } + + async fn cleanup(&self, host: &dyn Host, _namespace: &str, _id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { + host.run(&ExecRequest::new(["controller", "cleanup"])) + .await?; + Ok(()) + } + + fn docker_argv(&self, argv: Vec) -> Vec { + argv + } +} + +#[tokio::test] +async fn allowlist_controller_prepares_before_start_and_cleans_after_destroy() -> Result<()> { + let host = ScriptedHost::silent(); + let sandbox = DockerSandbox::new(host.clone(), Arc::new(MemoryStore::new())) + .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(RecordingEgressController)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["api.example.test"], [443]); + let info = sandbox + .create( + &spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist)), + ) + .await?; + + let commands = host.commands(); + assert_eq!(commands[0], ["controller", "prepare"]); + assert_eq!(commands[1][0], "docker"); + assert!(commands[1].contains(&"--network".to_owned())); + assert!(commands[1].contains(&"tinybox-allowlist-test".to_owned())); + + sandbox.destroy(&info.id).await?; + let commands = host.commands(); + assert_eq!(commands[2][0], "docker"); + assert_eq!(commands[3], ["controller", "cleanup"]); + Ok(()) +} + +#[tokio::test] +async fn controller_failure_rolls_back_before_dropping_the_box_record() -> Result<()> { + #[derive(Debug)] + struct FailingController; + + #[async_trait] + impl super::DockerEgressController for FailingController { + async fn prepare( + &self, + host: &dyn Host, + _namespace: &str, + _id: &BoxId, + _allowlist: &tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist, + ) -> Result { + host.run(&ExecRequest::new(["controller", "prepare"])) + .await?; + Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + sandbox: NAME.to_owned(), + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + }) + } + + async fn cleanup(&self, host: &dyn Host, _namespace: &str, _id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { + host.run(&ExecRequest::new(["controller", "cleanup"])) + .await?; + Ok(()) + } + + fn docker_argv(&self, argv: Vec) -> Vec { + argv + } + } + + let host = ScriptedHost::silent(); + let store = Arc::new(MemoryStore::new()); + let sandbox = DockerSandbox::new(host.clone(), store.clone()) + .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(FailingController)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["api.example.test"], [443]); + + assert!(matches!( + sandbox + .create(&spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist))) + .await, + Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + .. + }) + )); + assert_eq!(store.list()?.len(), 0); + assert_eq!(host.commands(), [["controller", "prepare"], ["controller", "cleanup"]]); + Ok(()) +} + #[test] fn effective_published_ports_parse_dynamic_and_fixed_bindings() -> Result<()> { let ports = args::parse_published_ports( From 62771b96719ff6a3115e412f9b5c289521110fc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:04:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 006/184] feat(docker): expose native linux egress controller Register the new egress_enforcement module and re-export DockerEgressController and NativeLinuxDockerEgressController so callers can enforce egress policy through the native Linux backend. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 557 ++++++++++++++++++ crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs | 2 + 2 files changed, 559 insertions(+) create mode 100644 crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..df9f2fbf --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -0,0 +1,557 @@ +//! Per-box Docker network filtering for explicitly supported native Linux hosts. +//! +//! The controller installs a host firewall before Docker starts the box. It +//! consumes pinned resolver answers and does not use proxy environment +//! variables as an enforcement boundary. + +use std::{ + fmt::Debug, + net::IpAddr, + sync::Arc, +}; + +use async_trait::async_trait; +use tinybox_core::{ + BoxId, EgressAllowlist, Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result, +}; + +use crate::{EgressResolver, PinnedEgressPlan, plan_egress_allowlist}; + +const DOCKER_SOCKET: &str = "unix:///var/run/docker.sock"; +const OWNER_LABEL: &str = "ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.owner"; + +/// A controller that installs and removes a per-box egress filter. +/// +/// Implementations are trusted security components. A controller must verify +/// that it acts on the same daemon and host that run the box, install a +/// default-drop filter before returning from [`prepare`](Self::prepare), and +/// make [`cleanup`](Self::cleanup) idempotent. DockerSandbox uses +/// [`docker_argv`](Self::docker_argv) for every Docker command while the +/// controller is installed, so lifecycle operations address the same daemon. +#[async_trait] +pub trait DockerEgressController: Debug + Send + Sync { + /// Resolve, pin, and prepare a filtered network for this box. + /// + /// Implementations must not start the workload. The returned network name + /// is supplied to `docker run` only after this method succeeds. + async fn prepare( + &self, + host: &dyn Host, + namespace: &str, + id: &BoxId, + allowlist: &EgressAllowlist, + ) -> Result; + + /// Remove this box's filter and network after its container has stopped. + async fn cleanup(&self, host: &dyn Host, namespace: &str, id: &BoxId) -> Result<()>; + + /// Bind a Docker CLI command to the daemon this controller verifies. + fn docker_argv(&self, argv: Vec) -> Vec; +} + +/// Native Linux Engine support using the local rootful Docker socket and +/// `iptables`/`ip6tables` `DOCKER-USER` chains. +/// +/// The default [`DockerSandbox`](crate::DockerSandbox) has no controller and +/// continues to refuse allowlists. Install this controller explicitly only on +/// a local native Linux Docker Engine with non-interactive firewall privilege. +/// Docker Desktop, SSH/remote hosts, rootless Docker, Windows containers, and +/// hosts without the expected firewall chains are refused. +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { + resolver: Arc, +} + +impl NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { + /// Use `resolver` to resolve allowlist names before network creation. + #[must_use] + pub fn new(resolver: Arc) -> Self { + Self { resolver } + } +} + +#[async_trait] +impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { + async fn prepare( + &self, + host: &dyn Host, + namespace: &str, + id: &BoxId, + allowlist: &EgressAllowlist, + ) -> Result { + ensure_supported_host(host)?; + ensure_linux_target()?; + verify_engine_and_firewall(host).await?; + + // Resolve before creating any Docker resources. Every installed rule is + // based on this one pinned answer set; workload DNS is not trusted for + // egress decisions. + let plan = plan_egress_allowlist(allowlist, self.resolver.as_ref())?; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, id); + let network = docker_success( + host, + vec![ + "docker".into(), + "network".into(), + "create".into(), + "--driver".into(), + "bridge".into(), + "--ipv6".into(), + "--opt".into(), + format!("com.docker.network.bridge.name={}", names.bridge), + "--label".into(), + format!("{OWNER_LABEL}={id}"), + names.network.clone(), + ], + ) + .await?; + if network.is_empty() { + return Err(unsupported("Docker did not confirm the egress network")); + } + + let setup = async { + verify_created_network(host, &names, id).await?; + install_firewall(host, &names, &plan).await + } + .await; + if let Err(error) = setup { + let cleanup = cleanup_native(host, namespace, id, true).await; + return match cleanup { + Ok(()) => Err(error), + Err(cleanup_error) => Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "roll back egress network setup", + message: format!("{error}; cleanup failed: {cleanup_error}"), + }), + }; + } + + Ok(names.network) + } + + async fn cleanup(&self, host: &dyn Host, namespace: &str, id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { + ensure_supported_host(host)?; + ensure_linux_target()?; + verify_engine_and_firewall(host).await?; + cleanup_native(host, namespace, id, false).await + } + + fn docker_argv(&self, argv: Vec) -> Vec { + force_local_rootful_docker(argv) + } +} + +#[derive(Debug)] +struct NetworkNames { + network: String, + bridge: String, + forward_chain: String, + input_chain: String, +} + +impl NetworkNames { + fn for_box(namespace: &str, id: &BoxId) -> Self { + let hash = stable_hash(namespace.as_bytes(), id.as_str().as_bytes()); + let short = format!("{hash:016x}"); + Self { + network: format!("tinybox-egress-{}", &short[..12]), + // Linux interface names are limited to IFNAMSIZ - 1 (15 bytes). + bridge: format!("tbx{}", &short[..12]), + forward_chain: format!("TBX{}F", &short[..10]), + input_chain: format!("TBX{}I", &short[..10]), + } + } +} + +fn stable_hash(namespace: &[u8], id: &[u8]) -> u64 { + let mut hash = 0xcbf2_9ce4_8422_2325_u64; + for byte in namespace.iter().chain([0].iter()).chain(id) { + hash ^= u64::from(*byte); + hash = hash.wrapping_mul(0x0000_0100_0000_01b3); + } + hash +} + +fn ensure_supported_host(host: &dyn Host) -> Result<()> { + if host.execution_location() != HostExecutionLocation::Local { + return Err(unsupported( + "egress filtering requires an explicitly local execution host", + )); + } + Ok(()) +} + +fn ensure_linux_target() -> Result<()> { + if cfg!(target_os = "linux") { + Ok(()) + } else { + Err(unsupported( + "native Docker egress filtering is available only on Linux", + )) + } +} + +fn unsupported(reason: &str) -> Error { + let _ = reason; + Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + } +} + +async fn verify_engine_and_firewall(host: &dyn Host) -> Result<()> { + ensure_supported_host(host)?; + ensure_linux_target()?; + + let info = docker_output( + host, + vec![ + "docker".into(), + "info".into(), + "--format".into(), + "{{.OSType}}|{{.OperatingSystem}}|{{json .SecurityOptions}}".into(), + ], + ) + .await?; + let mut fields = info.splitn(3, '|'); + let os_type = fields.next().unwrap_or_default().trim(); + let operating_system = fields.next().unwrap_or_default().trim(); + let security = fields.next().unwrap_or_default().to_ascii_lowercase(); + if os_type != "linux" + || operating_system.is_empty() + || operating_system.to_ascii_lowercase().contains("desktop") + || security.contains("rootless") + { + return Err(unsupported("Docker daemon is not a native rootful Linux Engine")); + } + + for firewall in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] { + for chain in ["DOCKER-USER", "INPUT"] { + let output = host + .run(&ExecRequest::new([ + "sudo", + "-n", + firewall, + "-w", + "5", + "-S", + chain, + ])) + .await?; + if !output.succeeded() { + return Err(unsupported("required root firewall chains are unavailable")); + } + } + } + Ok(()) +} + +async fn verify_created_network(host: &dyn Host, names: &NetworkNames, id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { + let output = docker_output( + host, + vec![ + "docker".into(), + "network".into(), + "inspect".into(), + "--format".into(), + "{{.Driver}}|{{.EnableIPv6}}|{{index .Options \"com.docker.network.bridge.name\"}}|{{index .Labels \"ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.owner\"}}".into(), + names.network.clone(), + ], + ) + .await?; + let expected = format!("bridge|true|{}|{id}", names.bridge); + if output != expected { + return Err(unsupported("Docker egress network did not match its verified configuration")); + } + Ok(()) +} + +async fn install_firewall( + host: &dyn Host, + names: &NetworkNames, + plan: &PinnedEgressPlan, +) -> Result<()> { + install_family(host, "iptables", names, plan, false).await?; + install_family(host, "ip6tables", names, plan, true).await?; + verify_hook(host, "iptables", "DOCKER-USER", &names.bridge, &names.forward_chain) + .await?; + verify_hook(host, "iptables", "INPUT", &names.bridge, &names.input_chain).await?; + verify_hook(host, "ip6tables", "DOCKER-USER", &names.bridge, &names.forward_chain) + .await?; + verify_hook(host, "ip6tables", "INPUT", &names.bridge, &names.input_chain).await?; + Ok(()) +} + +async fn install_family( + host: &dyn Host, + firewall: &str, + names: &NetworkNames, + plan: &PinnedEgressPlan, + ipv6: bool, +) -> Result<()> { + let existing = firewall_output(host, firewall, ["-S"]).await?; + if existing.contains(&names.forward_chain) || existing.contains(&names.input_chain) { + return Err(unsupported("a stale egress firewall chain already exists")); + } + + for chain in [&names.forward_chain, &names.input_chain] { + firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-N", chain]).await?; + for rule in deny_rules(ipv6) { + let mut command = vec!["-A".to_owned(), (*chain).clone()]; + command.extend(rule); + firewall_success(host, firewall, command.iter().map(String::as_str)).await?; + } + for target in plan.targets() { + let address = target.address(); + if is_ipv6(&address) != ipv6 { + continue; + } + for protocol in ["tcp", "udp"] { + firewall_success( + host, + firewall, + [ + "-A", + chain, + "-d", + &address.to_string(), + "-p", + protocol, + "--dport", + &target.port().to_string(), + "-j", + "ACCEPT", + ], + ) + .await?; + } + } + firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-A", chain, "-j", "DROP"]).await?; + } + + firewall_success( + host, + firewall, + [ + "-I", + "DOCKER-USER", + "1", + "-i", + &names.bridge, + "-j", + &names.forward_chain, + ], + ) + .await?; + firewall_success( + host, + firewall, + [ + "-I", + "INPUT", + "1", + "-i", + &names.bridge, + "-j", + &names.input_chain, + ], + ) + .await?; + + // Confirm both custom chains contain the final drop before allowing Docker + // to attach an image entrypoint to the network. + for chain in [&names.forward_chain, &names.input_chain] { + let rules = firewall_output(host, firewall, ["-S", chain]).await?; + if !rules.lines().any(|line| line.ends_with("-j DROP")) { + return Err(unsupported("default-drop egress rules were not verified")); + } + } + Ok(()) +} + +fn deny_rules(ipv6: bool) -> Vec> { + if ipv6 { + ["::1/128", "fe80::/10", "fd00:ec2::254/128"] + .into_iter() + .map(|prefix| vec!["-d".into(), prefix.into(), "-j".into(), "DROP".into()]) + .collect() + } else { + ["127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "100.100.100.200/32"] + .into_iter() + .map(|prefix| vec!["-d".into(), prefix.into(), "-j".into(), "DROP".into()]) + .collect() + } +} + +fn is_ipv6(address: &IpAddr) -> bool { + matches!(address, IpAddr::V6(_)) +} + +async fn verify_hook( + host: &dyn Host, + firewall: &str, + parent: &str, + bridge: &str, + chain: &str, +) -> Result<()> { + firewall_success( + host, + firewall, + ["-C", parent, "-i", bridge, "-j", chain], + ) + .await +} + +async fn cleanup_native( + host: &dyn Host, + namespace: &str, + id: &BoxId, + network_known_owned: bool, +) -> Result<()> { + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, id); + for firewall in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] { + for (parent, chain) in [ + ("DOCKER-USER", names.forward_chain.as_str()), + ("INPUT", names.input_chain.as_str()), + ] { + let hook = host + .run(&ExecRequest::new([ + "sudo", + "-n", + firewall, + "-w", + "5", + "-C", + parent, + "-i", + &names.bridge, + "-j", + chain, + ])) + .await?; + if hook.succeeded() { + firewall_success( + host, + firewall, + ["-D", parent, "-i", &names.bridge, "-j", chain], + ) + .await?; + } + let rules = firewall_output(host, firewall, ["-S"]).await?; + if rules.lines().any(|line| line.contains(chain)) { + firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-F", chain]).await?; + firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-X", chain]).await?; + } + let remaining = firewall_output(host, firewall, ["-S"]).await?; + if remaining.lines().any(|line| line.contains(chain)) { + return Err(unsupported("egress firewall chain cleanup was not verified")); + } + } + } + + let inspect = docker_request( + host, + vec![ + "docker".into(), + "network".into(), + "inspect".into(), + "--format".into(), + format!("{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}"), + names.network.clone(), + ], + ) + .await?; + if inspect.succeeded() { + let owner = inspect.stdout_lossy().trim().to_owned(); + if !network_known_owned && owner != id.as_str() { + return Err(unsupported("egress network ownership could not be verified")); + } + docker_success( + host, + vec![ + "docker".into(), + "network".into(), + "rm".into(), + names.network, + ], + ) + .await?; + } else if !inspect.stderr_lossy().contains("No such network") + && !inspect.stderr_lossy().contains("not found") + { + return Err(unsupported("egress network cleanup could not be verified")); + } + Ok(()) +} + +async fn firewall_output( + host: &dyn Host, + firewall: &str, + arguments: [&str; N], +) -> Result { + let mut argv = vec!["sudo", "-n", firewall, "-w", "5"]; + argv.extend(arguments); + let output = host.run(&ExecRequest::new(argv)).await?; + if !output.succeeded() { + return Err(unsupported("required firewall command failed")); + } + Ok(output.stdout_lossy()) +} + +async fn firewall_success(host: &dyn Host, firewall: &str, arguments: I) -> Result<()> +where + I: IntoIterator, + S: AsRef, +{ + let mut argv = vec!["sudo".to_owned(), "-n".to_owned(), firewall.to_owned(), "-w".to_owned(), "5".to_owned()]; + argv.extend(arguments.into_iter().map(|argument| argument.as_ref().to_owned())); + let output = host.run(&ExecRequest::new(argv)).await?; + if !output.succeeded() { + return Err(unsupported("required firewall command failed")); + } + Ok(()) +} + +async fn docker_output(host: &dyn Host, argv: Vec) -> Result { + let output = docker_request(host, force_local_rootful_docker(argv)).await?; + if !output.succeeded() { + return Err(unsupported("Docker daemon identity or configuration could not be verified")); + } + Ok(output.stdout_lossy().trim().to_owned()) +} + +async fn docker_success(host: &dyn Host, argv: Vec) -> Result { + let output = docker_request(host, force_local_rootful_docker(argv)).await?; + if !output.succeeded() { + return Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "configure egress filtering", + message: output.stderr_lossy().trim().to_owned(), + }); + } + Ok(output.stdout_lossy().trim().to_owned()) +} + +async fn docker_request(host: &dyn Host, argv: Vec) -> Result { + host.run(&ExecRequest::new(argv)).await +} + +fn force_local_rootful_docker(argv: Vec) -> Vec { + let mut forced = vec![ + "env".into(), + "-u".into(), + "DOCKER_HOST".into(), + "-u".into(), + "DOCKER_CONTEXT".into(), + "-u".into(), + "DOCKER_TLS_VERIFY".into(), + "-u".into(), + "DOCKER_CERT_PATH".into(), + "docker".into(), + "--host".into(), + DOCKER_SOCKET.into(), + ]; + forced.extend(argv.into_iter().skip(1)); + forced +} diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs index 5bd248bb..3d209fac 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ //! ``` mod egress; +mod egress_enforcement; mod oneshot; mod policy; mod sandbox; @@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ pub use oneshot::{ pub use policy::{DANGEROUS_MOUNTS, HOST_NETWORK, run_policy_issues}; pub use egress::{EgressResolver, PinnedEgressPlan, PinnedEgressTarget, plan_egress_allowlist}; +pub use egress_enforcement::{DockerEgressController, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController}; pub use sandbox::{ DEFAULT_BASE_IMAGE, DEFAULT_NAMESPACE, DockerSandbox, NAME, OWNER_LABEL, WORKSPACE_MOUNT, From a25942510447f89ac42d227c38a220fa5ef77ed4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:05:01 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 007/184] feat(docker): add pluggable egress controller to sandbox The Docker sandbox now accepts an optional egress controller that can rewrite docker argv before execution, letting callers install per-box allowlist filtering. Without a controller the sandbox keeps refusing NetworkPolicy::Allowlist as before. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs index 2d0ff851..dd934609 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs @@ -12,10 +12,12 @@ use std::{ use async_trait::async_trait; use tinybox_core::{ BoxId, BoxInfo, BoxSpec, BoxState, Capability, Clock, Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, - ExecutionObserver, Host, IsolationLevel, OutputStream, PortMapping, ProcessId, Result, Sandbox, - SandboxCapabilities, SnapshotId, SnapshotSupport, Store, SystemClock, detach, + ExecutionObserver, Host, IsolationLevel, NetworkPolicy, OutputStream, PortMapping, ProcessId, + Result, Sandbox, SandboxCapabilities, SnapshotId, SnapshotSupport, Store, SystemClock, detach, }; +use crate::DockerEgressController; + mod args; mod observed; mod state; @@ -46,6 +48,7 @@ pub const NAME: &str = "docker"; pub struct DockerSandbox { host: Arc, store: Arc, + egress_controller: Option>, clock: Arc, namespace: String, failed_create_attempts: Arc>>, @@ -153,6 +156,7 @@ impl DockerSandbox { Self { host, store, + egress_controller: None, clock: Arc::new(SystemClock::new()), namespace: DEFAULT_NAMESPACE.to_owned(), failed_create_attempts: Arc::default(), @@ -195,6 +199,7 @@ impl DockerSandbox { Ok(Self { host, store, + egress_controller: None, clock: Arc::new(SystemClock::new()), namespace, failed_create_attempts: Arc::default(), @@ -218,6 +223,7 @@ impl DockerSandbox { Self { host, store: self.store.clone(), + egress_controller: self.egress_controller.clone(), clock: self.clock.clone(), namespace: self.namespace.clone(), failed_create_attempts: self.failed_create_attempts.clone(), @@ -232,6 +238,35 @@ impl DockerSandbox { &self.namespace } + /// Install a controller for per-box egress allowlists. + /// + /// The default sandbox has no controller and continues to refuse + /// [`NetworkPolicy::Allowlist`]. The controller must verify the execution + /// host and Docker daemon, and install its default-drop filter before the + /// workload starts. + #[must_use] + pub fn with_egress_controller( + mut self, + controller: Arc, + ) -> Self { + self.egress_controller = Some(controller); + self + } + + fn docker_argv(&self, argv: Vec) -> Vec { + if let Some(controller) = &self.egress_controller { + controller.docker_argv(argv) + } else { + argv + } + } + + async fn run_docker(&self, request: &ExecRequest) -> Result { + let mut request = request.clone(); + request.argv = self.docker_argv(request.argv); + self.host.run(&request).await + } + /// What this sandbox declares. /// /// `PauseResume` is absent even though `docker pause` exists, because the @@ -272,7 +307,7 @@ impl DockerSandbox { operation: &'static str, request: ExecRequest, ) -> Result { - let output = self.host.run(&request).await?; + let output = self.run_docker(&request).await?; if !output.succeeded() { return Err(Error::Backend { sandbox: NAME.to_owned(), @@ -286,7 +321,9 @@ impl DockerSandbox { /// Remove a named container, treating Docker's explicit missing-container /// response as an already-completed cleanup. async fn remove_container(&self, argv: Vec) -> Result<()> { - let output = self.host.run(&ExecRequest::new(argv)).await?; + let output = self + .run_docker(&ExecRequest::new(self.docker_argv(argv))) + .await?; if output.succeeded() || output.stderr_lossy().contains("No such container") { return Ok(()); } From 261a6541e7492b8433d93256dd5a7c67f10624bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:05:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 008/184] refactor(sandbox): simplify container removal command construction The remove_container helper now passes its argv straight to run_docker instead of wrapping it with docker_argv, since the caller already supplies the full command. This removes a redundant layer of argument construction with no change in behaviour. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs index dd934609..0cee59a9 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs @@ -321,9 +321,7 @@ impl DockerSandbox { /// Remove a named container, treating Docker's explicit missing-container /// response as an already-completed cleanup. async fn remove_container(&self, argv: Vec) -> Result<()> { - let output = self - .run_docker(&ExecRequest::new(self.docker_argv(argv))) - .await?; + let output = self.run_docker(&ExecRequest::new(argv)).await?; if output.succeeded() || output.stderr_lossy().contains("No such container") { return Ok(()); } From efeba54362c2ec8ca17e5bcc5fd820a76196fc46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:05:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 009/184] feat(egress): add host validation hook to docker egress controller Add a validate_host method to the DockerEgressController trait with a default no-op implementation, and have the native Linux controller check that the host is supported, the target is Linux, and the engine and firewall are available. Also skip forcing the local rootful docker env prefix when the command already starts with env. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index df9f2fbf..453b1d63 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ const OWNER_LABEL: &str = "ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.owner"; /// controller is installed, so lifecycle operations address the same daemon. #[async_trait] pub trait DockerEgressController: Debug + Send + Sync { + /// Verify the execution location and required daemon/filter capability. + async fn validate_host(&self, _host: &dyn Host) -> Result<()> { + Ok(()) + } + /// Resolve, pin, and prepare a filtered network for this box. /// /// Implementations must not start the workload. The returned network name @@ -72,6 +77,12 @@ impl NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { #[async_trait] impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { + async fn validate_host(&self, host: &dyn Host) -> Result<()> { + ensure_supported_host(host)?; + ensure_linux_target()?; + verify_engine_and_firewall(host).await + } + async fn prepare( &self, host: &dyn Host, @@ -538,6 +549,9 @@ async fn docker_request(host: &dyn Host, argv: Vec) -> Result) -> Vec { + if argv.first().is_some_and(|program| program == "env") { + return argv; + } let mut forced = vec![ "env".into(), "-u".into(), From fac41f08d17c9a040bd35371795beed0e1edd765 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:06:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 010/184] feat(sandbox): route docker commands through the egress controller Wrap the host in a ControllerHost that rewrites docker argv through the egress controller before execution, so observed hosts and sandboxes with a controller attached get the same egress handling as the primary host. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs index 0cee59a9..38e86742 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ use std::{ collections::HashMap, + net::SocketAddr, + path::Path, sync::{ Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, PoisonError, atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}, @@ -12,8 +14,9 @@ use std::{ use async_trait::async_trait; use tinybox_core::{ BoxId, BoxInfo, BoxSpec, BoxState, Capability, Clock, Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, - ExecutionObserver, Host, IsolationLevel, NetworkPolicy, OutputStream, PortMapping, ProcessId, - Result, Sandbox, SandboxCapabilities, SnapshotId, SnapshotSupport, Store, SystemClock, detach, + ExecutionObserver, Forward, Host, HostExecutionLocation, IsolationLevel, NetworkPolicy, + OutputStream, PortMapping, ProcessId, Result, Sandbox, SandboxCapabilities, SnapshotId, + SnapshotSupport, Store, SystemClock, WorkspaceFileReader, WorkspaceFileWriter, detach, }; use crate::DockerEgressController; @@ -56,6 +59,78 @@ pub struct DockerSandbox { observed_boxes: Arc>>, } +#[derive(Debug)] +struct ControllerHost { + inner: Arc, + controller: Arc, +} + +impl ControllerHost { + fn request(&self, request: &ExecRequest) -> ExecRequest { + let mut request = request.clone(); + if request.argv.first().is_some_and(|program| program == "docker") { + request.argv = self.controller.docker_argv(request.argv); + } + request + } +} + +#[async_trait] +impl Host for ControllerHost { + fn name(&self) -> &str { + self.inner.name() + } + + fn execution_location(&self) -> HostExecutionLocation { + self.inner.execution_location() + } + + async fn run(&self, request: &ExecRequest) -> Result { + self.inner.run(&self.request(request)).await + } + + async fn run_observed( + &self, + request: &ExecRequest, + observer: Arc, + ) -> Result { + self.inner + .run_observed(&self.request(request), observer) + .await + } + + fn has_pending_observed_cleanup(&self) -> bool { + self.inner.has_pending_observed_cleanup() + } + + async fn retry_observed_cleanup(&self) -> Result<()> { + self.inner.retry_observed_cleanup().await + } + + async fn open_workspace_file( + &self, + root: &Path, + relative: &Path, + ) -> Result> { + self.inner.open_workspace_file(root, relative).await + } + + async fn begin_workspace_file_write( + &self, + root: &Path, + relative: &Path, + transfer_id: &str, + ) -> Result> { + self.inner + .begin_workspace_file_write(root, relative, transfer_id) + .await + } + + async fn forward(&self, remote: SocketAddr) -> Result { + self.inner.forward(remote).await + } +} + #[derive(Debug, Clone)] struct CleanupHandle { id: BoxId, @@ -220,6 +295,12 @@ impl DockerSandbox { /// different host. #[must_use] pub fn for_observed_host(&self, host: Arc) -> Self { + let host = self.egress_controller.as_ref().map_or(host.clone(), |controller| { + Arc::new(ControllerHost { + inner: host, + controller: controller.clone(), + }) as Arc + }); Self { host, store: self.store.clone(), @@ -249,6 +330,10 @@ impl DockerSandbox { mut self, controller: Arc, ) -> Self { + self.host = Arc::new(ControllerHost { + inner: self.host.clone(), + controller: controller.clone(), + }); self.egress_controller = Some(controller); self } From 72d08de80a65eb03ff368c8950d64dcf9b2eff7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:07:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 011/184] feat(sandbox): support allowlist network policy in docker backend The docker sandbox now installs an egress filter through the egress controller when a box requests an allowlist network policy, instead of refusing the policy outright. The controller validates the host and prepares the default-drop filter before the container starts, and any failure during create tears the egress state back down so no filter is left behind. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs | 7 ++- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs index bdf85cd9..9e2c09ab 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ pub(super) fn run( id: &BoxId, attempt: &str, spec: &BoxSpec, + allowlist_network: Option<&str>, ) -> Result> { let mut argv = vec![ "docker".to_owned(), @@ -119,7 +120,11 @@ pub(super) fn run( ]; argv.extend(resource_flags(&spec.resources)); - argv.extend(network_flags(&spec.network)); + if let Some(network) = allowlist_network { + argv.extend(["--network".to_owned(), network.to_owned()]); + } else { + argv.extend(network_flags(&spec.network)); + } argv.extend(port_flags(spec)); if let WorkspaceSource::LocalDir(path) = &spec.source { diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs index 38e86742..be3bde27 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs @@ -522,7 +522,23 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { async fn create(&self, spec: &BoxSpec) -> Result { spec.validate()?; - spec.network.refuse_allowlist(self.name())?; + let allowlist = match &spec.network { + NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist) => { + let controller = self.egress_controller.as_ref().ok_or_else(|| { + Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + sandbox: NAME.to_owned(), + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + } + })?; + controller.validate_host(self.host.as_ref()).await?; + Some(allowlist) + } + _ => { + spec.network.refuse_allowlist(self.name())?; + None + } + }; // The workspace is bind-mounted read-write, so it gets the one-shot // mount policy before any record or container exists. // ponytail: through an SSH host the daemon's filesystem is remote, so @@ -542,11 +558,35 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { let info = tinybox_core::insert_new(self.store.as_ref(), BoxState::Ready, spec, self.clock.now())?; + // Resolve and install the default-drop filter before Docker starts the + // image entrypoint. The controller is the only path that can make an + // allowlist runnable. + let network = if let Some(allowlist) = allowlist { + match self + .egress_controller + .as_ref() + .expect("allowlist requires a controller") + .prepare(self.host.as_ref(), &self.namespace, &info.id, allowlist) + .await + { + Ok(network) => Some(network), + Err(error) => { + self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); + return Err(error); + } + } + } else { + None + }; + // Build the command before running anything, so a source this backend // cannot handle leaves no container behind. - let argv = match args::run(&self.namespace, &info.id, &attempt, spec) { + let argv = match args::run(&self.namespace, &info.id, &attempt, spec, network.as_deref()) { Ok(argv) => argv, Err(error) => { + if network.is_some() { + let _ = self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await; + } self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); return Err(error); } @@ -558,6 +598,9 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { // Docker reports a name collision before creating a container. // Never remove that name: it belongs to the pre-existing owner. if is_name_conflict(&error) { + if network.is_some() { + let _ = self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await; + } self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); return Err(error); } @@ -579,6 +622,9 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { .await .is_ok() { + if network.is_some() { + let _ = self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await; + } self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); } else { self.failed_create_attempts @@ -588,9 +634,15 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { } } Ok(_) => { + if network.is_some() { + let _ = self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await; + } self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); } Err(Error::Backend { message, .. }) if message.contains("No such container") => { + if network.is_some() { + let _ = self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await; + } self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); } Err(_) => { @@ -881,6 +933,7 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { // recoverable, a container without a record is a leak. self.remove_container(args::remove(&self.namespace, id)) .await?; + self.cleanup_egress(id).await?; self.mark_observed_box_destroyed(id); self.acknowledge_observed_cleanup_for_destroyed_box(id); self.store.remove(id)?; @@ -892,6 +945,15 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { } } +impl DockerSandbox { + async fn cleanup_egress(&self, id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { + if let Some(controller) = &self.egress_controller { + controller.cleanup(self.host.as_ref(), &self.namespace, id).await?; + } + Ok(()) + } +} + fn is_name_conflict(error: &Error) -> bool { matches!(error, Error::Backend { message, .. } if message.contains("container name") && message.contains("already in use")) From 548863d90c3ca229cb9c95010a5d1f7050e014e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:07:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 012/184] style: format egress enforcement and sandbox code Reformat the egress enforcement and sandbox modules to satisfy rustfmt, wrapping long argument lists and error strings and collapsing short ones. No behaviour changes. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 84 ++++++++++++------- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs | 38 ++++++--- .../tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 9 +- crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs | 4 +- 4 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 453b1d63..f3975771 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -4,11 +4,7 @@ //! consumes pinned resolver answers and does not use proxy environment //! variables as an enforcement boundary. -use std::{ - fmt::Debug, - net::IpAddr, - sync::Arc, -}; +use std::{fmt::Debug, net::IpAddr, sync::Arc}; use async_trait::async_trait; use tinybox_core::{ @@ -234,20 +230,16 @@ async fn verify_engine_and_firewall(host: &dyn Host) -> Result<()> { || operating_system.to_ascii_lowercase().contains("desktop") || security.contains("rootless") { - return Err(unsupported("Docker daemon is not a native rootful Linux Engine")); + return Err(unsupported( + "Docker daemon is not a native rootful Linux Engine", + )); } for firewall in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] { for chain in ["DOCKER-USER", "INPUT"] { let output = host .run(&ExecRequest::new([ - "sudo", - "-n", - firewall, - "-w", - "5", - "-S", - chain, + "sudo", "-n", firewall, "-w", "5", "-S", chain, ])) .await?; if !output.succeeded() { @@ -273,7 +265,9 @@ async fn verify_created_network(host: &dyn Host, names: &NetworkNames, id: &BoxI .await?; let expected = format!("bridge|true|{}|{id}", names.bridge); if output != expected { - return Err(unsupported("Docker egress network did not match its verified configuration")); + return Err(unsupported( + "Docker egress network did not match its verified configuration", + )); } Ok(()) } @@ -285,12 +279,31 @@ async fn install_firewall( ) -> Result<()> { install_family(host, "iptables", names, plan, false).await?; install_family(host, "ip6tables", names, plan, true).await?; - verify_hook(host, "iptables", "DOCKER-USER", &names.bridge, &names.forward_chain) - .await?; + verify_hook( + host, + "iptables", + "DOCKER-USER", + &names.bridge, + &names.forward_chain, + ) + .await?; verify_hook(host, "iptables", "INPUT", &names.bridge, &names.input_chain).await?; - verify_hook(host, "ip6tables", "DOCKER-USER", &names.bridge, &names.forward_chain) - .await?; - verify_hook(host, "ip6tables", "INPUT", &names.bridge, &names.input_chain).await?; + verify_hook( + host, + "ip6tables", + "DOCKER-USER", + &names.bridge, + &names.forward_chain, + ) + .await?; + verify_hook( + host, + "ip6tables", + "INPUT", + &names.bridge, + &names.input_chain, + ) + .await?; Ok(()) } @@ -406,12 +419,7 @@ async fn verify_hook( bridge: &str, chain: &str, ) -> Result<()> { - firewall_success( - host, - firewall, - ["-C", parent, "-i", bridge, "-j", chain], - ) - .await + firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-C", parent, "-i", bridge, "-j", chain]).await } async fn cleanup_native( @@ -456,7 +464,9 @@ async fn cleanup_native( } let remaining = firewall_output(host, firewall, ["-S"]).await?; if remaining.lines().any(|line| line.contains(chain)) { - return Err(unsupported("egress firewall chain cleanup was not verified")); + return Err(unsupported( + "egress firewall chain cleanup was not verified", + )); } } } @@ -476,7 +486,9 @@ async fn cleanup_native( if inspect.succeeded() { let owner = inspect.stdout_lossy().trim().to_owned(); if !network_known_owned && owner != id.as_str() { - return Err(unsupported("egress network ownership could not be verified")); + return Err(unsupported( + "egress network ownership could not be verified", + )); } docker_success( host, @@ -515,8 +527,18 @@ where I: IntoIterator, S: AsRef, { - let mut argv = vec!["sudo".to_owned(), "-n".to_owned(), firewall.to_owned(), "-w".to_owned(), "5".to_owned()]; - argv.extend(arguments.into_iter().map(|argument| argument.as_ref().to_owned())); + let mut argv = vec![ + "sudo".to_owned(), + "-n".to_owned(), + firewall.to_owned(), + "-w".to_owned(), + "5".to_owned(), + ]; + argv.extend( + arguments + .into_iter() + .map(|argument| argument.as_ref().to_owned()), + ); let output = host.run(&ExecRequest::new(argv)).await?; if !output.succeeded() { return Err(unsupported("required firewall command failed")); @@ -527,7 +549,9 @@ where async fn docker_output(host: &dyn Host, argv: Vec) -> Result { let output = docker_request(host, force_local_rootful_docker(argv)).await?; if !output.succeeded() { - return Err(unsupported("Docker daemon identity or configuration could not be verified")); + return Err(unsupported( + "Docker daemon identity or configuration could not be verified", + )); } Ok(output.stdout_lossy().trim().to_owned()) } diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs index be3bde27..0da4f651 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs @@ -68,7 +68,11 @@ struct ControllerHost { impl ControllerHost { fn request(&self, request: &ExecRequest) -> ExecRequest { let mut request = request.clone(); - if request.argv.first().is_some_and(|program| program == "docker") { + if request + .argv + .first() + .is_some_and(|program| program == "docker") + { request.argv = self.controller.docker_argv(request.argv); } request @@ -295,12 +299,15 @@ impl DockerSandbox { /// different host. #[must_use] pub fn for_observed_host(&self, host: Arc) -> Self { - let host = self.egress_controller.as_ref().map_or(host.clone(), |controller| { - Arc::new(ControllerHost { - inner: host, - controller: controller.clone(), - }) as Arc - }); + let host = self + .egress_controller + .as_ref() + .map_or(host.clone(), |controller| { + Arc::new(ControllerHost { + inner: host, + controller: controller.clone(), + }) as Arc + }); Self { host, store: self.store.clone(), @@ -326,10 +333,7 @@ impl DockerSandbox { /// host and Docker daemon, and install its default-drop filter before the /// workload starts. #[must_use] - pub fn with_egress_controller( - mut self, - controller: Arc, - ) -> Self { + pub fn with_egress_controller(mut self, controller: Arc) -> Self { self.host = Arc::new(ControllerHost { inner: self.host.clone(), controller: controller.clone(), @@ -581,7 +585,13 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { // Build the command before running anything, so a source this backend // cannot handle leaves no container behind. - let argv = match args::run(&self.namespace, &info.id, &attempt, spec, network.as_deref()) { + let argv = match args::run( + &self.namespace, + &info.id, + &attempt, + spec, + network.as_deref(), + ) { Ok(argv) => argv, Err(error) => { if network.is_some() { @@ -948,7 +958,9 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { impl DockerSandbox { async fn cleanup_egress(&self, id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { if let Some(controller) = &self.egress_controller { - controller.cleanup(self.host.as_ref(), &self.namespace, id).await?; + controller + .cleanup(self.host.as_ref(), &self.namespace, id) + .await?; } Ok(()) } diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 87a4ff4f..8ecf18ac 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -58,9 +58,7 @@ async fn allowlist_controller_prepares_before_start_and_cleans_after_destroy() - .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(RecordingEgressController)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["api.example.test"], [443]); let info = sandbox - .create( - &spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist)), - ) + .create(&spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist))) .await?; let commands = host.commands(); @@ -127,7 +125,10 @@ async fn controller_failure_rolls_back_before_dropping_the_box_record() -> Resul }) )); assert_eq!(store.list()?.len(), 0); - assert_eq!(host.commands(), [["controller", "prepare"], ["controller", "cleanup"]]); + assert_eq!( + host.commands(), + [["controller", "prepare"], ["controller", "cleanup"]] + ); Ok(()) } diff --git a/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs index d4c906f6..1d021d64 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs @@ -3,9 +3,7 @@ use std::sync::Arc; use async_trait::async_trait; -use tinybox_core::{ - Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Forward, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result, -}; +use tinybox_core::{Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Forward, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result}; mod forward; mod observed; From 1b7ea68fe315fb03f15e21e44358c6339fcb3b62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:08:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 013/184] fix(egress): return owned stdout from firewall output The firewall output helper now converts the lossy stdout to an owned value before returning it, so the result no longer borrows from the command output. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index f3975771..a45dced0 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ async fn firewall_output( if !output.succeeded() { return Err(unsupported("required firewall command failed")); } - Ok(output.stdout_lossy()) + Ok(output.stdout_lossy().into_owned()) } async fn firewall_success(host: &dyn Host, firewall: &str, arguments: I) -> Result<()> From 7a460fc7a93877537a6e377b34b77544afc74350 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:08:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 014/184] fix(sandbox): roll back egress state when container creation fails Failed container creates now run a shared rollback path that tears down egress rules and records the attempt for later cleanup when that teardown itself fails, instead of silently discarding the failure record. Egress enforcement also installs allowlist rules only on the forward chain and drops all host-origin traffic on the input chain, so allowlisted destinations no longer apply to traffic originating from the host. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 61 +++++++++-------- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs | 67 ++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index a45dced0..5a81156e 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -321,38 +321,41 @@ async fn install_family( for chain in [&names.forward_chain, &names.input_chain] { firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-N", chain]).await?; - for rule in deny_rules(ipv6) { - let mut command = vec!["-A".to_owned(), (*chain).clone()]; - command.extend(rule); - firewall_success(host, firewall, command.iter().map(String::as_str)).await?; + } + for rule in deny_rules(ipv6) { + let mut command = vec!["-A".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()]; + command.extend(rule); + firewall_success(host, firewall, command.iter().map(String::as_str)).await?; + } + for target in plan.targets() { + let address = target.address(); + if is_ipv6(&address) != ipv6 { + continue; } - for target in plan.targets() { - let address = target.address(); - if is_ipv6(&address) != ipv6 { - continue; - } - for protocol in ["tcp", "udp"] { - firewall_success( - host, - firewall, - [ - "-A", - chain, - "-d", - &address.to_string(), - "-p", - protocol, - "--dport", - &target.port().to_string(), - "-j", - "ACCEPT", - ], - ) - .await?; - } + for protocol in ["tcp", "udp"] { + firewall_success( + host, + firewall, + [ + "-A", + &names.forward_chain, + "-d", + &address.to_string(), + "-p", + protocol, + "--dport", + &target.port().to_string(), + "-j", + "ACCEPT", + ], + ) + .await?; } - firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-A", chain, "-j", "DROP"]).await?; } + firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-A", &names.forward_chain, "-j", "DROP"]).await?; + // Host-origin traffic from the managed bridge is categorically denied. + // Allowlist entries apply only to routed container egress. + firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-A", &names.input_chain, "-j", "DROP"]).await?; firewall_success( host, diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs index 0da4f651..5f164371 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs @@ -575,8 +575,9 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { { Ok(network) => Some(network), Err(error) => { - self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); - return Err(error); + return Err(self + .rollback_failed_egress_create(&info.id, &attempt, error) + .await); } } } else { @@ -595,7 +596,9 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { Ok(argv) => argv, Err(error) => { if network.is_some() { - let _ = self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await; + return Err(self + .rollback_failed_egress_create(&info.id, &attempt, error) + .await); } self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); return Err(error); @@ -609,7 +612,9 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { // Never remove that name: it belongs to the pre-existing owner. if is_name_conflict(&error) { if network.is_some() { - let _ = self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await; + return Err(self + .rollback_failed_egress_create(&info.id, &attempt, error) + .await); } self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); return Err(error); @@ -632,8 +637,17 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { .await .is_ok() { - if network.is_some() { - let _ = self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await; + let cleanup = if network.is_some() { + self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await + } else { + Ok(()) + }; + if cleanup.is_err() { + self.failed_create_attempts + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .insert(info.id.clone(), attempt); + return Err(error); } self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); } else { @@ -645,13 +659,25 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { } Ok(_) => { if network.is_some() { - let _ = self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await; + if self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await.is_err() { + self.failed_create_attempts + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .insert(info.id.clone(), attempt); + return Err(error); + } } self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); } Err(Error::Backend { message, .. }) if message.contains("No such container") => { if network.is_some() { - let _ = self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await; + if self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await.is_err() { + self.failed_create_attempts + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .insert(info.id.clone(), attempt); + return Err(error); + } } self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); } @@ -956,6 +982,31 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { } impl DockerSandbox { + async fn rollback_failed_egress_create( + &self, + id: &BoxId, + attempt: &str, + error: Error, + ) -> Error { + match self.cleanup_egress(id).await { + Ok(()) => { + self.discard_failed_create_record(id, attempt); + error + } + Err(cleanup_error) => { + self.failed_create_attempts + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .insert(id.clone(), attempt.to_owned()); + Error::Backend { + sandbox: NAME.to_owned(), + operation: "roll back egress network setup", + message: format!("{error}; cleanup failed: {cleanup_error}"), + } + } + } + } + async fn cleanup_egress(&self, id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { if let Some(controller) = &self.egress_controller { controller From ad3750cadf049bf47a90a5f2ac26254b6cebfe0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:09:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 015/184] test(sandbox): cover native controller rejecting hosts without local identity Add a test asserting that the native Linux egress controller refuses to create a sandbox when the host has no explicit local identity, returning ConstraintNotEnforced for the network constraint without issuing any host commands. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 31 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 8ecf18ac..f748f158 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -132,6 +132,37 @@ async fn controller_failure_rolls_back_before_dropping_the_box_record() -> Resul Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +async fn native_controller_refuses_hosts_without_explicit_local_identity() -> Result<()> { + #[derive(Debug)] + struct Resolver; + impl crate::EgressResolver for Resolver { + fn resolve(&self, _hostname: &str) -> Result> { + Ok(vec!["203.0.113.7".parse().expect("valid test address")]) + } + } + + let host = ScriptedHost::silent(); + let sandbox = DockerSandbox::new(host.clone(), Arc::new(MemoryStore::new())) + .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(crate::NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new( + Arc::new(Resolver), + ))); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["api.example.test"], [443]); + + assert!(matches!( + sandbox + .create(&spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist))) + .await, + Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + .. + }) + )); + assert!(host.commands().is_empty()); + Ok(()) +} + #[test] fn effective_published_ports_parse_dynamic_and_fixed_bindings() -> Result<()> { let ports = args::parse_published_ports( From bcce19b1f1a79224ac9e71eceea079249a653fb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:09:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 016/184] test(sandbox): use std::io::Result in egress resolver stub Update the test resolver to return std::io::Result so it matches the EgressResolver trait signature. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index f748f158..1e7409cb 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ async fn native_controller_refuses_hosts_without_explicit_local_identity() -> Re #[derive(Debug)] struct Resolver; impl crate::EgressResolver for Resolver { - fn resolve(&self, _hostname: &str) -> Result> { + fn resolve(&self, _hostname: &str) -> std::io::Result> { Ok(vec!["203.0.113.7".parse().expect("valid test address")]) } } From 8acafa7d67243d1b64ac74086be0d00164313eaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:10:19 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 017/184] test(docker): add egress controller imports to live tests Extend the live Docker test imports with BoxId, EgressAllowlist, and the egress controller types so the suite can exercise network policy enforcement against a real daemon. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index d2b204dd..9afd03b8 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -29,10 +29,12 @@ use std::{ }; use tinybox_core::{ - BoxSpec, Error, ExecRequest, Host as _, HostRef, MemoryStore, NetworkPolicy, Placement, Result, - Sandbox, SandboxRef, WorkspaceSource, + BoxId, BoxSpec, EgressAllowlist, Error, ExecRequest, Host as _, HostRef, MemoryStore, + NetworkPolicy, Placement, Result, Sandbox, SandboxRef, WorkspaceSource, +}; +use tinybox_docker::{ + DockerEgressController, DockerSandbox, EgressResolver, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController, }; -use tinybox_docker::DockerSandbox; use tinybox_host::LocalHost; /// The image every live test uses. Small, and it ships a shell. From 40399c2b0fcacd492b43fd6090ca4d05571de07e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:10:51 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 018/184] test(docker): cover native egress allowlist against raw tcp Add a live test that runs two listeners in a test-owned bridge container and checks the native firewall controller permits the allowlisted port while blocking other raw TCP, using a fixed resolver so no public service or Docker host path is involved. The test tears down the sandbox and listener container before asserting so failures do not leak resources. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 141 ++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 136 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 9afd03b8..5f95a268 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -29,12 +29,10 @@ use std::{ }; use tinybox_core::{ - BoxId, BoxSpec, EgressAllowlist, Error, ExecRequest, Host as _, HostRef, MemoryStore, - NetworkPolicy, Placement, Result, Sandbox, SandboxRef, WorkspaceSource, -}; -use tinybox_docker::{ - DockerEgressController, DockerSandbox, EgressResolver, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController, + BoxSpec, EgressAllowlist, Error, ExecRequest, Host as _, HostRef, MemoryStore, NetworkPolicy, + Placement, Result, Sandbox, SandboxRef, WorkspaceSource, }; +use tinybox_docker::{DockerSandbox, EgressResolver, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController}; use tinybox_host::LocalHost; /// The image every live test uses. Small, and it ships a shell. @@ -378,6 +376,139 @@ async fn live_network_policy_controls_host_listener_connectivity() -> Result<()> Ok(()) } +#[derive(Debug)] +struct FixedResolver(std::net::IpAddr); + +impl EgressResolver for FixedResolver { + fn resolve(&self, _hostname: &str) -> std::io::Result> { + Ok(vec![self.0]) + } +} + +fn docker_command(arguments: &[&str]) -> Result { + let output = Command::new("docker") + .args(arguments) + .output() + .map_err(|error| Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "run the controlled egress listener", + message: error.to_string(), + })?; + if !output.status.success() { + return Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "run the controlled egress listener", + message: String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).trim().to_owned(), + }); + } + Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim().to_owned()) +} + +/// A disposable Linux Engine proof for the native firewall controller. +/// +/// Both listeners run in a separate, test-owned bridge container, so this +/// exercises raw TCP from the sandbox without opening a path to the Docker +/// host or relying on a public service. +#[tokio::test] +async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<()> { + if !live_docker_enabled()? { + return Ok(()); + } + + let suffix = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string(); + let target_name = format!("tinybox-egress-target-{}", &suffix[..12]); + const ALLOWED_PORT: &str = "18373"; + const BLOCKED_PORT: &str = "18374"; + let image = docker_command(&[ + "run", + "-d", + "--name", + &target_name, + IMAGE, + "sh", + "-c", + "(while true; do nc -l -p 18373 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed; done) & (while true; do nc -l -p 18374 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/blocked; done) & wait", + ]); + let _ = image?; + let result = async { + let ip = docker_command(&[ + "inspect", + "--format", + "{{range .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{.IPAddress}}{{end}}", + &target_name, + ])? + .parse::() + .map_err(|error| Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "read the controlled listener address", + message: error.to_string(), + })?; + + let resolver: Arc = Arc::new(FixedResolver(ip)); + let sandbox = sandbox(&format!("ns-egress-{}", &suffix[..8]))? + .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(resolver))); + let allowlist = EgressAllowlist::new(["listener.test"], [18373]); + let info = sandbox + .create(&spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist))) + .await?; + + let allowed = sandbox + .exec( + &info.id, + &ExecRequest::new(["sh", "-c", &format!("nc -z -w 3 {ip} {ALLOWED_PORT}")]), + ) + .await; + let blocked = sandbox + .exec( + &info.id, + &ExecRequest::new(["sh", "-c", &format!("nc -z -w 2 {ip} {BLOCKED_PORT}")]), + ) + .await; + let allowed_hits = + docker_command(&["exec", &target_name, "sh", "-c", "test -s /tmp/allowed"]); + let blocked_hits = Command::new("docker") + .args(["exec", &target_name, "sh", "-c", "test ! -s /tmp/blocked"]) + .status() + .map_err(|error| Error::io("check forbidden listener", &error)); + + // Cleanup runs before any assertion is returned to the test harness. + let destroy = sandbox.destroy(&info.id).await; + let allowed = allowed?; + let blocked = blocked?; + destroy?; + allowed_hits?; + let blocked_hits = blocked_hits?; + if allowed.exit_code != 0 || blocked.exit_code == 0 || !blocked_hits.success() { + return Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "verify native egress allowlist", + message: format!( + "allowed exit={}, blocked exit={}, forbidden listener hit={}", + allowed.exit_code, + blocked.exit_code, + !blocked_hits.success() + ), + }); + } + Ok(()) + } + .await; + let cleanup = Command::new("docker") + .args(["rm", "-f", &target_name]) + .status() + .map_err(|error| Error::io("remove controlled listener", &error)); + result?; + let cleanup = cleanup?; + if !cleanup.success() { + return Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "remove controlled listener", + message: "docker rm returned a failure status".to_owned(), + }); + } + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] async fn live_a_memory_limit_is_actually_enforced() -> Result<()> { if !enabled() { From 8025f57a2c4bc919f20ec9aa8458029d1e5924fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:11:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 019/184] test(docker): cover egress rollback and host-gateway allowlist denial Add a unit test asserting that a failed egress cleanup keeps the box record so a later cleanup retry can find it, and extend the live allowlist test to prove that direct raw TCP to the host gateway is refused while the pinned destination still connects. The CI workflow now runs the new live test. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .github/workflows/ci.yml | 10 +++- .../tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 50 +++++++++++++++++++ crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 40 +++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml index c14e2c27..83fecc15 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs: gateway="$(docker network inspect bridge --format '{{(index .IPAM.Config 0).Gateway}}')" test -n "$gateway" echo "Docker bridge gateway: $gateway" - - name: Prove Egress connectivity and default-Denied refusal + - name: Prove Egress, default-Denied, and pinned allowlist connectivity env: TINYBOX_LIVE_DOCKER: "1" TINYBOX_REQUIRE_LIVE_DOCKER: "1" @@ -40,3 +40,11 @@ jobs: cargo test --locked -p tinybox-docker --test live_docker live_network_policy_controls_host_listener_connectivity -- --nocapture --test-threads=1 + - name: Prove native allowlist blocks direct raw TCP outside pinned ports + env: + TINYBOX_LIVE_DOCKER: "1" + TINYBOX_REQUIRE_LIVE_DOCKER: "1" + run: >- + cargo test --locked -p tinybox-docker --test live_docker + live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp -- + --nocapture --test-threads=1 diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 1e7409cb..89a3e7dc 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -163,6 +163,56 @@ async fn native_controller_refuses_hosts_without_explicit_local_identity() -> Re Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +async fn failed_egress_rollback_retains_box_record_for_cleanup_retry() -> Result<()> { + #[derive(Debug)] + struct CleanupFailureController; + + #[async_trait] + impl super::DockerEgressController for CleanupFailureController { + async fn prepare( + &self, + _host: &dyn Host, + _namespace: &str, + _id: &BoxId, + _allowlist: &tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist, + ) -> Result { + Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + sandbox: NAME.to_owned(), + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + }) + } + + async fn cleanup(&self, _host: &dyn Host, _namespace: &str, _id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { + Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: NAME.to_owned(), + operation: "remove test egress filter", + message: "filter unavailable".to_owned(), + }) + } + + fn docker_argv(&self, argv: Vec) -> Vec { + argv + } + } + + let host = ScriptedHost::silent(); + let store = Arc::new(MemoryStore::new()); + let sandbox = DockerSandbox::new(host, store.clone()) + .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(CleanupFailureController)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["api.example.test"], [443]); + + assert!(matches!( + sandbox + .create(&spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist))) + .await, + Err(Error::Backend { message, .. }) if message.contains("cleanup failed") + )); + assert_eq!(store.list()?.len(), 1); + Ok(()) +} + #[test] fn effective_published_ports_parse_dynamic_and_fixed_bindings() -> Result<()> { let ports = args::parse_published_ports( diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 5f95a268..d5fa64aa 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -419,6 +419,18 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( let target_name = format!("tinybox-egress-target-{}", &suffix[..12]); const ALLOWED_PORT: &str = "18373"; const BLOCKED_PORT: &str = "18374"; + let gateway = docker_bridge_gateway()?; + let host_listener = TcpListener::bind((gateway, 0)).map_err(|error| Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "bind the host-gateway negative-control listener", + message: error.to_string(), + })?; + host_listener + .set_nonblocking(true) + .map_err(|error| Error::io("configure host-gateway listener", &error))?; + let host_address = host_listener + .local_addr() + .map_err(|error| Error::io("read host-gateway listener address", &error))?; let image = docker_command(&[ "run", "-d", @@ -464,6 +476,20 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( &ExecRequest::new(["sh", "-c", &format!("nc -z -w 2 {ip} {BLOCKED_PORT}")]), ) .await; + let host_gateway = sandbox + .exec( + &info.id, + &ExecRequest::new([ + "sh", + "-c", + &format!("nc -z -w 2 {} {}", host_address.ip(), host_address.port()), + ]), + ) + .await; + let host_listener_untouched = matches!( + accept_before(&host_listener, Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(250)), + Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut + ); let allowed_hits = docker_command(&["exec", &target_name, "sh", "-c", "test -s /tmp/allowed"]); let blocked_hits = Command::new("docker") @@ -475,18 +501,26 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( let destroy = sandbox.destroy(&info.id).await; let allowed = allowed?; let blocked = blocked?; + let host_gateway = host_gateway?; destroy?; allowed_hits?; let blocked_hits = blocked_hits?; - if allowed.exit_code != 0 || blocked.exit_code == 0 || !blocked_hits.success() { + if allowed.exit_code != 0 + || blocked.exit_code == 0 + || host_gateway.exit_code == 0 + || !blocked_hits.success() + || !host_listener_untouched + { return Err(Error::Backend { sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), operation: "verify native egress allowlist", message: format!( - "allowed exit={}, blocked exit={}, forbidden listener hit={}", + "allowed exit={}, blocked exit={}, host-gateway exit={}, forbidden listener hit={}, host listener touched={}", allowed.exit_code, blocked.exit_code, - !blocked_hits.success() + host_gateway.exit_code, + !blocked_hits.success(), + !host_listener_untouched ), }); } From 67c90734e33c7f05a12a67489c284fa63738ed9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:12:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 020/184] docs(specs): document docker allowlist enforcement The contract and runtime specs now describe the NativeLinuxDockerEgressController, which lets a verified local rootful Linux Docker Engine enforce Allowlist by pinning resolved addresses into default-drop IPv4/IPv6 filters before the workload starts. Other backends and unsupported daemon configurations continue to refuse Allowlist, and the allowlist semantics were reworded to clarify that filtering pins firewall authorization addresses rather than DNS answers. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- docs/specs/contract-1-19.md | 23 ++++++++++++++++------- docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md | 2 +- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md b/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md index 16d7b35b..4e9de9c0 100644 --- a/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md +++ b/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md @@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ least 19, which `tinybox_bus::is_compatible` already enforces. ## Allowlist semantics -- Names are resolved outside the box, once, and pinned. The box gets those - addresses (or a proxy that connects only to them) and no resolver of its own, - so a later DNS answer cannot widen the list. +- Names are resolved before filter installation, once, and the resulting + addresses are pinned into the firewall rules. A later DNS answer cannot widen + the set of destinations the box can reach. - Cloud metadata endpoints (`169.254.169.254`, `169.254.170.2`, `100.100.100.200`, `fd00:ec2::254`, `metadata.google.internal`) are refused when the spec is validated, and a backend must also block them when a name @@ -44,10 +44,19 @@ least 19, which `tinybox_bus::is_compatible` already enforces. ## Status per backend -No shipped backend enforces `Allowlist` yet: `passthrough`, `docker`, -`namespace` and `microvm` all refuse it. Enforcement (netns + nftables or an -egress proxy, Seatbelt or proxy, AppContainer or WFP) is tracked under -tinybox#27 phase 3. +`docker` can enforce `Allowlist` only when explicitly configured with +`NativeLinuxDockerEgressController` and a local, rootful Linux Docker Engine +whose firewall chains can be verified. It resolves names before creating the +per-box bridge, installs default-drop IPv4 and IPv6 filters before `docker run`, +and permits only pinned destination IP/port pairs. Traffic from that bridge to +the Docker host is dropped. The ordinary Docker sandbox continues to refuse +allowlists unless this controller is installed. + +Docker Desktop, Windows, remote or unknown Hosts, rootless daemons, and daemons +without the required firewall support refuse `Allowlist` as Unsupported. +`passthrough`, `namespace` and `microvm` continue to refuse it. The filter does +not claim to filter DNS answers; it pins the addresses used for firewall +authorization, so later answers cannot expand reachable destinations. ## Deprecated diff --git a/docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md b/docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md index 6e22aa80..18cb6069 100644 --- a/docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md +++ b/docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ composition in M4. ADR 0004 records the tradeoff. | `Snapshot` | The committed image. | | `GitRepo` | Refused by name — no clone step exists yet. | | Limits | `--memory`, `--cpus`, `--pids-limit`. Disk is **not** applied: `--storage-opt size=` works on a minority of storage drivers, and a flag that silently does nothing on most systems is worse than an honest omission. | -| Network | `Denied` → `--network none`. Docker has no outbound-only mode, so `Egress` uses the default bridge; nothing is published inbound because tinybox never passes `--publish`. | +| Network | `Denied` → `--network none`. Docker has no outbound-only mode, so `Egress` uses the default bridge. `Allowlist` requires an explicitly installed `NativeLinuxDockerEgressController` on a verified local rootful Linux Engine; it installs default-drop IPv4/IPv6 rules before the workload starts and allows only pinned IP/port pairs. Docker host destinations are blocked. Desktop, remote, rootless, Windows, and unverified daemon configurations refuse it. | | State | Read from `docker inspect`, not from the store. A container can be stopped or removed by anything with daemon access, and reporting a stale `ready` would send commands to a box that is gone. Docker's `running` maps to `Ready`, because a tinybox box is `Running` only while a command executes and the keepalive loop is not a command. | `Sandbox::exec_observed` runs `docker exec -i` through the same `Host`, so From 2692fff6d7c1653e0c45d9eeaad7f6eef6877817 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:13:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 021/184] test(sandbox): cover unknown and remote host locations The native egress controller test now exercises both unknown and remote execution locations instead of only the default, and the scripted host gains a configurable execution location so the refusal path is verified for each case. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 48 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 89a3e7dc..3a8712e8 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ use std::sync::{ use async_trait::async_trait; use tinybox_core::{ BoxId, BoxSpec, BoxState, Capability, Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, HostRef, - IsolationLevel, MemoryStore, NetworkPolicy, Placement, PortMapping, Resources, Result, Sandbox, - SandboxRef, SnapshotId, SnapshotSupport, Store, WorkspaceSource, + HostExecutionLocation, IsolationLevel, MemoryStore, NetworkPolicy, Placement, PortMapping, + Resources, Result, Sandbox, SandboxRef, SnapshotId, SnapshotSupport, Store, WorkspaceSource, }; use super::{DockerSandbox, NAME, args, cleanup_timeout_error, state}; @@ -142,24 +142,29 @@ async fn native_controller_refuses_hosts_without_explicit_local_identity() -> Re } } - let host = ScriptedHost::silent(); - let sandbox = DockerSandbox::new(host.clone(), Arc::new(MemoryStore::new())) - .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(crate::NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new( - Arc::new(Resolver), - ))); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["api.example.test"], [443]); - - assert!(matches!( - sandbox - .create(&spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist))) - .await, - Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { - constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, - enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, - .. - }) - )); - assert!(host.commands().is_empty()); + for location in [HostExecutionLocation::Unknown, HostExecutionLocation::Remote] { + let host = Arc::new(ScriptedHost { + location: Some(location), + ..ScriptedHost::default() + }); + let sandbox = DockerSandbox::new(host.clone(), Arc::new(MemoryStore::new())) + .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(crate::NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new( + Arc::new(Resolver), + ))); + + assert!(matches!( + sandbox + .create(&spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist.clone()))) + .await, + Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + .. + }) + )); + assert!(host.commands().is_empty()); + } Ok(()) } @@ -247,6 +252,7 @@ struct ScriptedHost { replies: Mutex>, seen: Mutex>>, seen_env: Mutex>>, + location: Option, cancel_observed: AtomicBool, refuse_observed: AtomicBool, block_observed: AtomicBool, @@ -314,6 +320,10 @@ impl Host for ScriptedHost { "scripted" } + fn execution_location(&self) -> HostExecutionLocation { + self.location.unwrap_or(HostExecutionLocation::Unknown) + } + async fn run(&self, request: &ExecRequest) -> Result { self.seen().push(request.argv.clone()); self.seen_env From a08371edf64a2a6d6d6efcd162cf2145934d9ff4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:13:11 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 022/184] test(sandbox): reformat imports and loop array Reformat the tinybox-core import list and the host execution location array in the sandbox tests to satisfy rustfmt. No behaviour changes. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 3a8712e8..2e107c2b 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -16,9 +16,10 @@ use std::sync::{ use async_trait::async_trait; use tinybox_core::{ - BoxId, BoxSpec, BoxState, Capability, Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, HostRef, - HostExecutionLocation, IsolationLevel, MemoryStore, NetworkPolicy, Placement, PortMapping, - Resources, Result, Sandbox, SandboxRef, SnapshotId, SnapshotSupport, Store, WorkspaceSource, + BoxId, BoxSpec, BoxState, Capability, Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, + HostExecutionLocation, HostRef, IsolationLevel, MemoryStore, NetworkPolicy, Placement, + PortMapping, Resources, Result, Sandbox, SandboxRef, SnapshotId, SnapshotSupport, Store, + WorkspaceSource, }; use super::{DockerSandbox, NAME, args, cleanup_timeout_error, state}; @@ -143,7 +144,10 @@ async fn native_controller_refuses_hosts_without_explicit_local_identity() -> Re } let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["api.example.test"], [443]); - for location in [HostExecutionLocation::Unknown, HostExecutionLocation::Remote] { + for location in [ + HostExecutionLocation::Unknown, + HostExecutionLocation::Remote, + ] { let host = Arc::new(ScriptedHost { location: Some(location), ..ScriptedHost::default() From 71fe94276fd079225440f50220ce55fbb4389c62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:13:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 023/184] test(tinybox-docker): unset proxy vars in live allowlist probes The live allowlist test now clears HTTP_PROXY and related environment variables before running its nc probes, so an inherited proxy setting cannot redirect the connections and mask the allowlist behaviour under test. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index d5fa64aa..355e9e08 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -467,13 +467,21 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( let allowed = sandbox .exec( &info.id, - &ExecRequest::new(["sh", "-c", &format!("nc -z -w 3 {ip} {ALLOWED_PORT}")]), + &ExecRequest::new([ + "sh", + "-c", + &format!("unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nc -z -w 3 {ip} {ALLOWED_PORT}"), + ]), ) .await; let blocked = sandbox .exec( &info.id, - &ExecRequest::new(["sh", "-c", &format!("nc -z -w 2 {ip} {BLOCKED_PORT}")]), + &ExecRequest::new([ + "sh", + "-c", + &format!("unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nc -z -w 2 {ip} {BLOCKED_PORT}"), + ]), ) .await; let host_gateway = sandbox @@ -482,7 +490,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( &ExecRequest::new([ "sh", "-c", - &format!("nc -z -w 2 {} {}", host_address.ip(), host_address.port()), + &format!("unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nc -z -w 2 {} {}", host_address.ip(), host_address.port()), ]), ) .await; From 7be99217656408765f5862f5cc5cba96296284d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:15:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 024/184] test(docker): run pinned allowlist proof in hosted live lane Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .github/workflows/ci.yml | 10 +--------- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml index 83fecc15..c14e2c27 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs: gateway="$(docker network inspect bridge --format '{{(index .IPAM.Config 0).Gateway}}')" test -n "$gateway" echo "Docker bridge gateway: $gateway" - - name: Prove Egress, default-Denied, and pinned allowlist connectivity + - name: Prove Egress connectivity and default-Denied refusal env: TINYBOX_LIVE_DOCKER: "1" TINYBOX_REQUIRE_LIVE_DOCKER: "1" @@ -40,11 +40,3 @@ jobs: cargo test --locked -p tinybox-docker --test live_docker live_network_policy_controls_host_listener_connectivity -- --nocapture --test-threads=1 - - name: Prove native allowlist blocks direct raw TCP outside pinned ports - env: - TINYBOX_LIVE_DOCKER: "1" - TINYBOX_REQUIRE_LIVE_DOCKER: "1" - run: >- - cargo test --locked -p tinybox-docker --test live_docker - live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp -- - --nocapture --test-threads=1 diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 355e9e08..a4f75648 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ async fn live_network_policy_controls_host_listener_connectivity() -> Result<()> no_denied_connection, "default-Denied container established a connection to the controlled listener" ); + live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp().await?; Ok(()) } @@ -409,7 +410,6 @@ fn docker_command(arguments: &[&str]) -> Result { /// Both listeners run in a separate, test-owned bridge container, so this /// exercises raw TCP from the sandbox without opening a path to the Docker /// host or relying on a public service. -#[tokio::test] async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<()> { if !live_docker_enabled()? { return Ok(()); From c5b304fe38ab872c4918c3e579d885841dca3fde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:24:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 025/184] test(egress): wire up egress enforcement test module Add a cfg(test) module declaration pointing at the new egress_enforcement_tests.rs file so the egress controller tests are compiled and run. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 4 + .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 102 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 106 insertions(+) create mode 100644 crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 5a81156e..f430c905 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ impl NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { } } +#[cfg(test)] +#[path = "egress_enforcement_tests.rs"] +mod tests; + #[async_trait] impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { async fn validate_host(&self, host: &dyn Host) -> Result<()> { diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cc15b56b --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +//! Tests for native Docker egress filter capability checks. + +use std::{ + net::IpAddr, + sync::{Arc, Mutex}, +}; + +use async_trait::async_trait; +use tinybox_core::{Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result}; + +use super::{DockerEgressController, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController}; +use crate::EgressResolver; + +#[derive(Debug)] +struct FakeNativeHost { + missing_forward_hook: &'static str, + commands: Mutex>>, +} + +impl FakeNativeHost { + fn new(missing_forward_hook: &'static str) -> Self { + Self { + missing_forward_hook, + commands: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + } + } + + fn commands(&self) -> Vec> { + self.commands + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .clone() + } +} + +#[async_trait] +impl Host for FakeNativeHost { + fn name(&self) -> &str { + "fake-native" + } + + fn execution_location(&self) -> HostExecutionLocation { + HostExecutionLocation::Local + } + + async fn run(&self, request: &ExecRequest) -> Result { + self.commands + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .push(request.argv.clone()); + + let is_missing_hook = request.argv.iter().any(|part| part == "-C") + && request.argv.iter().any(|part| part == "FORWARD") + && request.argv.iter().any(|part| part == "DOCKER-USER") + && request + .argv + .iter() + .any(|part| part == self.missing_forward_hook); + if request.argv.iter().any(|part| part == "docker") { + return Ok(ExecOutput::new( + 0, + b"linux|Ubuntu 26.04|[]".to_vec(), + Vec::new(), + )); + } + if is_missing_hook { + return Ok(ExecOutput::new(1, Vec::new(), b"rule not found".to_vec())); + } + Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, b"chain exists\n".to_vec(), Vec::new())) + } +} + +#[derive(Debug)] +struct Resolver; + +impl EgressResolver for Resolver { + fn resolve(&self, _hostname: &str) -> std::io::Result> { + Ok(vec!["203.0.113.8".parse().expect("test IP is valid")]) + } +} + +#[tokio::test] +async fn missing_forward_hook_refuses_native_egress_before_resource_creation() { + for firewall in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] { + let host = FakeNativeHost::new(firewall); + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + + assert!(matches!( + controller.validate_host(&host).await, + Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + .. + }) + )); + assert!( + host.commands() + .iter() + .all(|argv| !argv.contains(&"create".to_owned())) + ); + } +} From 7e95600c10f3ee6964513f48a6b9720b1257e0f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:24:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 026/184] fix(egress): verify docker forward hook is first in the chain The engine and firewall check now inspects the FORWARD chain and rejects setups where the DOCKER-USER jump is missing or preceded by another rule, since egress filtering would otherwise be bypassed. The fake host in the tests was extended to answer FORWARD rule listings so this case can be exercised. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 7 +++++++ .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 15 +++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index f430c905..6958bb1d 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -250,6 +250,13 @@ async fn verify_engine_and_firewall(host: &dyn Host) -> Result<()> { return Err(unsupported("required root firewall chains are unavailable")); } } + let forward = firewall_output(host, firewall, ["-S", "FORWARD"]).await?; + let first_rule = forward.lines().find(|line| line.starts_with("-A FORWARD ")); + if first_rule != Some("-A FORWARD -j DOCKER-USER") { + return Err(unsupported( + "Docker egress firewall hook is missing or ordered after another FORWARD rule", + )); + } } Ok(()) } diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index cc15b56b..ce015d58 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -66,6 +66,21 @@ impl Host for FakeNativeHost { if is_missing_hook { return Ok(ExecOutput::new(1, Vec::new(), b"rule not found".to_vec())); } + if request.argv.iter().any(|part| part == "FORWARD") + && request.argv.iter().any(|part| part == "-S") + { + let firewall = if request.argv.iter().any(|part| part == "ip6tables") { + "ip6tables" + } else { + "iptables" + }; + let rules = if firewall == self.missing_forward_hook { + "-P FORWARD DROP\n-A FORWARD -j DOCKER-FORWARD\n" + } else { + "-P FORWARD DROP\n-A FORWARD -j DOCKER-USER\n-A FORWARD -j DOCKER-FORWARD\n" + }; + return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, rules.as_bytes().to_vec(), Vec::new())); + } Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, b"chain exists\n".to_vec(), Vec::new())) } } From 61725399ec6f245619337c276e6dbfe321bc0aa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:25:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 027/184] refactor(sandbox): extract create rollback and network policy helpers The create path in DockerSandbox now delegates network policy validation, egress preparation, and failure rollback to dedicated helper methods, so the main flow reads as a sequence of steps rather than nested error handling. The egress controller doc comment was also reworded to use code formatting for DockerSandbox. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 2 +- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs | 132 ++---------------- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 123 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 6958bb1d..33b12d49 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ const OWNER_LABEL: &str = "ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.owner"; /// Implementations are trusted security components. A controller must verify /// that it acts on the same daemon and host that run the box, install a /// default-drop filter before returning from [`prepare`](Self::prepare), and -/// make [`cleanup`](Self::cleanup) idempotent. DockerSandbox uses +/// make [`cleanup`](Self::cleanup) idempotent. `DockerSandbox` uses /// [`docker_argv`](Self::docker_argv) for every Docker command while the /// controller is installed, so lifecycle operations address the same daemon. #[async_trait] diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs index 5f164371..dd847638 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs @@ -526,23 +526,7 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { async fn create(&self, spec: &BoxSpec) -> Result { spec.validate()?; - let allowlist = match &spec.network { - NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist) => { - let controller = self.egress_controller.as_ref().ok_or_else(|| { - Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { - sandbox: NAME.to_owned(), - constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, - enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, - } - })?; - controller.validate_host(self.host.as_ref()).await?; - Some(allowlist) - } - _ => { - spec.network.refuse_allowlist(self.name())?; - None - } - }; + self.validate_network_policy(spec).await?; // The workspace is bind-mounted read-write, so it gets the one-shot // mount policy before any record or container exists. // ponytail: through an SSH host the daemon's filesystem is remote, so @@ -565,23 +549,9 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { // Resolve and install the default-drop filter before Docker starts the // image entrypoint. The controller is the only path that can make an // allowlist runnable. - let network = if let Some(allowlist) = allowlist { - match self - .egress_controller - .as_ref() - .expect("allowlist requires a controller") - .prepare(self.host.as_ref(), &self.namespace, &info.id, allowlist) - .await - { - Ok(network) => Some(network), - Err(error) => { - return Err(self - .rollback_failed_egress_create(&info.id, &attempt, error) - .await); - } - } - } else { - None + let network = match self.prepare_egress_network(spec, &info.id, &attempt).await { + Ok(network) => network, + Err(error) => return Err(error), }; // Build the command before running anything, so a source this backend @@ -595,100 +565,18 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { ) { Ok(argv) => argv, Err(error) => { - if network.is_some() { - return Err(self - .rollback_failed_egress_create(&info.id, &attempt, error) - .await); - } - self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); - return Err(error); + return Err(self + .rollback_failed_create(&info.id, &attempt, network.is_some(), error) + .await); } }; let mut create = ExecRequest::new(argv); create.env.clone_from(&spec.env); if let Err(error) = self.docker_request("create the container", create).await { - // Docker reports a name collision before creating a container. - // Never remove that name: it belongs to the pre-existing owner. - if is_name_conflict(&error) { - if network.is_some() { - return Err(self - .rollback_failed_egress_create(&info.id, &attempt, error) - .await); - } - self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); - return Err(error); - } - - // A lost response can hide a successful create. Reconcile only - // after the daemon confirms this exact attempt token; otherwise a - // deterministic name may refer to another store's container with - // the same box id. - match self - .docker( - "inspect the failed create", - args::inspect_attempt(&self.namespace, &info.id), - ) - .await - { - Ok(owner) if owner == attempt => { - if self - .remove_container(args::remove(&self.namespace, &info.id)) - .await - .is_ok() - { - let cleanup = if network.is_some() { - self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await - } else { - Ok(()) - }; - if cleanup.is_err() { - self.failed_create_attempts - .lock() - .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .insert(info.id.clone(), attempt); - return Err(error); - } - self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); - } else { - self.failed_create_attempts - .lock() - .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .insert(info.id.clone(), attempt); - } - } - Ok(_) => { - if network.is_some() { - if self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await.is_err() { - self.failed_create_attempts - .lock() - .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .insert(info.id.clone(), attempt); - return Err(error); - } - } - self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); - } - Err(Error::Backend { message, .. }) if message.contains("No such container") => { - if network.is_some() { - if self.cleanup_egress(&info.id).await.is_err() { - self.failed_create_attempts - .lock() - .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .insert(info.id.clone(), attempt); - return Err(error); - } - } - self.discard_failed_create_record(&info.id, &attempt); - } - Err(_) => { - self.failed_create_attempts - .lock() - .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .insert(info.id.clone(), attempt); - } - } - return Err(error); + return Err(self + .reconcile_failed_create(&info.id, &attempt, network.is_some(), error) + .await); } self.failed_create_attempts .lock() From 01e03ea5c093e55c5fe708797090a37b5aa3bd72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:26:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 028/184] refactor(sandbox): extract egress and failed-create helpers Move the network policy validation, egress preparation, and failed-create rollback logic into dedicated methods on DockerSandbox so the create path reads as a sequence of named steps. The new reconcile_failed_create helper inspects the container to decide whether cleanup is safe, and a shared unsupported_egress_policy constructor replaces the inline error. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 141 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs index dd847638..56ce348b 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs @@ -224,6 +224,136 @@ impl ExecutionObserver for DockerExecutionObserver { pub const DEFAULT_NAMESPACE: &str = "default"; impl DockerSandbox { + async fn validate_network_policy(&self, spec: &BoxSpec) -> Result<()> { + if let NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(_) = &spec.network { + let Some(controller) = &self.egress_controller else { + return Err(unsupported_egress_policy()); + }; + controller.validate_host(self.host.as_ref()).await?; + } else { + spec.network.refuse_allowlist(self.name())?; + } + Ok(()) + } + + async fn prepare_egress_network( + &self, + spec: &BoxSpec, + id: &BoxId, + attempt: &str, + ) -> Result> { + let NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist) = &spec.network else { + return Ok(None); + }; + let Some(controller) = &self.egress_controller else { + return Err(self + .rollback_failed_egress_create(id, attempt, unsupported_egress_policy()) + .await); + }; + match controller + .prepare(self.host.as_ref(), &self.namespace, id, allowlist) + .await + { + Ok(network) => Ok(Some(network)), + Err(error) => Err(self.rollback_failed_egress_create(id, attempt, error).await), + } + } + + async fn rollback_failed_create( + &self, + id: &BoxId, + attempt: &str, + has_egress_network: bool, + error: Error, + ) -> Error { + if has_egress_network { + self.rollback_failed_egress_create(id, attempt, error).await + } else { + self.discard_failed_create_record(id, attempt); + error + } + } + + async fn reconcile_failed_create( + &self, + id: &BoxId, + attempt: &str, + has_egress_network: bool, + error: Error, + ) -> Error { + if is_name_conflict(&error) { + return self + .rollback_failed_create(id, attempt, has_egress_network, error) + .await; + } + + match self + .docker( + "inspect the failed create", + args::inspect_attempt(&self.namespace, id), + ) + .await + { + Ok(owner) if owner == attempt => { + if self + .remove_container(args::remove(&self.namespace, id)) + .await + .is_err() + { + self.remember_failed_create_attempt(id, attempt); + return error; + } + if !self + .cleanup_failed_egress_network(id, attempt, has_egress_network) + .await + { + return error; + } + self.discard_failed_create_record(id, attempt); + } + Ok(_) => { + if !self + .cleanup_failed_egress_network(id, attempt, has_egress_network) + .await + { + return error; + } + self.discard_failed_create_record(id, attempt); + } + Err(Error::Backend { message, .. }) if message.contains("No such container") => { + if !self + .cleanup_failed_egress_network(id, attempt, has_egress_network) + .await + { + return error; + } + self.discard_failed_create_record(id, attempt); + } + Err(_) => self.remember_failed_create_attempt(id, attempt), + } + error + } + + async fn cleanup_failed_egress_network( + &self, + id: &BoxId, + attempt: &str, + has_egress_network: bool, + ) -> bool { + if has_egress_network && self.cleanup_egress(id).await.is_err() { + self.remember_failed_create_attempt(id, attempt); + return false; + } + true + } + + fn remember_failed_create_attempt(&self, id: &BoxId, attempt: &str) { + self.failed_create_attempts + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .insert(id.clone(), attempt.to_owned()); + } + /// Run containers via `docker` on `host`, recording boxes in `store`. /// /// Uses [`DEFAULT_NAMESPACE`]. Two stores on one machine that both allocate @@ -549,10 +679,9 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { // Resolve and install the default-drop filter before Docker starts the // image entrypoint. The controller is the only path that can make an // allowlist runnable. - let network = match self.prepare_egress_network(spec, &info.id, &attempt).await { - Ok(network) => network, - Err(error) => return Err(error), - }; + let network = self + .prepare_egress_network(spec, &info.id, &attempt) + .await?; // Build the command before running anything, so a source this backend // cannot handle leaves no container behind. @@ -910,6 +1039,14 @@ fn is_name_conflict(error: &Error) -> bool { if message.contains("container name") && message.contains("already in use")) } +fn unsupported_egress_policy() -> Error { + Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + sandbox: NAME.to_owned(), + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + } +} + fn lock(mutex: &Mutex) -> MutexGuard<'_, T> { mutex.lock().unwrap_or_else(PoisonError::into_inner) } From 8b38bdac4971907af511a2cd0759920623391e2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:26:59 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 029/184] test(tinybox-ssh): bind inner host in name test The recording host's inner value was discarded with an underscore prefix even though the test needs it to inspect recorded calls. Renaming it to `inner` keeps the binding available for assertions. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs index 6848d529..b18bc2a0 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ fn last_argv(inner: &RecordingHost) -> Vec { #[test] fn it_reports_its_name() -> Result<()> { - let (host, _inner) = host()?; + let (host, inner) = host()?; assert_eq!(host.name(), "ssh"); assert_eq!(host.name(), NAME); From 360aa64a86eb704fcdf1e779eeb8dc39846f2e00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:27:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 030/184] test: construct test ip addresses without parsing strings Test resolvers now build their addresses directly from octets instead of parsing string literals, removing the expect calls that could panic if a literal were ever mistyped. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 2 +- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index ce015d58..8be79bad 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ struct Resolver; impl EgressResolver for Resolver { fn resolve(&self, _hostname: &str) -> std::io::Result> { - Ok(vec!["203.0.113.8".parse().expect("test IP is valid")]) + Ok(vec![IpAddr::from([203, 0, 113, 8])]) } } diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 2e107c2b..7b5c879e 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -139,7 +139,9 @@ async fn native_controller_refuses_hosts_without_explicit_local_identity() -> Re struct Resolver; impl crate::EgressResolver for Resolver { fn resolve(&self, _hostname: &str) -> std::io::Result> { - Ok(vec!["203.0.113.7".parse().expect("valid test address")]) + Ok(vec![std::net::IpAddr::V4(std::net::Ipv4Addr::new( + 203, 0, 113, 7, + ))]) } } From 6b0e24f58e5d7cbc15cc7ac189fc384c70d8a2c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:27:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 031/184] chore(deps): update tokio and pin windows-sys to 0.52.0 Bump tokio from 1.53.1 to 1.53.3 and downgrade the windows-sys dependency of several crates from 0.61.2 to 0.52.0 to keep the lockfile consistent. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- Cargo.lock | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lock index 195f7c15..62d57104 100644 --- a/Cargo.lock +++ b/Cargo.lock @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "39cab71617ae0d63f51a36d69f866391735b51691dbda63cf6f96d042b63efeb" dependencies = [ "libc", - "windows-sys 0.61.2", + "windows-sys 0.52.0", ] [[package]] @@ -979,7 +979,7 @@ dependencies = [ "errno", "libc", "linux-raw-sys", - "windows-sys 0.61.2", + "windows-sys 0.52.0", ] [[package]] @@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@ dependencies = [ "getrandom 0.3.4", "once_cell", "rustix", - "windows-sys 0.61.2", + "windows-sys 0.52.0", ] [[package]] @@ -1637,9 +1637,9 @@ dependencies = [ [[package]] name = "tokio" -version = "1.53.1" +version = "1.53.3" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" -checksum = "202caea871b69668250d242070849eb495be178ed697a3e98aebce5bc81a0bed" +checksum = "ce3335fa71841cda333a58d7615b03901380ecf09d59b3296d21f8bbac0dde4e" dependencies = [ "bytes", "libc", @@ -1941,7 +1941,7 @@ version = "0.1.11" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "c2a7b1c03c876122aa43f3020e6c3c3ee5c05081c9a00739faf7503aeba10d22" dependencies = [ - "windows-sys 0.61.2", + "windows-sys 0.52.0", ] [[package]] From 043b3624f83d7d1c130b029f01a7e4a7804cd7fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:29:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 032/184] test(sandbox): cover destroy refusal for persisted allowlist without controller Add a test asserting that destroying a sandbox with a persisted allowlist fails with ConstraintNotEnforced when the reconstructed sandbox has no egress controller, and that no host commands run and the store record is left intact. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 26 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 7b5c879e..9369c3a6 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -75,6 +75,32 @@ async fn allowlist_controller_prepares_before_start_and_cleans_after_destroy() - Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +async fn destroying_persisted_allowlist_without_controller_refuses_before_removal() -> Result<()> { + let host = ScriptedHost::silent(); + let store = Arc::new(MemoryStore::new()); + let sandbox = DockerSandbox::new(host.clone(), store.clone()) + .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(RecordingEgressController)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["api.example.test"], [443]); + let info = sandbox + .create(&spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist))) + .await?; + let commands_before_destroy = host.commands(); + let reconstructed = DockerSandbox::new(host.clone(), store.clone()); + + assert!(matches!( + reconstructed.destroy(&info.id).await, + Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + .. + }) + )); + assert_eq!(host.commands(), commands_before_destroy); + assert_eq!(store.list()?.len(), 1); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] async fn controller_failure_rolls_back_before_dropping_the_box_record() -> Result<()> { #[derive(Debug)] From 3af991c1f08a2bbc02edcd82411ab7ef3f611378 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:29:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 033/184] fix(sandbox): reject destroy for allowlist boxes without egress controller Destroy now fails early when a box uses an allowlist network policy but no egress controller is configured, matching the check already applied at creation time. This prevents tearing down a box whose egress rules could not have been enforced. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs index 56ce348b..fd4ab7fc 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs @@ -955,7 +955,12 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { async fn destroy(&self, id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { // Fail on an unknown box before touching Docker. - self.store.get(id)?; + let info = self.store.get(id)?; + if matches!(info.spec.network, NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(_)) + && self.egress_controller.is_none() + { + return Err(unsupported_egress_policy()); + } let attempt = self .failed_create_attempts .lock() From d5b1cda3ae9b14a5d14ade73423215cd57c1b922 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:29:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 034/184] fix(limited): silence deprecation warning for async pipe registration The deprecated AsyncFd constructor is still used because the workspace forbids unsafe code, and the owned File is moved directly into AsyncFd so its descriptor remains valid until drop. An allow attribute with an explanatory comment documents why the warning is suppressed. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs b/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs index a3a081a9..ed5f5b5e 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs @@ -27,9 +27,13 @@ fn async_pipe(file: std::fs::File) -> Result { use nix::fcntl::fcntl; set_nonblocking_with(&file, |descriptor, argument| fcntl(descriptor, argument))?; - tokio::io::unix::AsyncFd::new(file) - .map(AsyncPipe) - .map_err(|error| Error::io("register native pipe", &error)) + // The deprecated constructor is retained because this workspace forbids + // unsafe code. `file` is an owned `std::fs::File` moved directly into + // AsyncFd, so its descriptor stays valid until AsyncFd is dropped. + #[allow(deprecated)] + let async_fd = tokio::io::unix::AsyncFd::new(file) + .map_err(|error| Error::io("register native pipe", &error))?; + Ok(AsyncPipe(async_fd)) } #[cfg(not(unix))] { From 06e16f09719af8cbb6689eca27e9a817ad17ea42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:31:07 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 035/184] fix(egress): verify docker bridge link before installing firewall Enforcement now checks that the Docker bridge interface is visible in the local network namespace before installing firewall rules, refusing with an unsupported constraint error when it is not. The allowlist protocol list was also extracted into a shared constant. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 30 ++++++++- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 65 ++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 33b12d49..a8da4953 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ use crate::{EgressResolver, PinnedEgressPlan, plan_egress_allowlist}; const DOCKER_SOCKET: &str = "unix:///var/run/docker.sock"; const OWNER_LABEL: &str = "ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.owner"; +const ALLOWLIST_PROTOCOLS: [&str; 2] = ["tcp", "udp"]; /// A controller that installs and removes a per-box egress filter. /// @@ -122,6 +123,7 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { let setup = async { verify_created_network(host, &names, id).await?; + verify_created_bridge_link(host, &names).await?; install_firewall(host, &names, &plan).await } .await; @@ -283,6 +285,32 @@ async fn verify_created_network(host: &dyn Host, names: &NetworkNames, id: &BoxI Ok(()) } +async fn verify_created_bridge_link(host: &dyn Host, names: &NetworkNames) -> Result<()> { + let output = host + .run(&ExecRequest::new([ + "ip", + "-o", + "link", + "show", + "dev", + &names.bridge, + ])) + .await + .map_err(|_| unsupported("Docker bridge is not visible in the local network namespace"))?; + let interface_exists = output.succeeded() + && output.stdout_lossy().lines().any(|line| { + line.split_whitespace() + .nth(1) + .is_some_and(|name| name.trim_end_matches(':') == names.bridge) + }); + if !interface_exists { + return Err(unsupported( + "Docker bridge is not visible in the local network namespace", + )); + } + Ok(()) +} + async fn install_firewall( host: &dyn Host, names: &NetworkNames, @@ -343,7 +371,7 @@ async fn install_family( if is_ipv6(&address) != ipv6 { continue; } - for protocol in ["tcp", "udp"] { + for protocol in ALLOWLIST_PROTOCOLS { firewall_success( host, firewall, diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 8be79bad..29c9413b 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -6,9 +6,12 @@ use std::{ }; use async_trait::async_trait; -use tinybox_core::{Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result}; +use tinybox_core::{BoxId, Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result}; -use super::{DockerEgressController, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController}; +use super::{ + DockerEgressController, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController, NetworkNames, + verify_created_bridge_link, +}; use crate::EgressResolver; #[derive(Debug)] @@ -94,6 +97,64 @@ impl EgressResolver for Resolver { } } +#[derive(Debug)] +struct BridgeLinkHost { + exists: bool, +} + +#[async_trait] +impl Host for BridgeLinkHost { + fn name(&self) -> &str { + "bridge-link-host" + } + + fn execution_location(&self) -> HostExecutionLocation { + HostExecutionLocation::Local + } + + async fn run(&self, request: &ExecRequest) -> Result { + let bridge = request.argv.last().map_or("", String::as_str); + if self.exists { + Ok(ExecOutput::new( + 0, + format!("17: {bridge}: \n").into_bytes(), + Vec::new(), + )) + } else { + Ok(ExecOutput::new(1, Vec::new(), b"Device not found".to_vec())) + } + } +} + +#[test] +fn allowlist_protocol_set_is_tcp_only() { + assert_eq!(super::ALLOWLIST_PROTOCOLS, ["tcp"]); +} + +#[tokio::test] +async fn missing_local_bridge_link_refuses_enforcement() -> Result<()> { + let names = NetworkNames::for_box("test", &BoxId::new("box-0")?); + let host = BridgeLinkHost { exists: false }; + + assert!(matches!( + verify_created_bridge_link(&host, &names).await, + Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + .. + }) + )); + Ok(()) +} + +#[tokio::test] +async fn existing_local_bridge_link_is_verified() -> Result<()> { + let names = NetworkNames::for_box("test", &BoxId::new("box-0")?); + let host = BridgeLinkHost { exists: true }; + + verify_created_bridge_link(&host, &names).await +} + #[tokio::test] async fn missing_forward_hook_refuses_native_egress_before_resource_creation() { for firewall in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] { From 5ce2df0b99261b37d2753b87b6633f1fd20baec7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:31:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 036/184] test(egress): compare allowlist protocols by slice Adjust the assertion to compare the allowlist protocols as a slice so the test compiles regardless of the constant's array type. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 29c9413b..7064982d 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ impl Host for BridgeLinkHost { #[test] fn allowlist_protocol_set_is_tcp_only() { - assert_eq!(super::ALLOWLIST_PROTOCOLS, ["tcp"]); + assert_eq!(&super::ALLOWLIST_PROTOCOLS[..], &["tcp"]); } #[tokio::test] From 6e3226e2f4f019d4e643d60042267abf58c9efd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:31:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 037/184] fix(egress): restrict allowlist protocols to tcp Drop udp from the allowlist protocols so egress rules are only installed for tcp, matching the intended enforcement scope. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index a8da4953..34804c9c 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ use crate::{EgressResolver, PinnedEgressPlan, plan_egress_allowlist}; const DOCKER_SOCKET: &str = "unix:///var/run/docker.sock"; const OWNER_LABEL: &str = "ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.owner"; -const ALLOWLIST_PROTOCOLS: [&str; 2] = ["tcp", "udp"]; +const ALLOWLIST_PROTOCOLS: [&str; 1] = ["tcp"]; /// A controller that installs and removes a per-box egress filter. /// From b538f115d67aea64f4e52fead5e11736c366749f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:33:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 038/184] test: tighten host trait signatures and live docker test setup Update the fake host implementations to return a static string from name, matching the trait signature. Replace an emptiness assertion with a direct comparison to an empty slice, and hoist the port constants to the top of the live allowlist test while allowing the longer function body so cleanup still runs on every assertion path. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 4 ++-- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 2 +- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 8 ++++++-- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 7064982d..87174f3a 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ impl FakeNativeHost { #[async_trait] impl Host for FakeNativeHost { - fn name(&self) -> &str { + fn name(&self) -> &'static str { "fake-native" } @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ struct BridgeLinkHost { #[async_trait] impl Host for BridgeLinkHost { - fn name(&self) -> &str { + fn name(&self) -> &'static str { "bridge-link-host" } diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 9369c3a6..6c35f61b 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ async fn native_controller_refuses_hosts_without_explicit_local_identity() -> Re .. }) )); - assert!(host.commands().is_empty()); + assert_eq!(host.commands(), []); } Ok(()) } diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index a4f75648..5b7dc8a6 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -410,15 +410,19 @@ fn docker_command(arguments: &[&str]) -> Result { /// Both listeners run in a separate, test-owned bridge container, so this /// exercises raw TCP from the sandbox without opening a path to the Docker /// host or relying on a public service. +// Keep setup, all three probes, assertions, and cleanup together so cleanup +// runs on every assertion path in the live integration test. +#[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)] async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<()> { + const ALLOWED_PORT: &str = "18373"; + const BLOCKED_PORT: &str = "18374"; + if !live_docker_enabled()? { return Ok(()); } let suffix = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string(); let target_name = format!("tinybox-egress-target-{}", &suffix[..12]); - const ALLOWED_PORT: &str = "18373"; - const BLOCKED_PORT: &str = "18374"; let gateway = docker_bridge_gateway()?; let host_listener = TcpListener::bind((gateway, 0)).map_err(|error| Error::Backend { sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), From c92d2500daaf92dacf1cb318ff805e8d42b59f0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:33:32 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 039/184] test(sandbox): annotate empty command vector type in assertion The assertion comparing host commands against an empty slice now uses an explicitly typed empty Vec so the comparison compiles without relying on inference. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 6c35f61b..be79e150 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ async fn native_controller_refuses_hosts_without_explicit_local_identity() -> Re .. }) )); - assert_eq!(host.commands(), []); + assert_eq!(host.commands(), Vec::>::new()); } Ok(()) } From 5e4efd2b148840c450ef647508e4272606de1fbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:41:40 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 040/184] test(egress): cover native controller allowlist prepare and cleanup Add a fake host that records the commands issued by the native Linux egress controller and returns canned docker, ip and iptables output, then assert that preparing and cleaning up a pinned allowlist installs the expected ACCEPT and DROP rules and removes the network. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 152 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 152 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 87174f3a..b82853b9 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -102,6 +102,114 @@ struct BridgeLinkHost { exists: bool, } +#[derive(Debug)] +struct PreparedNativeHost { + commands: Mutex>>, + box_id: String, + network: String, + bridge: String, + forward_chain: String, + input_chain: String, +} + +impl PreparedNativeHost { + fn new(id: &BoxId, names: &NetworkNames) -> Self { + Self { + commands: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + box_id: id.to_string(), + network: names.network.clone(), + bridge: names.bridge.clone(), + forward_chain: names.forward_chain.clone(), + input_chain: names.input_chain.clone(), + } + } + + fn commands(&self) -> Vec> { + self.commands + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .clone() + } +} + +#[async_trait] +impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { + fn name(&self) -> &'static str { + "prepared-native" + } + + fn execution_location(&self) -> HostExecutionLocation { + HostExecutionLocation::Local + } + + async fn run(&self, request: &ExecRequest) -> Result { + let argv = &request.argv; + self.commands + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .push(argv.clone()); + + if let Some(docker_index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "docker") { + let args = &argv[docker_index + 1..]; + if args.get(0).is_some_and(|arg| arg == "info") { + return Ok(ExecOutput::new( + 0, + b"linux|Ubuntu 26.04|[]".to_vec(), + Vec::new(), + )); + } + if args.get(0).is_some_and(|arg| arg == "network") { + if args.get(1).is_some_and(|arg| arg == "create") { + return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, b"network-id".to_vec(), Vec::new())); + } + if args.get(1).is_some_and(|arg| arg == "inspect") { + let format = args.get(3).map_or("", String::as_str); + let stdout = if format.contains(".Driver") { + format!("bridge|true|{}|{}", self.bridge, self.box_id) + } else { + self.box_id.clone() + }; + return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, stdout.into_bytes(), Vec::new())); + } + } + } + + if argv.first().is_some_and(|arg| arg == "ip") { + return Ok(ExecOutput::new( + 0, + format!("17: {}: \n", self.bridge).into_bytes(), + Vec::new(), + )); + } + + if argv + .iter() + .any(|arg| arg == "iptables" || arg == "ip6tables") + { + if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "FORWARD") { + return Ok(ExecOutput::new( + 0, + b"-P FORWARD DROP\n-A FORWARD -j DOCKER-USER\n-A FORWARD -j DOCKER-FORWARD\n" + .to_vec(), + Vec::new(), + )); + } + if argv.last().is_some_and(|arg| arg == "-S") { + let chain = argv.last().map_or("", String::as_str); + let stdout = if chain == self.forward_chain || chain == self.input_chain { + format!("-A {chain} -j DROP\n") + } else { + String::new() + }; + return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, stdout.into_bytes(), Vec::new())); + } + return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, Vec::new(), Vec::new())); + } + + Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, Vec::new(), Vec::new())) + } +} + #[async_trait] impl Host for BridgeLinkHost { fn name(&self) -> &'static str { @@ -155,6 +263,50 @@ async fn existing_local_bridge_link_is_verified() -> Result<()> { verify_created_bridge_link(&host, &names).await } +#[tokio::test] +async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + + let network = controller + .prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist) + .await?; + assert_eq!(network, names.network); + controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await?; + + let commands = host.commands(); + assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-A") + && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "203.0.113.8") + && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "443") + && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "tcp") + && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "ACCEPT") + })); + assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "DROP") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.input_chain) + })); + assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-D") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "DOCKER-USER") + })); + assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.network) + })); + assert!( + commands + .iter() + .filter(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "docker")) + .all(|argv| { + argv.first().is_some_and(|arg| arg == "env") + && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "unix:///var/run/docker.sock") + }) + ); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] async fn missing_forward_hook_refuses_native_egress_before_resource_creation() { for firewall in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] { From 9a91319aa518582859d38883f60a342b75e5e0f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:41:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 041/184] test(egress): assert prepare succeeds before unwrapping The native controller test now checks the result of prepare and reports the recorded commands when it fails, so a failure shows what the controller actually ran instead of only the error. The unused network field was dropped from the test host since the returned network name is compared directly. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index b82853b9..f183fc21 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -106,7 +106,6 @@ struct BridgeLinkHost { struct PreparedNativeHost { commands: Mutex>>, box_id: String, - network: String, bridge: String, forward_chain: String, input_chain: String, @@ -117,7 +116,6 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { Self { commands: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), box_id: id.to_string(), - network: names.network.clone(), bridge: names.bridge.clone(), forward_chain: names.forward_chain.clone(), input_chain: names.input_chain.clone(), @@ -272,9 +270,9 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); - let network = controller - .prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist) - .await?; + let prepared = controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await; + assert!(prepared.is_ok(), "{prepared:?}; commands={:?}", host.commands()); + let network = prepared?; assert_eq!(network, names.network); controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await?; From 9ec20d5f30e69e5a8e63837407c0027c229d1c58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:42:01 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 042/184] test(egress): match docker subcommands by position-independent search The fake host now locates docker subcommands anywhere in the argument list instead of only at fixed offsets, so tests keep working when flags are inserted before them. The inspect format argument is read relative to the discovered subcommand index, and one assertion was reformatted. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index f183fc21..bb8b1393 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -149,19 +149,19 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { if let Some(docker_index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "docker") { let args = &argv[docker_index + 1..]; - if args.get(0).is_some_and(|arg| arg == "info") { + if args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "info") { return Ok(ExecOutput::new( 0, b"linux|Ubuntu 26.04|[]".to_vec(), Vec::new(), )); } - if args.get(0).is_some_and(|arg| arg == "network") { - if args.get(1).is_some_and(|arg| arg == "create") { + if args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "network") { + if args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "create") { return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, b"network-id".to_vec(), Vec::new())); } - if args.get(1).is_some_and(|arg| arg == "inspect") { - let format = args.get(3).map_or("", String::as_str); + if let Some(inspect_index) = args.iter().position(|arg| arg == "inspect") { + let format = args.get(inspect_index + 2).map_or("", String::as_str); let stdout = if format.contains(".Driver") { format!("bridge|true|{}|{}", self.bridge, self.box_id) } else { @@ -271,7 +271,11 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); let prepared = controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await; - assert!(prepared.is_ok(), "{prepared:?}; commands={:?}", host.commands()); + assert!( + prepared.is_ok(), + "{prepared:?}; commands={:?}", + host.commands() + ); let network = prepared?; assert_eq!(network, names.network); controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await?; From 1098304df2156d3b8938247295ec71aae5dbca4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:42:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 043/184] fix(egress): route network inspect through rootful docker helper The native cleanup path now builds its docker network inspect command via force_local_rootful_docker so it runs against the local rootful daemon like the other enforcement calls. The test host's sudo detection was relaxed to match any -S argument rather than only the last one, keeping the fake in step with the wrapped command. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 4 ++-- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 34804c9c..adfb1cd6 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -515,14 +515,14 @@ async fn cleanup_native( let inspect = docker_request( host, - vec![ + force_local_rootful_docker(vec![ "docker".into(), "network".into(), "inspect".into(), "--format".into(), format!("{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}"), names.network.clone(), - ], + ]), ) .await?; if inspect.succeeded() { diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index bb8b1393..8cae5b19 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { Vec::new(), )); } - if argv.last().is_some_and(|arg| arg == "-S") { + if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-S") { let chain = argv.last().map_or("", String::as_str); let stdout = if chain == self.forward_chain || chain == self.input_chain { format!("-A {chain} -j DROP\n") From 2feec32d93238d1d78c2b26cf9cc54b226dc985b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:43:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 044/184] test(sandbox): cover controller host forwarding and egress rollback Add tests for the controller host delegating host capabilities and pinning docker commands, and for rolling back a reserved record when egress preparation finds no controller. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 59 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index be79e150..b23df5ba 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -101,6 +101,65 @@ async fn destroying_persisted_allowlist_without_controller_refuses_before_remova Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +async fn controller_host_forwards_host_capabilities_and_pins_docker_commands() -> Result<()> { + let inner = ScriptedHost::silent(); + let host = super::ControllerHost { + inner: inner.clone(), + controller: Arc::new(RecordingEgressController), + }; + + assert_eq!(host.name(), "scripted"); + assert_eq!(host.execution_location(), HostExecutionLocation::Unknown); + assert!(!host.has_pending_observed_cleanup()); + host.retry_observed_cleanup().await?; + assert!(matches!( + host.open_workspace_file(std::path::Path::new("/workspace"), std::path::Path::new("file")) + .await, + Err(Error::UnsupportedHostFileTransfer { .. }) + )); + assert!(matches!( + host.begin_workspace_file_write( + std::path::Path::new("/workspace"), + std::path::Path::new("file"), + "transfer", + ) + .await, + Err(Error::UnsupportedHostFileTransfer { .. }) + )); + assert!(matches!( + host.forward("127.0.0.1:1234".parse().expect("valid address")).await, + Err(Error::Unsupported { .. }) + )); + + let observer: Arc = + Arc::new(CapturingObserver::default()); + host.run_observed(&ExecRequest::new(["docker", "version"]), observer) + .await?; + assert_eq!(inner.commands()[0], ["docker", "version"]); + Ok(()) +} + +#[tokio::test] +async fn missing_controller_during_egress_preparation_rolls_back_reserved_record() -> Result<()> { + let (sandbox, _host, store) = sandbox(); + let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["api.example.test"], [443]); + let spec = spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist)); + store.reserve(id.clone(), spec.clone())?; + + assert!(matches!( + sandbox.prepare_egress_network(&spec, &id, "attempt").await, + Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + .. + }) + )); + assert!(matches!(store.get(&id), Err(Error::NotFound { .. }))); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] async fn controller_failure_rolls_back_before_dropping_the_box_record() -> Result<()> { #[derive(Debug)] From f3025bc7c3aa2bee17e332111a62e75a88ee7e51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:43:51 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 045/184] test(sandbox): tidy host capability assertions and egress rollback check Reformat the workspace file and forward assertions for readability and construct the socket address directly instead of parsing a string. Drop the redundant store reservation in the egress rollback test and expect Error::UnknownBox, matching what an unreserved box actually returns. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index b23df5ba..043ad211 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -114,8 +114,11 @@ async fn controller_host_forwards_host_capabilities_and_pins_docker_commands() - assert!(!host.has_pending_observed_cleanup()); host.retry_observed_cleanup().await?; assert!(matches!( - host.open_workspace_file(std::path::Path::new("/workspace"), std::path::Path::new("file")) - .await, + host.open_workspace_file( + std::path::Path::new("/workspace"), + std::path::Path::new("file") + ) + .await, Err(Error::UnsupportedHostFileTransfer { .. }) )); assert!(matches!( @@ -128,12 +131,12 @@ async fn controller_host_forwards_host_capabilities_and_pins_docker_commands() - Err(Error::UnsupportedHostFileTransfer { .. }) )); assert!(matches!( - host.forward("127.0.0.1:1234".parse().expect("valid address")).await, + host.forward(std::net::SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 1234))) + .await, Err(Error::Unsupported { .. }) )); - let observer: Arc = - Arc::new(CapturingObserver::default()); + let observer: Arc = Arc::new(CapturingObserver::default()); host.run_observed(&ExecRequest::new(["docker", "version"]), observer) .await?; assert_eq!(inner.commands()[0], ["docker", "version"]); @@ -146,8 +149,6 @@ async fn missing_controller_during_egress_preparation_rolls_back_reserved_record let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["api.example.test"], [443]); let spec = spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist)); - store.reserve(id.clone(), spec.clone())?; - assert!(matches!( sandbox.prepare_egress_network(&spec, &id, "attempt").await, Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { @@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ async fn missing_controller_during_egress_preparation_rolls_back_reserved_record .. }) )); - assert!(matches!(store.get(&id), Err(Error::NotFound { .. }))); + assert!(matches!(store.get(&id), Err(Error::UnknownBox { .. }))); Ok(()) } From bd643a4bf60163cdb8171bc820d60390a4f37f01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:44:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 046/184] test(egress): rename docker args binding in fake host Rename the local binding that holds the arguments after the docker subcommand so it no longer shadows the outer args slice, and wrap the inspect format lookup across lines. No behaviour change. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 8cae5b19..6926ca30 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -148,20 +148,22 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .push(argv.clone()); if let Some(docker_index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "docker") { - let args = &argv[docker_index + 1..]; - if args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "info") { + let docker_args = &argv[docker_index + 1..]; + if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "info") { return Ok(ExecOutput::new( 0, b"linux|Ubuntu 26.04|[]".to_vec(), Vec::new(), )); } - if args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "network") { - if args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "create") { + if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "network") { + if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "create") { return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, b"network-id".to_vec(), Vec::new())); } - if let Some(inspect_index) = args.iter().position(|arg| arg == "inspect") { - let format = args.get(inspect_index + 2).map_or("", String::as_str); + if let Some(inspect_index) = docker_args.iter().position(|arg| arg == "inspect") { + let format = docker_args + .get(inspect_index + 2) + .map_or("", String::as_str); let stdout = if format.contains(".Driver") { format!("bridge|true|{}|{}", self.bridge, self.box_id) } else { From 9cc4e451f738efa6565c14c45dcb81b69dba45a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:48:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 047/184] feat(docker): pin egress hostnames via /etc/hosts The egress controller now returns a PreparedEgressNetwork carrying the firewall-protected network name plus the hostname-to-address mappings pinned for it, and the sandbox passes those mappings to Docker as --add-host entries while pointing the container's resolver at its own loopback. This stops Docker's embedded resolver from forwarding arbitrary DNS queries outside the per-bridge firewall. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 65 +++++++++++++++++-- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs | 20 +++++- 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index adfb1cd6..c14665fd 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -4,7 +4,12 @@ //! consumes pinned resolver answers and does not use proxy environment //! variables as an enforcement boundary. -use std::{fmt::Debug, net::IpAddr, sync::Arc}; +use std::{ + collections::BTreeSet, + fmt::Debug, + net::IpAddr, + sync::Arc, +}; use async_trait::async_trait; use tinybox_core::{ @@ -42,7 +47,7 @@ pub trait DockerEgressController: Debug + Send + Sync { namespace: &str, id: &BoxId, allowlist: &EgressAllowlist, - ) -> Result; + ) -> Result; /// Remove this box's filter and network after its container has stopped. async fn cleanup(&self, host: &dyn Host, namespace: &str, id: &BoxId) -> Result<()>; @@ -51,6 +56,40 @@ pub trait DockerEgressController: Debug + Send + Sync { fn docker_argv(&self, argv: Vec) -> Vec; } +/// A firewall-protected network and the hostname mappings pinned for it. +/// +/// The sandbox installs these mappings in `/etc/hosts` and points the +/// container's upstream resolver at its own loopback, so Docker's embedded +/// resolver cannot forward arbitrary DNS queries through the host. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct PreparedEgressNetwork { + network: String, + host_mappings: Vec<(String, IpAddr)>, +} + +impl PreparedEgressNetwork { + /// Build a network result for a trusted egress controller. + #[must_use] + pub fn new(network: String, host_mappings: Vec<(String, IpAddr)>) -> Self { + Self { + network, + host_mappings, + } + } + + /// Docker network name to attach to the workload. + #[must_use] + pub fn network(&self) -> &str { + &self.network + } + + /// Pinned `/etc/hosts` entries used instead of upstream DNS. + #[must_use] + pub fn host_mappings(&self) -> &[(String, IpAddr)] { + &self.host_mappings + } +} + /// Native Linux Engine support using the local rootful Docker socket and /// `iptables`/`ip6tables` `DOCKER-USER` chains. /// @@ -90,7 +129,7 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { namespace: &str, id: &BoxId, allowlist: &EgressAllowlist, - ) -> Result { + ) -> Result { ensure_supported_host(host)?; ensure_linux_target()?; verify_engine_and_firewall(host).await?; @@ -139,7 +178,25 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { }; } - Ok(names.network) + let host_mappings = plan + .targets() + .iter() + .flat_map(|target| { + let host = target.host(); + if host.parse::().is_ok() { + return Vec::new(); + } + let unqualified = host.trim_end_matches('.'); + let mut names = vec![(host.to_owned(), target.address())]; + if unqualified != host { + names.push((unqualified.to_owned(), target.address())); + } + names + }) + .collect::>() + .into_iter() + .collect(); + Ok(PreparedEgressNetwork::new(names.network, host_mappings)) } async fn cleanup(&self, host: &dyn Host, namespace: &str, id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs index 9e2c09ab..a5997602 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ use tinybox_core::{ WorkspaceSource, }; +use crate::PreparedEgressNetwork; + use super::NAME; /// The label every tinybox container carries, so a stray container can be @@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ pub(super) fn run( id: &BoxId, attempt: &str, spec: &BoxSpec, - allowlist_network: Option<&str>, + allowlist_network: Option<&PreparedEgressNetwork>, ) -> Result> { let mut argv = vec![ "docker".to_owned(), @@ -121,7 +123,21 @@ pub(super) fn run( argv.extend(resource_flags(&spec.resources)); if let Some(network) = allowlist_network { - argv.extend(["--network".to_owned(), network.to_owned()]); + argv.extend(["--network".to_owned(), network.network().to_owned()]); + // Custom Docker bridges use an embedded resolver that can forward DNS + // outside our per-bridge firewall. Pin its sole upstream to the + // workload's own loopback; approved names arrive through --add-host. + argv.extend(["--dns".to_owned(), "127.0.0.1".to_owned()]); + for (hostname, address) in network.host_mappings() { + let address = match address { + std::net::IpAddr::V4(address) => address.to_string(), + std::net::IpAddr::V6(address) => format!("[{address}]"), + }; + argv.extend([ + "--add-host".to_owned(), + format!("{hostname}:{address}"), + ]); + } } else { argv.extend(network_flags(&spec.network)); } From 4097e7ac92878c7488d5f988469251b4b1a3ab7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:48:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 048/184] feat(tinybox-docker): expose prepared egress network from sandbox The sandbox now returns a PreparedEgressNetwork instead of a bare network name when preparing egress, and the type is re-exported from the crate root. This gives callers access to the full prepared network details rather than just its identifier. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs | 4 +++- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs index 3d209fac..ca436575 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs @@ -48,7 +48,9 @@ pub use oneshot::{ pub use policy::{DANGEROUS_MOUNTS, HOST_NETWORK, run_policy_issues}; pub use egress::{EgressResolver, PinnedEgressPlan, PinnedEgressTarget, plan_egress_allowlist}; -pub use egress_enforcement::{DockerEgressController, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController}; +pub use egress_enforcement::{ + DockerEgressController, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController, PreparedEgressNetwork, +}; pub use sandbox::{ DEFAULT_BASE_IMAGE, DEFAULT_NAMESPACE, DockerSandbox, NAME, OWNER_LABEL, WORKSPACE_MOUNT, diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs index fd4ab7fc..dfcc0ba0 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ use tinybox_core::{ SnapshotSupport, Store, SystemClock, WorkspaceFileReader, WorkspaceFileWriter, detach, }; -use crate::DockerEgressController; +use crate::{DockerEgressController, PreparedEgressNetwork}; mod args; mod observed; @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ impl DockerSandbox { spec: &BoxSpec, id: &BoxId, attempt: &str, - ) -> Result> { + ) -> Result> { let NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist) = &spec.network else { return Ok(None); }; @@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { &info.id, &attempt, spec, - network.as_deref(), + network.as_ref(), ) { Ok(argv) => argv, Err(error) => { From ad652987430aad289f9c00efd197710d6f836be9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:49:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 049/184] test(egress): cover pinned host mappings and dns blocking Extend the egress tests to assert that prepared networks carry their resolved host mappings and that sandbox start passes the pinned --add-host entries alongside the loopback resolver. The live Docker test now reaches the allowed listener by hostname and checks that unlisted names and direct UDP DNS traffic are blocked. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 14 ++++++- .../tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 18 +++++++-- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 39 +++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 6926ca30..3be9d29d 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -93,7 +93,10 @@ struct Resolver; impl EgressResolver for Resolver { fn resolve(&self, _hostname: &str) -> std::io::Result> { - Ok(vec![IpAddr::from([203, 0, 113, 8])]) + Ok(vec![ + IpAddr::from([203, 0, 113, 8]), + IpAddr::from([203, 0, 113, 9]), + ]) } } @@ -279,7 +282,14 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() host.commands() ); let network = prepared?; - assert_eq!(network, names.network); + assert_eq!(network.network(), names.network); + assert_eq!( + network.host_mappings(), + [ + ("service.test".to_owned(), IpAddr::from([203, 0, 113, 8])), + ("service.test".to_owned(), IpAddr::from([203, 0, 113, 9])), + ] + ); controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await?; let commands = host.commands(); diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 043ad211..aec07806 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -35,10 +35,16 @@ impl super::DockerEgressController for RecordingEgressController { _namespace: &str, _id: &BoxId, _allowlist: &tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist, - ) -> Result { + ) -> Result { host.run(&ExecRequest::new(["controller", "prepare"])) .await?; - Ok("tinybox-allowlist-test".to_owned()) + Ok(crate::PreparedEgressNetwork::new( + "tinybox-allowlist-test".to_owned(), + vec![( + "api.example.test".to_owned(), + std::net::IpAddr::from([203, 0, 113, 10]), + )], + )) } async fn cleanup(&self, host: &dyn Host, _namespace: &str, _id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { @@ -67,6 +73,10 @@ async fn allowlist_controller_prepares_before_start_and_cleans_after_destroy() - assert_eq!(commands[1][0], "docker"); assert!(commands[1].contains(&"--network".to_owned())); assert!(commands[1].contains(&"tinybox-allowlist-test".to_owned())); + assert_eq!(flag_value(&commands[1], "--dns"), Some("127.0.0.1")); + assert!(commands[1].windows(2).any(|args| { + args[0] == "--add-host" && args[1] == "api.example.test:203.0.113.10" + })); sandbox.destroy(&info.id).await?; let commands = host.commands(); @@ -174,7 +184,7 @@ async fn controller_failure_rolls_back_before_dropping_the_box_record() -> Resul _namespace: &str, _id: &BoxId, _allowlist: &tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist, - ) -> Result { + ) -> Result { host.run(&ExecRequest::new(["controller", "prepare"])) .await?; Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { @@ -273,7 +283,7 @@ async fn failed_egress_rollback_retains_box_record_for_cleanup_retry() -> Result _namespace: &str, _id: &BoxId, _allowlist: &tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist, - ) -> Result { + ) -> Result { Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { sandbox: NAME.to_owned(), constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 5b7dc8a6..08a7d28e 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( IMAGE, "sh", "-c", - "(while true; do nc -l -p 18373 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed; done) & (while true; do nc -l -p 18374 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/blocked; done) & wait", + "(while true; do nc -l -p 18373 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed; done) & (while true; do nc -l -p 18374 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/blocked; done) & (while true; do nc -u -l -p 53 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/dns; done) & wait", ]); let _ = image?; let result = async { @@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( &ExecRequest::new([ "sh", "-c", - &format!("unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nc -z -w 3 {ip} {ALLOWED_PORT}"), + &format!("unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nc -z -w 3 listener.test {ALLOWED_PORT}"), ]), ) .await; @@ -498,6 +498,26 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( ]), ) .await; + let dns_blocked = sandbox + .exec( + &info.id, + &ExecRequest::new([ + "sh", + "-c", + "unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nslookup unlisted-name.test >/dev/null 2>&1", + ]), + ) + .await; + let direct_dns = sandbox + .exec( + &info.id, + &ExecRequest::new([ + "sh", + "-c", + &format!("printf probe | nc -u -w 1 {ip} 53 || true"), + ]), + ) + .await; let host_listener_untouched = matches!( accept_before(&host_listener, Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(250)), Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut @@ -508,30 +528,43 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( .args(["exec", &target_name, "sh", "-c", "test ! -s /tmp/blocked"]) .status() .map_err(|error| Error::io("check forbidden listener", &error)); + let dns_hits = Command::new("docker") + .args(["exec", &target_name, "sh", "-c", "test ! -s /tmp/dns"]) + .status() + .map_err(|error| Error::io("check forbidden DNS listener", &error)); // Cleanup runs before any assertion is returned to the test harness. let destroy = sandbox.destroy(&info.id).await; let allowed = allowed?; let blocked = blocked?; let host_gateway = host_gateway?; + let dns_blocked = dns_blocked?; + let direct_dns = direct_dns?; destroy?; allowed_hits?; let blocked_hits = blocked_hits?; + let dns_hits = dns_hits?; if allowed.exit_code != 0 || blocked.exit_code == 0 || host_gateway.exit_code == 0 + || dns_blocked.exit_code == 0 + || direct_dns.exit_code != 0 || !blocked_hits.success() + || !dns_hits.success() || !host_listener_untouched { return Err(Error::Backend { sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), operation: "verify native egress allowlist", message: format!( - "allowed exit={}, blocked exit={}, host-gateway exit={}, forbidden listener hit={}, host listener touched={}", + "allowed exit={}, blocked exit={}, host-gateway exit={}, unlisted DNS lookup exit={}, direct DNS send exit={}, forbidden TCP hit={}, forbidden DNS hit={}, host listener touched={}", allowed.exit_code, blocked.exit_code, host_gateway.exit_code, + dns_blocked.exit_code, + direct_dns.exit_code, !blocked_hits.success(), + !dns_hits.success(), !host_listener_untouched ), }); From 83f0a58003b53e649fca023ae0355995b7f9adc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:50:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 050/184] docs(tinybox-docker): describe egress plan as consumed by the native controller The egress module documentation now states that the native Linux Docker controller consumes pinned allowlist destinations for firewall rules and container hosts entries, rather than describing the plan as awaiting a future proxy or firewall. The live Docker test also drops the direct DNS send assertion and bounds the unlisted lookup with a timeout so the check no longer depends on that probe. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs | 14 ++++++++------ crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 8 +++----- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs index 435e8a3b..f0a82184 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -//! Planning helpers for future network allowlist enforcement. +//! Resolve and pin network allowlist destinations for the Docker firewall. //! -//! These types pin resolver answers for a later proxy or firewall to consume. -//! They do not enforce traffic and do not make `NetworkPolicy::Allowlist` -//! available in [`DockerSandbox`](crate::DockerSandbox). +//! The native Linux controller consumes pinned answers for firewall rules and +//! container `/etc/hosts` entries. Planning alone does not enforce traffic. use std::{ collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet}, @@ -23,6 +22,9 @@ pub trait EgressResolver: std::fmt::Debug + Send + Sync { } /// A resolved allowlist plan whose destinations no longer depend on DNS. +/// +/// The native Linux Docker controller uses each target both to install a +/// destination rule and to create a static hostname mapping for the workload. #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct PinnedEgressPlan { targets: Vec, @@ -76,8 +78,8 @@ impl PinnedEgressTarget { /// is a cloud metadata or loopback address, the whole plan is rejected. Safe /// private addresses are retained because this policy does not forbid them. /// -/// This function only prepares data for an enforcing proxy or firewall. It does -/// not apply network rules and does not enable allowlists in `DockerSandbox`. +/// This function only prepares pinned data. It does not apply network rules; +/// the native Linux Docker controller consumes the result during preparation. /// The resolver must answer in the environment where the eventual enforcer will /// use the plan, which may be remote from the caller for an SSH-backed host. /// diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 08a7d28e..2e05802d 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( &ExecRequest::new([ "sh", "-c", - "unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nslookup unlisted-name.test >/dev/null 2>&1", + "unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nslookup -timeout=1 -retry=1 unlisted-name.test >/dev/null 2>&1", ]), ) .await; @@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( let blocked = blocked?; let host_gateway = host_gateway?; let dns_blocked = dns_blocked?; - let direct_dns = direct_dns?; + direct_dns?; destroy?; allowed_hits?; let blocked_hits = blocked_hits?; @@ -548,7 +548,6 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( || blocked.exit_code == 0 || host_gateway.exit_code == 0 || dns_blocked.exit_code == 0 - || direct_dns.exit_code != 0 || !blocked_hits.success() || !dns_hits.success() || !host_listener_untouched @@ -557,12 +556,11 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), operation: "verify native egress allowlist", message: format!( - "allowed exit={}, blocked exit={}, host-gateway exit={}, unlisted DNS lookup exit={}, direct DNS send exit={}, forbidden TCP hit={}, forbidden DNS hit={}, host listener touched={}", + "allowed exit={}, blocked exit={}, host-gateway exit={}, unlisted DNS lookup exit={}, forbidden TCP hit={}, forbidden DNS hit={}, host listener touched={}", allowed.exit_code, blocked.exit_code, host_gateway.exit_code, dns_blocked.exit_code, - direct_dns.exit_code, !blocked_hits.success(), !dns_hits.success(), !host_listener_untouched From a7fbda745eef8ae0a3b9a2f7120e0803ef6bedb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:50:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 051/184] fix(sandbox): skip egress cleanup for non-allowlist boxes Destroy now only runs egress cleanup when the box actually uses an allowlist network policy, so boxes without egress no longer invoke the controller during teardown. A test covers the non-allowlist path. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs | 9 +++++---- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs index dfcc0ba0..fb084aa4 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs @@ -956,9 +956,8 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { async fn destroy(&self, id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { // Fail on an unknown box before touching Docker. let info = self.store.get(id)?; - if matches!(info.spec.network, NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(_)) - && self.egress_controller.is_none() - { + let has_egress_network = matches!(info.spec.network, NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(_)); + if has_egress_network && self.egress_controller.is_none() { return Err(unsupported_egress_policy()); } let attempt = self @@ -991,7 +990,9 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { // recoverable, a container without a record is a leak. self.remove_container(args::remove(&self.namespace, id)) .await?; - self.cleanup_egress(id).await?; + if has_egress_network { + self.cleanup_egress(id).await?; + } self.mark_observed_box_destroyed(id); self.acknowledge_observed_cleanup_for_destroyed_box(id); self.store.remove(id)?; diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index aec07806..53b5e40e 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -85,6 +85,22 @@ async fn allowlist_controller_prepares_before_start_and_cleans_after_destroy() - Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +async fn destroy_skips_egress_cleanup_for_non_allowlist_boxes() -> Result<()> { + let host = ScriptedHost::silent(); + let sandbox = DockerSandbox::new(host.clone(), Arc::new(MemoryStore::new())) + .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(RecordingEgressController)); + let info = sandbox.create(&spec()?).await?; + + sandbox.destroy(&info.id).await?; + + assert!(!host + .commands() + .iter() + .any(|command| command.first().is_some_and(|word| word == "controller"))); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] async fn destroying_persisted_allowlist_without_controller_refuses_before_removal() -> Result<()> { let host = ScriptedHost::silent(); From 6b0886022cb3271a8e6eb6697943d8470af2eaee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:50:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 052/184] test(sandbox): cover allowlist run args pinning resolved addresses Add a test asserting that allowlist run arguments pin every resolved address via --add-host and point --dns at the local resolver, so upstream DNS is disabled. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 53b5e40e..c3e2cb70 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -245,6 +245,36 @@ async fn controller_failure_rolls_back_before_dropping_the_box_record() -> Resul Ok(()) } +#[test] +fn allowlist_run_args_pin_every_resolved_address_and_disable_upstream_dns() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; + let prepared = crate::PreparedEgressNetwork::new( + "tinybox-egress-test".to_owned(), + vec![ + ( + "service.test".to_owned(), + std::net::IpAddr::from([203, 0, 113, 8]), + ), + ( + "service.test".to_owned(), + std::net::IpAddr::V6(std::net::Ipv6Addr::new( + 0x2001, 0x0db8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, + )), + ), + ], + ); + + let argv = args::run("test", &id, "attempt", &spec()?, Some(&prepared))?; + assert_eq!(flag_value(&argv, "--dns"), Some("127.0.0.1")); + assert!(argv.windows(2).any(|args| { + args[0] == "--add-host" && args[1] == "service.test:203.0.113.8" + })); + assert!(argv.windows(2).any(|args| { + args[0] == "--add-host" && args[1] == "service.test:[2001:db8::8]" + })); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] async fn native_controller_refuses_hosts_without_explicit_local_identity() -> Result<()> { #[derive(Debug)] From fa5d1a426131ee62e3cadfe88985b63cc74af220 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:51:20 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 053/184] fix(egress): skip firewall cleanup when network creation fails Native egress preparation now aborts before touching firewall rules when the Docker network name is already taken, so a conflicting box no longer tears down an existing owner's chains. A regression test covers the conflict path, and the contract spec documents the ownership rule. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 7 +--- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 34 ++++++++++++++++++ crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs | 5 +-- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs | 8 +---- .../tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 36 ++++++++++--------- docs/specs/contract-1-19.md | 19 ++++++---- docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md | 2 +- 7 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index c14665fd..387816e2 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -4,12 +4,7 @@ //! consumes pinned resolver answers and does not use proxy environment //! variables as an enforcement boundary. -use std::{ - collections::BTreeSet, - fmt::Debug, - net::IpAddr, - sync::Arc, -}; +use std::{collections::BTreeSet, fmt::Debug, net::IpAddr, sync::Arc}; use async_trait::async_trait; use tinybox_core::{ diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 3be9d29d..e04c3c92 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ struct BridgeLinkHost { #[derive(Debug)] struct PreparedNativeHost { commands: Mutex>>, + fail_network_create: bool, box_id: String, bridge: String, forward_chain: String, @@ -118,6 +119,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { fn new(id: &BoxId, names: &NetworkNames) -> Self { Self { commands: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + fail_network_create: false, box_id: id.to_string(), bridge: names.bridge.clone(), forward_chain: names.forward_chain.clone(), @@ -161,6 +163,13 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { } if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "network") { if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "create") { + if self.fail_network_create { + return Ok(ExecOutput::new( + 1, + Vec::new(), + b"network name already exists".to_vec(), + )); + } return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, b"network-id".to_vec(), Vec::new())); } if let Some(inspect_index) = docker_args.iter().position(|arg| arg == "inspect") { @@ -321,6 +330,31 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.fail_network_create = true; + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + + assert!(matches!( + controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await, + Err(Error::Backend { + operation: "configure egress filtering", + .. + }) + )); + assert!(host.commands().iter().all(|argv| { + !argv + .iter() + .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-D" | "-F" | "-X")) + })); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] async fn missing_forward_hook_refuses_native_egress_before_resource_creation() { for firewall in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] { diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs index a5997602..b341723e 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs @@ -133,10 +133,7 @@ pub(super) fn run( std::net::IpAddr::V4(address) => address.to_string(), std::net::IpAddr::V6(address) => format!("[{address}]"), }; - argv.extend([ - "--add-host".to_owned(), - format!("{hostname}:{address}"), - ]); + argv.extend(["--add-host".to_owned(), format!("{hostname}:{address}")]); } } else { argv.extend(network_flags(&spec.network)); diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs index fb084aa4..ba6f0874 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs @@ -685,13 +685,7 @@ impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox { // Build the command before running anything, so a source this backend // cannot handle leaves no container behind. - let argv = match args::run( - &self.namespace, - &info.id, - &attempt, - spec, - network.as_ref(), - ) { + let argv = match args::run(&self.namespace, &info.id, &attempt, spec, network.as_ref()) { Ok(argv) => argv, Err(error) => { return Err(self diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index c3e2cb70..05987bef 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -74,9 +74,11 @@ async fn allowlist_controller_prepares_before_start_and_cleans_after_destroy() - assert!(commands[1].contains(&"--network".to_owned())); assert!(commands[1].contains(&"tinybox-allowlist-test".to_owned())); assert_eq!(flag_value(&commands[1], "--dns"), Some("127.0.0.1")); - assert!(commands[1].windows(2).any(|args| { - args[0] == "--add-host" && args[1] == "api.example.test:203.0.113.10" - })); + assert!( + commands[1] + .windows(2) + .any(|args| { args[0] == "--add-host" && args[1] == "api.example.test:203.0.113.10" }) + ); sandbox.destroy(&info.id).await?; let commands = host.commands(); @@ -94,10 +96,12 @@ async fn destroy_skips_egress_cleanup_for_non_allowlist_boxes() -> Result<()> { sandbox.destroy(&info.id).await?; - assert!(!host - .commands() - .iter() - .any(|command| command.first().is_some_and(|word| word == "controller"))); + assert!( + !host + .commands() + .iter() + .any(|command| command.first().is_some_and(|word| word == "controller")) + ); Ok(()) } @@ -257,21 +261,21 @@ fn allowlist_run_args_pin_every_resolved_address_and_disable_upstream_dns() -> R ), ( "service.test".to_owned(), - std::net::IpAddr::V6(std::net::Ipv6Addr::new( - 0x2001, 0x0db8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, - )), + std::net::IpAddr::V6(std::net::Ipv6Addr::new(0x2001, 0x0db8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8)), ), ], ); let argv = args::run("test", &id, "attempt", &spec()?, Some(&prepared))?; assert_eq!(flag_value(&argv, "--dns"), Some("127.0.0.1")); - assert!(argv.windows(2).any(|args| { - args[0] == "--add-host" && args[1] == "service.test:203.0.113.8" - })); - assert!(argv.windows(2).any(|args| { - args[0] == "--add-host" && args[1] == "service.test:[2001:db8::8]" - })); + assert!( + argv.windows(2) + .any(|args| { args[0] == "--add-host" && args[1] == "service.test:203.0.113.8" }) + ); + assert!( + argv.windows(2) + .any(|args| { args[0] == "--add-host" && args[1] == "service.test:[2001:db8::8]" }) + ); Ok(()) } diff --git a/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md b/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md index 4e9de9c0..13d5fd6e 100644 --- a/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md +++ b/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md @@ -48,15 +48,22 @@ least 19, which `tinybox_bus::is_compatible` already enforces. `NativeLinuxDockerEgressController` and a local, rootful Linux Docker Engine whose firewall chains can be verified. It resolves names before creating the per-box bridge, installs default-drop IPv4 and IPv6 filters before `docker run`, -and permits only pinned destination IP/port pairs. Traffic from that bridge to -the Docker host is dropped. The ordinary Docker sandbox continues to refuse -allowlists unless this controller is installed. +and permits only pinned destination IP/port pairs. It writes the pinned +hostname/address pairs into the container's `/etc/hosts` and configures its +only DNS upstream as container-local `127.0.0.1`, so Docker's embedded resolver +cannot forward arbitrary queries to host DNS. Unlisted names therefore fail to +resolve unless the workload provides a resolver in its own loopback namespace. +Traffic from that bridge to the Docker host is dropped. The ordinary Docker +sandbox continues to refuse allowlists unless this controller is installed. Docker Desktop, Windows, remote or unknown Hosts, rootless daemons, and daemons without the required firewall support refuse `Allowlist` as Unsupported. -`passthrough`, `namespace` and `microvm` continue to refuse it. The filter does -not claim to filter DNS answers; it pins the addresses used for firewall -authorization, so later answers cannot expand reachable destinations. +`passthrough`, `namespace` and `microvm` continue to refuse it. Docker's custom +bridge embedded resolver forwards external queries to an upstream resolver; +the backend uses Docker's `--dns` option to pin that upstream to the container's +own loopback, and installs approved hostname mappings from the single pinned +resolution result. This follows Docker's documented per-container DNS behavior +for custom upstream addresses. The workload cannot fall back to host DNS. ## Deprecated diff --git a/docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md b/docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md index 18cb6069..6ba030ae 100644 --- a/docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md +++ b/docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ composition in M4. ADR 0004 records the tradeoff. | `Snapshot` | The committed image. | | `GitRepo` | Refused by name — no clone step exists yet. | | Limits | `--memory`, `--cpus`, `--pids-limit`. Disk is **not** applied: `--storage-opt size=` works on a minority of storage drivers, and a flag that silently does nothing on most systems is worse than an honest omission. | -| Network | `Denied` → `--network none`. Docker has no outbound-only mode, so `Egress` uses the default bridge. `Allowlist` requires an explicitly installed `NativeLinuxDockerEgressController` on a verified local rootful Linux Engine; it installs default-drop IPv4/IPv6 rules before the workload starts and allows only pinned IP/port pairs. Docker host destinations are blocked. Desktop, remote, rootless, Windows, and unverified daemon configurations refuse it. | +| Network | `Denied` → `--network none`. Docker has no outbound-only mode, so `Egress` uses the default bridge. `Allowlist` requires an explicitly installed `NativeLinuxDockerEgressController` on a verified local rootful Linux Engine; it installs default-drop IPv4/IPv6 rules before the workload starts and allows only pinned IP/port pairs. Approved names map to pinned addresses in `/etc/hosts`; the only DNS upstream is container-local `127.0.0.1`, so unlisted names cannot fall back to host DNS. Docker host destinations are blocked. Desktop, remote, rootless, Windows, and unverified daemon configurations refuse it. | | State | Read from `docker inspect`, not from the store. A container can be stopped or removed by anything with daemon access, and reporting a stale `ready` would send commands to a box that is gone. Docker's `running` maps to `Ready`, because a tinybox box is `Running` only while a command executes and the keepalive loop is not a command. | `Sandbox::exec_observed` runs `docker exec -i` through the same `Host`, so From 276c2d7fe36ff402e9ceae8635e16e33db996a57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:51:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 054/184] refactor(sandbox): drop dns pinning and host mappings from docker args The allowlist network branch no longer pins the container resolver to loopback or emits --add-host entries for the network's host mappings, so the docker run arguments are built from the network name alone. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs | 11 ----------- 1 file changed, 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs index b341723e..033d9c1b 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs @@ -124,17 +124,6 @@ pub(super) fn run( argv.extend(resource_flags(&spec.resources)); if let Some(network) = allowlist_network { argv.extend(["--network".to_owned(), network.network().to_owned()]); - // Custom Docker bridges use an embedded resolver that can forward DNS - // outside our per-bridge firewall. Pin its sole upstream to the - // workload's own loopback; approved names arrive through --add-host. - argv.extend(["--dns".to_owned(), "127.0.0.1".to_owned()]); - for (hostname, address) in network.host_mappings() { - let address = match address { - std::net::IpAddr::V4(address) => address.to_string(), - std::net::IpAddr::V6(address) => format!("[{address}]"), - }; - argv.extend(["--add-host".to_owned(), format!("{hostname}:{address}")]); - } } else { argv.extend(network_flags(&spec.network)); } From 5aa61438ac12a6e298b594d5c411cc97e8fd437a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:51:44 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 055/184] fix(sandbox): pin allowlist network dns to loopback Custom Docker bridges run an embedded resolver that can forward DNS outside the per-bridge firewall, so the container is now given --dns 127.0.0.1 and approved names are supplied via --add-host instead. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs index 033d9c1b..b341723e 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs @@ -124,6 +124,17 @@ pub(super) fn run( argv.extend(resource_flags(&spec.resources)); if let Some(network) = allowlist_network { argv.extend(["--network".to_owned(), network.network().to_owned()]); + // Custom Docker bridges use an embedded resolver that can forward DNS + // outside our per-bridge firewall. Pin its sole upstream to the + // workload's own loopback; approved names arrive through --add-host. + argv.extend(["--dns".to_owned(), "127.0.0.1".to_owned()]); + for (hostname, address) in network.host_mappings() { + let address = match address { + std::net::IpAddr::V4(address) => address.to_string(), + std::net::IpAddr::V6(address) => format!("[{address}]"), + }; + argv.extend(["--add-host".to_owned(), format!("{hostname}:{address}")]); + } } else { argv.extend(network_flags(&spec.network)); } From af47a8d0b24875abfef33851e70e3e29286ad8b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:52:48 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 056/184] docs(specs): clarify docker dns upstream rationale Move the explanation of Docker's per-container DNS behavior next to the paragraph describing the embedded resolver, and cite the upstream security advisory that documents it. The remaining text about the pinned upstream was redundant with the relocated passage, so it was dropped. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- docs/specs/contract-1-19.md | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md b/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md index 13d5fd6e..87032ea5 100644 --- a/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md +++ b/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md @@ -53,17 +53,17 @@ hostname/address pairs into the container's `/etc/hosts` and configures its only DNS upstream as container-local `127.0.0.1`, so Docker's embedded resolver cannot forward arbitrary queries to host DNS. Unlisted names therefore fail to resolve unless the workload provides a resolver in its own loopback namespace. +Docker documents `--dns` as a per-container resolver setting, and its [embedded +DNS security advisory](https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-mq39-4gv4-mvpx) +explains that a custom upstream forces external lookups to originate from the +container network namespace. Traffic from that bridge to the Docker host is dropped. The ordinary Docker sandbox continues to refuse allowlists unless this controller is installed. Docker Desktop, Windows, remote or unknown Hosts, rootless daemons, and daemons without the required firewall support refuse `Allowlist` as Unsupported. -`passthrough`, `namespace` and `microvm` continue to refuse it. Docker's custom -bridge embedded resolver forwards external queries to an upstream resolver; -the backend uses Docker's `--dns` option to pin that upstream to the container's -own loopback, and installs approved hostname mappings from the single pinned -resolution result. This follows Docker's documented per-container DNS behavior -for custom upstream addresses. The workload cannot fall back to host DNS. +`passthrough`, `namespace` and `microvm` continue to refuse it. The workload +cannot fall back to host DNS. ## Deprecated From 2e00f4a06abb769640eabf8a1563f05fda5103c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:54:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 057/184] fix(egress): roll back network setup and allow IPv6 neighbour discovery Native egress preparation now tears down the network it created when Docker returns an empty network id, surfacing a backend error if that rollback also fails so the sandbox can retry cleanup later. The managed firewall additionally permits IPv6 neighbour solicitation to the bridge gateway and accepts established or related forwarded traffic, which keeps IPv6 egress working without widening the allowlist. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 51 ++++++++++++++++++- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 32 +++++++++++- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs | 20 ++++++-- .../tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 2 + 4 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 387816e2..d628f6e4 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -35,7 +35,11 @@ pub trait DockerEgressController: Debug + Send + Sync { /// Resolve, pin, and prepare a filtered network for this box. /// /// Implementations must not start the workload. The returned network name - /// is supplied to `docker run` only after this method succeeds. + /// is supplied to `docker run` only after this method succeeds. On error, + /// the controller must roll back every resource it created. If rollback + /// fails, it must return `Error::Backend` with operation + /// `"roll back egress network setup"`, allowing the sandbox to retain the + /// box record for a later cleanup retry. async fn prepare( &self, host: &dyn Host, @@ -152,7 +156,15 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { ) .await?; if network.is_empty() { - return Err(unsupported("Docker did not confirm the egress network")); + let error = unsupported("Docker did not confirm the egress network"); + return match cleanup_native(host, namespace, id, true).await { + Ok(()) => Err(error), + Err(cleanup_error) => Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "roll back egress network setup", + message: format!("{error}; cleanup failed: {cleanup_error}"), + }), + }; } let setup = async { @@ -418,6 +430,26 @@ async fn install_family( command.extend(rule); firewall_success(host, firewall, command.iter().map(String::as_str)).await?; } + if ipv6 { + // IPv6 needs Neighbor Solicitation to resolve the bridge gateway's + // link-layer address. Permit only this control message to the host; + // all other managed-bridge INPUT traffic remains dropped. + firewall_success( + host, + firewall, + [ + "-A", + &names.input_chain, + "-p", + "ipv6-icmp", + "--icmpv6-type", + "neighbor-solicitation", + "-j", + "ACCEPT", + ], + ) + .await?; + } for target in plan.targets() { let address = target.address(); if is_ipv6(&address) != ipv6 { @@ -443,6 +475,21 @@ async fn install_family( .await?; } } + firewall_success( + host, + firewall, + [ + "-A", + &names.forward_chain, + "-m", + "conntrack", + "--ctstate", + "ESTABLISHED,RELATED", + "-j", + "ACCEPT", + ], + ) + .await?; firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-A", &names.forward_chain, "-j", "DROP"]).await?; // Host-origin traffic from the managed bridge is categorically denied. // Allowlist entries apply only to routed container egress. diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index e04c3c92..ae93a751 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ struct BridgeLinkHost { struct PreparedNativeHost { commands: Mutex>>, fail_network_create: bool, + empty_network_create: bool, box_id: String, bridge: String, forward_chain: String, @@ -120,6 +121,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { Self { commands: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), fail_network_create: false, + empty_network_create: false, box_id: id.to_string(), bridge: names.bridge.clone(), forward_chain: names.forward_chain.clone(), @@ -170,7 +172,12 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { b"network name already exists".to_vec(), )); } - return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, b"network-id".to_vec(), Vec::new())); + let network_id = if self.empty_network_create { + Vec::new() + } else { + b"network-id".to_vec() + }; + return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, network_id, Vec::new())); } if let Some(inspect_index) = docker_args.iter().position(|arg| arg == "inspect") { let format = docker_args @@ -355,6 +362,29 @@ async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> R Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +async fn empty_successful_network_create_rolls_back_the_owned_network() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.empty_network_create = true; + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + + assert!(matches!( + controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await, + Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + .. + }) + )); + assert!(host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.network) + })); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] async fn missing_forward_hook_refuses_native_egress_before_resource_creation() { for firewall in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] { diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs index ba6f0874..2b51e841 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs @@ -246,16 +246,28 @@ impl DockerSandbox { return Ok(None); }; let Some(controller) = &self.egress_controller else { - return Err(self - .rollback_failed_egress_create(id, attempt, unsupported_egress_policy()) - .await); + self.discard_failed_create_record(id, attempt); + return Err(unsupported_egress_policy()); }; match controller .prepare(self.host.as_ref(), &self.namespace, id, allowlist) .await { Ok(network) => Ok(Some(network)), - Err(error) => Err(self.rollback_failed_egress_create(id, attempt, error).await), + Err(error) => { + if matches!( + &error, + Error::Backend { + operation: "roll back egress network setup", + .. + } + ) { + self.remember_failed_create_attempt(id, attempt); + } else { + self.discard_failed_create_record(id, attempt); + } + Err(error) + } } } diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 05987bef..b158e6c6 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -207,6 +207,8 @@ async fn controller_failure_rolls_back_before_dropping_the_box_record() -> Resul ) -> Result { host.run(&ExecRequest::new(["controller", "prepare"])) .await?; + host.run(&ExecRequest::new(["controller", "cleanup"])) + .await?; Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { sandbox: NAME.to_owned(), constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, From cf45605dd83118fa30e85ff08db795b724e974bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:55:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 058/184] test(docker): assert firewall rule ordering and published-port reachability Extend the egress enforcement unit test to check that the established-flow rule precedes the forward default-drop and that the IPv6 neighbor-solicitation rule precedes the INPUT default-drop, guarding against ordering regressions. The live Docker test now publishes a dynamic port and verifies the guest listener is reachable through it while the allowlist is active. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 44 +++++++++++ crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 73 ++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index ae93a751..56ad11cc 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -319,6 +319,50 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "DROP") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.input_chain) })); + let established_position = commands + .iter() + .position(|argv| argv.windows(2).any(|args| args == ["--ctstate", "ESTABLISHED,RELATED"])) + .ok_or_else(|| Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "find established-flow firewall rule", + message: "rule was not installed".to_owned(), + })?; + let forward_drop_position = commands + .iter() + .position(|argv| { + argv.windows(4) + .any(|args| args == ["-A", &names.forward_chain, "-j", "DROP"]) + }) + .ok_or_else(|| Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "find forward default-drop rule", + message: "rule was not installed".to_owned(), + })?; + assert!(established_position < forward_drop_position); + let neighbor_solicitation_position = commands + .iter() + .position(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "ip6tables") + && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "neighbor-solicitation") + }) + .ok_or_else(|| Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "find IPv6 neighbor-discovery rule", + message: "rule was not installed".to_owned(), + })?; + let input_drop_position = commands + .iter() + .position(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "ip6tables") + && argv.windows(4) + .any(|args| args == ["-A", &names.input_chain, "-j", "DROP"]) + }) + .ok_or_else(|| Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "find INPUT default-drop rule", + message: "rule was not installed".to_owned(), + })?; + assert!(neighbor_solicitation_position < input_drop_position); assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-D") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "DOCKER-USER") })); diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 2e05802d..7cd028f7 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ use std::{ use tinybox_core::{ BoxSpec, EgressAllowlist, Error, ExecRequest, Host as _, HostRef, MemoryStore, NetworkPolicy, - Placement, Result, Sandbox, SandboxRef, WorkspaceSource, + Placement, PortMapping, Result, Sandbox, SandboxRef, WorkspaceSource, }; use tinybox_docker::{DockerSandbox, EgressResolver, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController}; use tinybox_host::LocalHost; @@ -112,6 +112,42 @@ fn accept_before(listener: &TcpListener, deadline: Instant) -> std::io::Result Result> { + loop { + match TcpStream::connect_timeout(&address, Duration::from_millis(100)) { + Ok(mut stream) => { + stream + .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(1))) + .map_err(|error| Error::io("set published-port read timeout", &error))?; + let mut response = Vec::new(); + stream + .read_to_end(&mut response) + .map_err(|error| Error::io("read published-port response", &error))?; + return Ok(response); + } + Err(error) + if matches!( + error.kind(), + std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionRefused + | std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut + | std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock + ) => + { + if Instant::now() >= deadline { + return Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "connect to published container port", + message: error.to_string(), + }); + } + thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); + } + Err(error) => return Err(Error::io("connect to published container port", &error)), + } + } +} + /// Build the bounded HTTP request the container uses to probe the listener. fn http_probe_command(address: SocketAddr) -> String { format!("wget -q -T 3 -O - http://{address}/probe") @@ -465,9 +501,39 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(resolver))); let allowlist = EgressAllowlist::new(["listener.test"], [18373]); let info = sandbox - .create(&spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist))) + .create( + &spec()? + .with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist)) + .with_port(PortMapping::dynamic(18375)), + ) .await?; + sandbox + .exec( + &info.id, + &ExecRequest::new([ + "sh", + "-c", + "while true; do printf 'published-ok\\n' | nc -l -p 18375; done /dev/null 2>&1 &", + ]), + ) + .await?; + let published_port = sandbox + .published_ports(&info.id) + .await? + .into_iter() + .find(|mapping| mapping.guest == 18375) + .and_then(|mapping| mapping.host) + .ok_or_else(|| Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "inspect published container port", + message: "Docker did not assign a host port".to_owned(), + })?; + let published_response = exchange_before( + SocketAddr::from((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, published_port)), + Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5), + )?; + let allowed = sandbox .exec( &info.id, @@ -548,6 +614,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( || blocked.exit_code == 0 || host_gateway.exit_code == 0 || dns_blocked.exit_code == 0 + || published_response != b"published-ok\n" || !blocked_hits.success() || !dns_hits.success() || !host_listener_untouched @@ -556,7 +623,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), operation: "verify native egress allowlist", message: format!( - "allowed exit={}, blocked exit={}, host-gateway exit={}, unlisted DNS lookup exit={}, forbidden TCP hit={}, forbidden DNS hit={}, host listener touched={}", + "allowed exit={}, blocked exit={}, host-gateway exit={}, unlisted DNS lookup exit={}, published response={published_response:?}, forbidden TCP hit={}, forbidden DNS hit={}, host listener touched={}", allowed.exit_code, blocked.exit_code, host_gateway.exit_code, From e76e1eb5f0f221b7a153a643331dc6d1c1744271 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:56:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 059/184] test(docker): cover ipv6 allowlist egress in live test The live allowlist test now attaches the target container to an IPv6-enabled bridge network and resolves both its IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, so the egress allowlist is exercised over IPv6 as well as IPv4. A new IPv6 listener and connectivity check assert that allowed IPv6 traffic reaches the target while other destinations remain blocked. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 69 +++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 7cd028f7..cc8f22b2 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -414,11 +414,11 @@ async fn live_network_policy_controls_host_listener_connectivity() -> Result<()> } #[derive(Debug)] -struct FixedResolver(std::net::IpAddr); +struct FixedResolver(Vec); impl EgressResolver for FixedResolver { fn resolve(&self, _hostname: &str) -> std::io::Result> { - Ok(vec![self.0]) + Ok(self.0.clone()) } } @@ -459,6 +459,8 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( let suffix = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string(); let target_name = format!("tinybox-egress-target-{}", &suffix[..12]); + let target_network = format!("tinybox-egress-v6-{}", &suffix[..12]); + let target_subnet = format!("fd42:{}:5678::/64", &suffix[..4]); let gateway = docker_bridge_gateway()?; let host_listener = TcpListener::bind((gateway, 0)).map_err(|error| Error::Backend { sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), @@ -479,14 +481,30 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( IMAGE, "sh", "-c", - "(while true; do nc -l -p 18373 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed; done) & (while true; do nc -l -p 18374 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/blocked; done) & (while true; do nc -u -l -p 53 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/dns; done) & wait", + "(while true; do nc -l -p 18373 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed; done) & (while true; do nc -l -p 18374 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/blocked; done) & (while true; do nc -6 -l -p 18376 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed-v6; done) & (while true; do nc -u -l -p 53 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/dns; done) & wait", ]); let _ = image?; + if let Err(error) = docker_command(&[ + "network", + "create", + "--driver", + "bridge", + "--ipv6", + "--subnet", + &target_subnet, + &target_network, + ]) { + let _ = Command::new("docker") + .args(["rm", "-f", &target_name]) + .status(); + return Err(error); + } let result = async { - let ip = docker_command(&[ + docker_command(&["network", "connect", &target_network, &target_name])?; + let ipv4 = docker_command(&[ "inspect", "--format", - "{{range .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{.IPAddress}}{{end}}", + "{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks \"bridge\").IPAddress}}", &target_name, ])? .parse::() @@ -495,8 +513,22 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( operation: "read the controlled listener address", message: error.to_string(), })?; + let ipv6 = docker_command(&[ + "inspect", + "--format", + &format!( + "{{{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks \\\"{target_network}\\\").GlobalIPv6Address}}}}" + ), + &target_name, + ])? + .parse::() + .map_err(|error| Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "read the controlled IPv6 listener address", + message: error.to_string(), + })?; - let resolver: Arc = Arc::new(FixedResolver(ip)); + let resolver: Arc = Arc::new(FixedResolver(vec![ipv4, ipv6])); let sandbox = sandbox(&format!("ns-egress-{}", &suffix[..8]))? .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(resolver))); let allowlist = EgressAllowlist::new(["listener.test"], [18373]); @@ -544,6 +576,16 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( ]), ) .await; + let allowed_v6 = sandbox + .exec( + &info.id, + &ExecRequest::new([ + "sh", + "-c", + "unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nc -6 -z -w 3 listener.test 18376", + ]), + ) + .await; let blocked = sandbox .exec( &info.id, @@ -590,6 +632,13 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( ); let allowed_hits = docker_command(&["exec", &target_name, "sh", "-c", "test -s /tmp/allowed"]); + let allowed_v6_hits = docker_command(&[ + "exec", + &target_name, + "sh", + "-c", + "test -s /tmp/allowed-v6", + ]); let blocked_hits = Command::new("docker") .args(["exec", &target_name, "sh", "-c", "test ! -s /tmp/blocked"]) .status() @@ -602,20 +651,24 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( // Cleanup runs before any assertion is returned to the test harness. let destroy = sandbox.destroy(&info.id).await; let allowed = allowed?; + let allowed_v6 = allowed_v6?; let blocked = blocked?; let host_gateway = host_gateway?; let dns_blocked = dns_blocked?; direct_dns?; destroy?; allowed_hits?; + let allowed_v6_hits = allowed_v6_hits?; let blocked_hits = blocked_hits?; let dns_hits = dns_hits?; if allowed.exit_code != 0 + || allowed_v6.exit_code != 0 || blocked.exit_code == 0 || host_gateway.exit_code == 0 || dns_blocked.exit_code == 0 || published_response != b"published-ok\n" || !blocked_hits.success() + || !allowed_v6_hits.success() || !dns_hits.success() || !host_listener_untouched { @@ -623,13 +676,15 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), operation: "verify native egress allowlist", message: format!( - "allowed exit={}, blocked exit={}, host-gateway exit={}, unlisted DNS lookup exit={}, published response={published_response:?}, forbidden TCP hit={}, forbidden DNS hit={}, host listener touched={}", + "allowed v4 exit={}, allowed v6 exit={}, blocked exit={}, host-gateway exit={}, unlisted DNS lookup exit={}, published response={published_response:?}, forbidden TCP hit={}, forbidden DNS hit={}, allowed v6 hit={}, host listener touched={}", allowed.exit_code, + allowed_v6.exit_code, blocked.exit_code, host_gateway.exit_code, dns_blocked.exit_code, !blocked_hits.success(), !dns_hits.success(), + !allowed_v6_hits.success(), !host_listener_untouched ), }); From c6193aa8a97a8b41a4e971e4575a6c8a75aa7434 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:56:57 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 060/184] test(docker): fix live egress allowlist probe cleanup Wrap the live allowlist probes in an async block so the sandbox is destroyed after the probe results are collected, and remove the stale IPv6 hit assertion that no longer reflects the probe set. Also clean up the controlled IPv6 listener network and use the resolved IPv4 address in the raw TCP and DNS probes. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 8 +++-- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 29 ++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 56ad11cc..1e66b257 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -321,7 +321,10 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() })); let established_position = commands .iter() - .position(|argv| argv.windows(2).any(|args| args == ["--ctstate", "ESTABLISHED,RELATED"])) + .position(|argv| { + argv.windows(2) + .any(|args| args == ["--ctstate", "ESTABLISHED,RELATED"]) + }) .ok_or_else(|| Error::Backend { sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), operation: "find established-flow firewall rule", @@ -354,7 +357,8 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() .iter() .position(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "ip6tables") - && argv.windows(4) + && argv + .windows(4) .any(|args| args == ["-A", &names.input_chain, "-j", "DROP"]) }) .ok_or_else(|| Error::Backend { diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index cc8f22b2..8fc9ac98 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -540,6 +540,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( ) .await?; + let probes = async { sandbox .exec( &info.id, @@ -592,7 +593,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( &ExecRequest::new([ "sh", "-c", - &format!("unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nc -z -w 2 {ip} {BLOCKED_PORT}"), + &format!("unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nc -z -w 2 {ipv4} {BLOCKED_PORT}"), ]), ) .await; @@ -622,7 +623,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( &ExecRequest::new([ "sh", "-c", - &format!("printf probe | nc -u -w 1 {ip} 53 || true"), + &format!("printf probe | nc -u -w 1 {ipv4} 53 || true"), ]), ) .await; @@ -648,15 +649,12 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( .status() .map_err(|error| Error::io("check forbidden DNS listener", &error)); - // Cleanup runs before any assertion is returned to the test harness. - let destroy = sandbox.destroy(&info.id).await; let allowed = allowed?; let allowed_v6 = allowed_v6?; let blocked = blocked?; let host_gateway = host_gateway?; let dns_blocked = dns_blocked?; direct_dns?; - destroy?; allowed_hits?; let allowed_v6_hits = allowed_v6_hits?; let blocked_hits = blocked_hits?; @@ -668,7 +666,6 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( || dns_blocked.exit_code == 0 || published_response != b"published-ok\n" || !blocked_hits.success() - || !allowed_v6_hits.success() || !dns_hits.success() || !host_listener_untouched { @@ -676,7 +673,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), operation: "verify native egress allowlist", message: format!( - "allowed v4 exit={}, allowed v6 exit={}, blocked exit={}, host-gateway exit={}, unlisted DNS lookup exit={}, published response={published_response:?}, forbidden TCP hit={}, forbidden DNS hit={}, allowed v6 hit={}, host listener touched={}", + "allowed v4 exit={}, allowed v6 exit={}, blocked exit={}, host-gateway exit={}, unlisted DNS lookup exit={}, published response={published_response:?}, forbidden TCP hit={}, forbidden DNS hit={}, host listener touched={}", allowed.exit_code, allowed_v6.exit_code, blocked.exit_code, @@ -684,25 +681,35 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( dns_blocked.exit_code, !blocked_hits.success(), !dns_hits.success(), - !allowed_v6_hits.success(), !host_listener_untouched ), }); } Ok(()) + } + .await; + let destroy = sandbox.destroy(&info.id).await; + probes?; + destroy?; + Ok(()) } .await; let cleanup = Command::new("docker") .args(["rm", "-f", &target_name]) .status() .map_err(|error| Error::io("remove controlled listener", &error)); + let network_cleanup = Command::new("docker") + .args(["network", "rm", &target_network]) + .status() + .map_err(|error| Error::io("remove controlled IPv6 listener network", &error)); result?; let cleanup = cleanup?; - if !cleanup.success() { + let network_cleanup = network_cleanup?; + if !cleanup.success() || !network_cleanup.success() { return Err(Error::Backend { sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), - operation: "remove controlled listener", - message: "docker rm returned a failure status".to_owned(), + operation: "remove controlled listeners", + message: "docker rm or docker network rm returned a failure status".to_owned(), }); } Ok(()) From 735bcae1dbd23fa00fcc53e185747eabc787a059 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:57:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 061/184] docs: document allowlist bridge-to-host exceptions The contract and runtime specs now state that IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation and connection-tracked published-port replies are the only traffic permitted from the bridge to the Docker host, replacing the blanket drop description. A live test binding was also simplified to drop an unused variable. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 2 +- docs/specs/contract-1-19.md | 7 +++++-- docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md | 2 +- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 8fc9ac98..7a762ef5 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( let dns_blocked = dns_blocked?; direct_dns?; allowed_hits?; - let allowed_v6_hits = allowed_v6_hits?; + allowed_v6_hits?; let blocked_hits = blocked_hits?; let dns_hits = dns_hits?; if allowed.exit_code != 0 diff --git a/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md b/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md index 87032ea5..9d79c53c 100644 --- a/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md +++ b/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md @@ -57,8 +57,11 @@ Docker documents `--dns` as a per-container resolver setting, and its [embedded DNS security advisory](https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-mq39-4gv4-mvpx) explains that a custom upstream forces external lookups to originate from the container network namespace. -Traffic from that bridge to the Docker host is dropped. The ordinary Docker -sandbox continues to refuse allowlists unless this controller is installed. +All other traffic from that bridge to the Docker host is dropped; IPv6 +Neighbor Solicitation is permitted for bridge-gateway address resolution. +Published-port replies are allowed only when connection tracking marks them +`ESTABLISHED` or `RELATED`. The ordinary Docker sandbox continues to refuse +allowlists unless this controller is installed. Docker Desktop, Windows, remote or unknown Hosts, rootless daemons, and daemons without the required firewall support refuse `Allowlist` as Unsupported. diff --git a/docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md b/docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md index 6ba030ae..d4a61c97 100644 --- a/docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md +++ b/docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ composition in M4. ADR 0004 records the tradeoff. | `Snapshot` | The committed image. | | `GitRepo` | Refused by name — no clone step exists yet. | | Limits | `--memory`, `--cpus`, `--pids-limit`. Disk is **not** applied: `--storage-opt size=` works on a minority of storage drivers, and a flag that silently does nothing on most systems is worse than an honest omission. | -| Network | `Denied` → `--network none`. Docker has no outbound-only mode, so `Egress` uses the default bridge. `Allowlist` requires an explicitly installed `NativeLinuxDockerEgressController` on a verified local rootful Linux Engine; it installs default-drop IPv4/IPv6 rules before the workload starts and allows only pinned IP/port pairs. Approved names map to pinned addresses in `/etc/hosts`; the only DNS upstream is container-local `127.0.0.1`, so unlisted names cannot fall back to host DNS. Docker host destinations are blocked. Desktop, remote, rootless, Windows, and unverified daemon configurations refuse it. | +| Network | `Denied` → `--network none`. Docker has no outbound-only mode, so `Egress` uses the default bridge. `Allowlist` requires an explicitly installed `NativeLinuxDockerEgressController` on a verified local rootful Linux Engine; it installs default-drop IPv4/IPv6 rules before the workload starts and allows only pinned IP/port pairs. Approved names map to pinned addresses in `/etc/hosts`; the only DNS upstream is container-local `127.0.0.1`, so unlisted names cannot fall back to host DNS. IPv6 neighbor solicitation and established published-port replies are the only exceptions to bridge-to-host drop rules. Desktop, remote, rootless, Windows, and unverified daemon configurations refuse it. | | State | Read from `docker inspect`, not from the store. A container can be stopped or removed by anything with daemon access, and reporting a stale `ready` would send commands to a box that is gone. Docker's `running` maps to `Ready`, because a tinybox box is `Running` only while a command executes and the keepalive loop is not a command. | `Sandbox::exec_observed` runs `docker exec -i` through the same `Host`, so From 076be2d7b867dd1186c3778617bf385bdd0b738e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:57:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 062/184] refactor(tinybox-docker): extract pinned destination rules into helper Moves the loop that appends ACCEPT rules for pinned egress targets out of install_family into a dedicated install_pinned_destinations function. This keeps install_family focused on sequencing and makes the pinned-destination rule generation reusable and easier to read. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 61 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index d628f6e4..00af1213 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -450,31 +450,7 @@ async fn install_family( ) .await?; } - for target in plan.targets() { - let address = target.address(); - if is_ipv6(&address) != ipv6 { - continue; - } - for protocol in ALLOWLIST_PROTOCOLS { - firewall_success( - host, - firewall, - [ - "-A", - &names.forward_chain, - "-d", - &address.to_string(), - "-p", - protocol, - "--dport", - &target.port().to_string(), - "-j", - "ACCEPT", - ], - ) - .await?; - } - } + install_pinned_destinations(host, firewall, names, plan, ipv6).await?; firewall_success( host, firewall, @@ -535,6 +511,41 @@ async fn install_family( Ok(()) } +async fn install_pinned_destinations( + host: &dyn Host, + firewall: &str, + names: &NetworkNames, + plan: &PinnedEgressPlan, + ipv6: bool, +) -> Result<()> { + for target in plan.targets() { + let address = target.address(); + if is_ipv6(&address) != ipv6 { + continue; + } + for protocol in ALLOWLIST_PROTOCOLS { + firewall_success( + host, + firewall, + [ + "-A", + &names.forward_chain, + "-d", + &address.to_string(), + "-p", + protocol, + "--dport", + &target.port().to_string(), + "-j", + "ACCEPT", + ], + ) + .await?; + } + } + Ok(()) +} + fn deny_rules(ipv6: bool) -> Vec> { if ipv6 { ["::1/128", "fe80::/10", "fd00:ec2::254/128"] From c5d229bd9b23984c61e0bfe127d7cd439d5f216e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:58:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 063/184] test(sandbox): assert rollback failure reports its own operation The egress rollback test now injects a backend error carrying the "roll back egress network setup" operation instead of a constraint violation, and the assertion matches on that operation. This keeps the test aligned with the controller reporting its failed partial-setup rollback distinctly so the box record is retained for a later destroy retry. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index b158e6c6..73052ba4 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -336,10 +336,14 @@ async fn failed_egress_rollback_retains_box_record_for_cleanup_retry() -> Result _id: &BoxId, _allowlist: &tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist, ) -> Result { - Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + // The controller owns its partial setup rollback. If that rollback + // fails, it reports the distinct operation so the sandbox retains + // the box record for a later destroy retry without issuing a + // second, potentially unsafe cleanup. + Err(Error::Backend { sandbox: NAME.to_owned(), - constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, - enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + operation: "roll back egress network setup", + message: "cleanup failed: filter unavailable".to_owned(), }) } @@ -366,7 +370,7 @@ async fn failed_egress_rollback_retains_box_record_for_cleanup_retry() -> Result sandbox .create(&spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist))) .await, - Err(Error::Backend { message, .. }) if message.contains("cleanup failed") + Err(Error::Backend { operation: "roll back egress network setup", message, .. }) if message.contains("cleanup failed") )); assert_eq!(store.list()?.len(), 1); Ok(()) From 4f794873ec418a62e22f7c2893ccc425b50bd84f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:59:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 064/184] test(sandbox): cover failed create cleanup retaining the record Add a test asserting that when egress cleanup fails during rollback of a failed create, the original error is preserved alongside the cleanup failure and the box record and attempt marker are kept so cleanup can be retried. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 63 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 73052ba4..2f8a906a 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -376,6 +376,69 @@ async fn failed_egress_rollback_retains_box_record_for_cleanup_retry() -> Result Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +async fn failed_create_cleanup_retains_the_record_for_retry() -> Result<()> { + #[derive(Debug)] + struct CleanupFailureController; + + #[async_trait] + impl super::DockerEgressController for CleanupFailureController { + async fn prepare( + &self, + _host: &dyn Host, + _namespace: &str, + _id: &BoxId, + _allowlist: &tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist, + ) -> Result { + unreachable!("this test enters the rollback path directly") + } + + async fn cleanup(&self, _host: &dyn Host, _namespace: &str, _id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { + Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: NAME.to_owned(), + operation: "remove test egress filter", + message: "filter unavailable".to_owned(), + }) + } + + fn docker_argv(&self, argv: Vec) -> Vec { + argv + } + } + + let host = ScriptedHost::silent(); + let store = Arc::new(MemoryStore::new()); + let sandbox = DockerSandbox::new(host, store.clone()) + .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(CleanupFailureController)); + let info = tinybox_core::insert_new(&store, BoxState::Ready, &spec()?, 0)?; + let original = Error::Backend { + sandbox: NAME.to_owned(), + operation: "start test container", + message: "start failed".to_owned(), + }; + + let error = sandbox + .rollback_failed_create(&info.id, "attempt", true, original) + .await; + + assert!(matches!( + error, + Error::Backend { operation: "roll back egress network setup", ref message, .. } + if message.contains("start failed") && message.contains("filter unavailable") + )); + assert_eq!(store.list()?.len(), 1); + assert_eq!( + sandbox + .failed_create_attempts + .lock() + .unwrap() + .get(&info.id) + .map(String::as_str), + Some("attempt") + ); + Ok(()) +} + #[test] fn effective_published_ports_parse_dynamic_and_fixed_bindings() -> Result<()> { let ports = args::parse_published_ports( From e78512e8efa293a23b9822aed61020546236f89b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:59:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 065/184] test(sandbox): update insert_new call in cleanup retry test The failed-create cleanup test now passes the store by reference and supplies an explicit timestamp to insert_new, matching the updated signature. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 2f8a906a..c186eb81 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -410,7 +410,12 @@ async fn failed_create_cleanup_retains_the_record_for_retry() -> Result<()> { let store = Arc::new(MemoryStore::new()); let sandbox = DockerSandbox::new(host, store.clone()) .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(CleanupFailureController)); - let info = tinybox_core::insert_new(&store, BoxState::Ready, &spec()?, 0)?; + let info = tinybox_core::insert_new( + store.as_ref(), + BoxState::Ready, + &spec()?, + std::time::SystemTime::now(), + )?; let original = Error::Backend { sandbox: NAME.to_owned(), operation: "start test container", From 505fdfb1ee57c07b6c7ef5208e19c9613fabe929 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:00:16 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 066/184] test(sandbox): recover poisoned lock in failed create cleanup test The test now recovers the mutex guard with unwrap_or_else and PoisonError::into_inner instead of unwrapping, so a poisoned lock no longer panics the assertion. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index c186eb81..0badc85b 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ async fn failed_create_cleanup_retains_the_record_for_retry() -> Result<()> { sandbox .failed_create_attempts .lock() - .unwrap() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .get(&info.id) .map(String::as_str), Some("attempt") From d1d3c9f53e3848abaf5ad324a8ea15c69f13f1c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:01:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 067/184] test(tinybox-docker): fix escaped quotes in live network inspect format The inspect format string passed to docker had unnecessary backslashes before the quotes around the network name, which would have produced a malformed Go template. The escaping was removed so the format string is built correctly. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 7a762ef5..087a3117 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( "inspect", "--format", &format!( - "{{{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks \\\"{target_network}\\\").GlobalIPv6Address}}}}" + "{{{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks \"{target_network}\").GlobalIPv6Address}}}}" ), &target_name, ])? From e31046010bfa873bdb953918c694c9577e007139 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:02:07 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 068/184] test(tinybox-docker): extract ipv6 inspect template helper The inline Go template used to read a container's global IPv6 address is now built by a small helper, with a unit test asserting the network name is quoted correctly. This makes the quoting behaviour verifiable without a live Docker engine. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 087a3117..e5b7ab37 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -441,6 +441,18 @@ fn docker_command(arguments: &[&str]) -> Result { Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim().to_owned()) } +fn ipv6_address_inspect_template(network: &str) -> String { + format!("{{{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks \"{network}\").GlobalIPv6Address}}}}") +} + +#[test] +fn ipv6_address_inspect_template_quotes_the_network_name() { + assert_eq!( + ipv6_address_inspect_template("controlled-v6"), + r#"{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks "controlled-v6").GlobalIPv6Address}}"# + ); +} + /// A disposable Linux Engine proof for the native firewall controller. /// /// Both listeners run in a separate, test-owned bridge container, so this @@ -516,9 +528,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( let ipv6 = docker_command(&[ "inspect", "--format", - &format!( - "{{{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks \"{target_network}\").GlobalIPv6Address}}}}" - ), + &ipv6_address_inspect_template(&target_network), &target_name, ])? .parse::() From f48aeb9ac0f9d5729fc161768036c0c6da533f26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:04:50 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 069/184] test(tinybox-docker): read a single line from the published port The live allowlist test now reads only up to the first newline instead of waiting for the connection to close, and the in-container listener exits after one connection. This keeps the test from hanging when the server holds the socket open. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index e5b7ab37..4d78eb6a 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ //! connectivity test fails if the opt-in gate was not enabled. use std::{ - io::{Read, Write}, + io::{BufRead, BufReader, Read, Write}, net::{Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr, TcpListener, TcpStream}, process::Command, sync::Arc, @@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ fn exchange_before(address: SocketAddr, deadline: Instant) -> Result> { .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(1))) .map_err(|error| Error::io("set published-port read timeout", &error))?; let mut response = Vec::new(); - stream - .read_to_end(&mut response) + BufReader::new(stream) + .read_until(b'\n', &mut response) .map_err(|error| Error::io("read published-port response", &error))?; return Ok(response); } @@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( &ExecRequest::new([ "sh", "-c", - "while true; do printf 'published-ok\\n' | nc -l -p 18375; done /dev/null 2>&1 &", + "while true; do printf 'published-ok\\n' | nc -l -p 18375 -q 1; done /dev/null 2>&1 &", ]), ) .await?; From 8d3963857fae4a0cca3cde3c50f97e92a10060b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:04:57 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 070/184] test(tinybox-docker): drop unused mut in live docker test The stream binding in exchange_before no longer needs to be mutable, so the mut qualifier was removed to silence the unused_mut warning. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 4d78eb6a..0ccc4b88 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ fn accept_before(listener: &TcpListener, deadline: Instant) -> std::io::Result Result> { loop { match TcpStream::connect_timeout(&address, Duration::from_millis(100)) { - Ok(mut stream) => { + Ok(stream) => { stream .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(1))) .map_err(|error| Error::io("set published-port read timeout", &error))?; From 9dd619d29dfbd10f252de37a7adb0cf4ce176ad3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:07:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 071/184] test(live-docker): serve published port over http The published-port fixture now runs a real httpd serving an index file instead of a netcat loop, and the client sends an HTTP request and reads the full response. This exercises the port-publishing path the way a browser would, rather than matching a single raw line. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 0ccc4b88..4f6e5780 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ //! connectivity test fails if the opt-in gate was not enabled. use std::{ - io::{BufRead, BufReader, Read, Write}, + io::{Read, Write}, net::{Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr, TcpListener, TcpStream}, process::Command, sync::Arc, @@ -120,9 +120,12 @@ fn exchange_before(address: SocketAddr, deadline: Instant) -> Result> { stream .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(1))) .map_err(|error| Error::io("set published-port read timeout", &error))?; + stream + .write_all(b"GET /index.html HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: localhost\r\n\r\n") + .map_err(|error| Error::io("request published-port response", &error))?; let mut response = Vec::new(); - BufReader::new(stream) - .read_until(b'\n', &mut response) + stream + .read_to_end(&mut response) .map_err(|error| Error::io("read published-port response", &error))?; return Ok(response); } @@ -557,7 +560,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( &ExecRequest::new([ "sh", "-c", - "while true; do printf 'published-ok\\n' | nc -l -p 18375 -q 1; done /dev/null 2>&1 &", + "printf 'published-ok\\n' >/tmp/index.html; httpd -f -p 18375 -h /tmp >/dev/null 2>&1 &", ]), ) .await?; @@ -674,7 +677,9 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( || blocked.exit_code == 0 || host_gateway.exit_code == 0 || dns_blocked.exit_code == 0 - || published_response != b"published-ok\n" + || !published_response + .windows(b"published-ok\n".len()) + .any(|window| window == b"published-ok\n") || !blocked_hits.success() || !dns_hits.success() || !host_listener_untouched From 11a29018af9c594b73ca0cdfd78264ccfc06f724 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:07:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 072/184] test(tinybox-docker): make stream binding mutable in live test The stream returned by connect_timeout is now bound as mutable so the subsequent read timeout configuration compiles. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 4f6e5780..7232d976 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ fn accept_before(listener: &TcpListener, deadline: Instant) -> std::io::Result Result> { loop { match TcpStream::connect_timeout(&address, Duration::from_millis(100)) { - Ok(stream) => { + Ok(mut stream) => { stream .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(1))) .map_err(|error| Error::io("set published-port read timeout", &error))?; From 535cbd188b76a7f8adf19e981b06d627887adcd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:11:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 073/184] test(tinybox-docker): read published-port response incrementally The live Docker test now sends Connection: close and reads the published-port response in chunks, returning as soon as the expected body marker appears instead of waiting for the stream to end. This avoids hanging when the server keeps the connection open. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 24 +++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 7232d976..deb36636 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -121,13 +121,27 @@ fn exchange_before(address: SocketAddr, deadline: Instant) -> Result> { .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(1))) .map_err(|error| Error::io("set published-port read timeout", &error))?; stream - .write_all(b"GET /index.html HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: localhost\r\n\r\n") + .write_all( + b"GET /index.html HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: localhost\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n", + ) .map_err(|error| Error::io("request published-port response", &error))?; let mut response = Vec::new(); - stream - .read_to_end(&mut response) - .map_err(|error| Error::io("read published-port response", &error))?; - return Ok(response); + let mut chunk = [0; 1024]; + loop { + let read = stream + .read(&mut chunk) + .map_err(|error| Error::io("read published-port response", &error))?; + if read == 0 { + return Ok(response); + } + response.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..read]); + if response + .windows(b"published-ok\n".len()) + .any(|window| window == b"published-ok\n") + { + return Ok(response); + } + } } Err(error) if matches!( From cbe0bc08878cee7a1682860d129b71d86cc4489c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:11:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 074/184] test(tinybox-docker): tolerate read timeouts while polling published port The live Docker test now retries reads that time out or would block as long as the overall deadline has not passed, instead of failing immediately, and the per-read timeout is shortened to 100ms so the loop can re-check the deadline promptly. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index deb36636..57911fde 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ fn exchange_before(address: SocketAddr, deadline: Instant) -> Result> { match TcpStream::connect_timeout(&address, Duration::from_millis(100)) { Ok(mut stream) => { stream - .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(1))) + .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_millis(100))) .map_err(|error| Error::io("set published-port read timeout", &error))?; stream .write_all( @@ -128,9 +128,21 @@ fn exchange_before(address: SocketAddr, deadline: Instant) -> Result> { let mut response = Vec::new(); let mut chunk = [0; 1024]; loop { - let read = stream - .read(&mut chunk) - .map_err(|error| Error::io("read published-port response", &error))?; + let read = match stream.read(&mut chunk) { + Ok(read) => read, + Err(error) + if matches!( + error.kind(), + std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock + | std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut + ) && Instant::now() < deadline => + { + continue; + } + Err(error) => { + return Err(Error::io("read published-port response", &error)); + } + }; if read == 0 { return Ok(response); } From 5c868976a2c6e48f36b927240f9c8634961510c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:11:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 075/184] test(tinybox-docker): collapse match arm onto one line Reformat the error kind match in the live Docker test so the two alternatives fit on a single line, matching rustfmt output. No behaviour change. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 57911fde..9a152f2c 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -133,8 +133,7 @@ fn exchange_before(address: SocketAddr, deadline: Instant) -> Result> { Err(error) if matches!( error.kind(), - std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock - | std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut + std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock | std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut ) && Instant::now() < deadline => { continue; From 27e867b1117ee500c97e5c541eada0f81b54c469 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:12:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 076/184] test(limited): cover local execution location reporting Add a test asserting that a limited local host reports its execution location as local, pinning the behaviour of the accessor. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod_tests.rs | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod_tests.rs index 80de6eb1..ca3ed25b 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod_tests.rs @@ -1,6 +1,14 @@ //! Bounded collection, simultaneous draining, and supervisor cleanup. use super::*; +#[test] +fn limited_local_host_reports_local_execution_location() { + assert_eq!( + LimitedLocalHost::new(16).execution_location(), + tinybox_core::HostExecutionLocation::Local + ); +} + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] #[tokio::test] async fn overflow_terminates_inherited_pipe_descendants_before_drain_returns() -> Result<()> { From f509d919067922d061efb0afa47486536609195b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:12:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 077/184] feat(limited): report execution location for limited local host The limited local host now implements execution_location by delegating to LocalHost, so callers get the correct location instead of the trait default. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs index edf22abf..971b6949 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs @@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ use std::sync::{ atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}, }; use tinybox_core::{ - Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, ExecutionObserver, Forward, Host, OutputStream, Result, - WorkspaceFileReader, WorkspaceFileWriter, + Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, ExecutionObserver, Forward, Host, HostExecutionLocation, + OutputStream, Result, WorkspaceFileReader, WorkspaceFileWriter, }; use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt}; use tokio::sync::{oneshot, watch}; @@ -297,6 +297,10 @@ impl Host for LimitedLocalHost { crate::LOCAL } + fn execution_location(&self) -> HostExecutionLocation { + LocalHost::new().execution_location() + } + async fn run(&self, request: &ExecRequest) -> Result { self.collect(request, None).await } From 9d758b9a9af14406f58b83491c65f33dcab420fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:12:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 078/184] test(egress): cover ipv4-mapped ipv6 answers Add a test asserting that an IPv4-mapped IPv6 resolver answer is normalized to its IPv4 target when planning an egress allowlist, so the mapped form is matched against the allowlist rather than treated as a distinct address. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs index 69c68685..11e7517a 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs @@ -231,6 +231,19 @@ fn allows_private_addresses_when_the_policy_does_not_forbid_them() Ok(()) } +#[test] +fn normalizes_ipv4_mapped_ipv6_answers_to_ipv4_targets() +-> std::result::Result<(), Box> { + let resolver = addresses("mapped.example", &["::ffff:203.0.113.11"])?; + let allowlist = EgressAllowlist::new(["mapped.example"], [443]); + + let plan = plan_egress_allowlist(&allowlist, &resolver)?; + + assert_eq!(plan.targets().len(), 1); + assert_eq!(plan.targets()[0].address(), "203.0.113.11".parse::()?); + Ok(()) +} + #[test] fn rejects_a_hostname_with_no_resolver_answers() -> std::result::Result<(), Box> { From c2564797b97a96f1eec0e5f00a63521238a8f329 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:13:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 079/184] fix(egress): normalize ipv4-mapped addresses in allowlist Resolved allowlist addresses are now normalized so IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses are treated as their IPv4 equivalents. This ensures the forbidden-address check catches metadata and loopback addresses that arrive in mapped form. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs index f0a82184..45599c4c 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs @@ -114,12 +114,16 @@ pub fn plan_egress_allowlist( reason: "allowlist host resolved to no addresses", }); } + let addresses = addresses + .into_iter() + .map(normalize_ip_address) + .collect::>(); if addresses.iter().any(is_forbidden_address) { return Err(Error::InvalidNetworkPolicy { reason: "allowlist host resolves to a metadata or loopback address", }); } - addresses_by_host.insert(host, addresses.into_iter().collect()); + addresses_by_host.insert(host, addresses); } let ports: BTreeSet<_> = allowlist.ports.iter().copied().collect(); @@ -143,6 +147,15 @@ fn normalize_host(host: &str) -> String { host.trim().trim_matches(['[', ']']).to_ascii_lowercase() } +fn normalize_ip_address(address: IpAddr) -> IpAddr { + match address { + IpAddr::V6(address) => address + .to_ipv4_mapped() + .map_or(IpAddr::V6(address), IpAddr::V4), + address => address, + } +} + fn is_forbidden_address(address: &IpAddr) -> bool { if EgressAllowlist::is_metadata_host(&address.to_string()) { return true; From 87e736237c4968ec09fd6cda5fdb74055f5a7070 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:13:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 080/184] test(egress): cover ipv4-mapped answers in native controller Add a fixture resolver that returns an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address and a test asserting the native controller records it as plain IPv4, emitting an iptables ACCEPT rule and no ip6tables rule. The existing normalization test is only reformatted. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 42 +++++++++++++++++++ crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs | 5 ++- 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 1e66b257..dc2a6033 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -100,6 +100,17 @@ impl EgressResolver for Resolver { } } +#[derive(Debug)] +struct MappedIpv4Resolver; + +impl EgressResolver for MappedIpv4Resolver { + fn resolve(&self, _hostname: &str) -> std::io::Result> { + Ok(vec!["::ffff:203.0.113.11".parse().map_err(|error| { + std::io::Error::other(format!("invalid fixture: {error}")) + })?]) + } +} + #[derive(Debug)] struct BridgeLinkHost { exists: bool, @@ -385,6 +396,37 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +async fn native_controller_maps_ipv4_mapped_answers_as_ipv4() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-mapped")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(MappedIpv4Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + + let prepared = controller + .prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist) + .await?; + + assert_eq!( + prepared.host_mappings(), + [("service.test".to_owned(), IpAddr::from([203, 0, 113, 11]))] + ); + let commands = host.commands(); + assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|part| part == "iptables") + && argv.iter().any(|part| part == "203.0.113.11") + && argv.iter().any(|part| part == "ACCEPT") + })); + assert!(!commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|part| part == "ip6tables") + && argv.iter().any(|part| part.contains("203.0.113.11")) + })); + controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await?; + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs index 11e7517a..8ea19189 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs @@ -240,7 +240,10 @@ fn normalizes_ipv4_mapped_ipv6_answers_to_ipv4_targets() let plan = plan_egress_allowlist(&allowlist, &resolver)?; assert_eq!(plan.targets().len(), 1); - assert_eq!(plan.targets()[0].address(), "203.0.113.11".parse::()?); + assert_eq!( + plan.targets()[0].address(), + "203.0.113.11".parse::()? + ); Ok(()) } From b6978088522f6301bae9563819d82984b10f17b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:13:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 081/184] fix(egress): make ipv4 arm of normalize_ip_address exhaustive The catch-all arm in normalize_ip_address was replaced with an explicit IpAddr::V4 pattern so the match no longer silently swallows future variants. Behaviour is unchanged for IPv4 addresses. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs index 45599c4c..108080f2 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ fn normalize_ip_address(address: IpAddr) -> IpAddr { IpAddr::V6(address) => address .to_ipv4_mapped() .map_or(IpAddr::V6(address), IpAddr::V4), - address => address, + IpAddr::V4(address) => IpAddr::V4(address), } } From 94f4bc3cd39b55c346f1645cf0188d210b96a0c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:16:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 082/184] test(docker): assert established input rule precedes drop rules The egress enforcement test now checks that the conntrack ESTABLISHED,RELATED return rule is installed before the IPv4 INPUT default-drop rule, and that neighbor solicitation still precedes it. This pins the ordering that keeps reply traffic from being dropped. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 33 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index dc2a6033..07daa7be 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -353,6 +353,36 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() message: "rule was not installed".to_owned(), })?; assert!(established_position < forward_drop_position); + let input_established_position = commands + .iter() + .position(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "iptables") + && argv + .windows(4) + .any(|args| args == ["-A", &names.input_chain, "-m", "conntrack"]) + && argv + .windows(2) + .any(|args| args == ["--ctstate", "ESTABLISHED,RELATED"]) + }) + .ok_or_else(|| Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "find established INPUT return rule", + message: "rule was not installed".to_owned(), + })?; + let ipv4_input_drop_position = commands + .iter() + .position(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "iptables") + && argv + .windows(4) + .any(|args| args == ["-A", &names.input_chain, "-j", "DROP"]) + }) + .ok_or_else(|| Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "find IPv4 INPUT default-drop rule", + message: "rule was not installed".to_owned(), + })?; + assert!(input_established_position < ipv4_input_drop_position); let neighbor_solicitation_position = commands .iter() .position(|argv| { @@ -377,7 +407,8 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() operation: "find INPUT default-drop rule", message: "rule was not installed".to_owned(), })?; - assert!(neighbor_solicitation_position < input_drop_position); + assert!(neighbor_solicitation_position < input_established_position); + assert!(input_established_position < input_drop_position); assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-D") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "DOCKER-USER") })); From 6127f90ed662521bb35544dd6f3b2c8588a27d6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:16:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 083/184] fix(egress): allow established return traffic to the host The INPUT chain dropped all bridge-to-host traffic, which also blocked responses to host-initiated connections such as published ports. An ESTABLISHED,RELATED conntrack rule is now installed ahead of the default drop so return traffic is accepted while new inbound connections stay blocked. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 20 +++++++++++++++++-- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 20 +++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 00af1213..418ae853 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -467,8 +467,24 @@ async fn install_family( ) .await?; firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-A", &names.forward_chain, "-j", "DROP"]).await?; - // Host-origin traffic from the managed bridge is categorically denied. - // Allowlist entries apply only to routed container egress. + // Permit only return traffic for host-initiated connections, such as + // responses to a published port. New bridge-to-host connections remain + // blocked regardless of the allowlist. + firewall_success( + host, + firewall, + [ + "-A", + &names.input_chain, + "-m", + "conntrack", + "--ctstate", + "ESTABLISHED,RELATED", + "-j", + "ACCEPT", + ], + ) + .await?; firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-A", &names.input_chain, "-j", "DROP"]).await?; firewall_success( diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 07daa7be..24be7ae1 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -407,8 +407,24 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() operation: "find INPUT default-drop rule", message: "rule was not installed".to_owned(), })?; - assert!(neighbor_solicitation_position < input_established_position); - assert!(input_established_position < input_drop_position); + let ipv6_input_established_position = commands + .iter() + .position(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "ip6tables") + && argv + .windows(4) + .any(|args| args == ["-A", &names.input_chain, "-m", "conntrack"]) + && argv + .windows(2) + .any(|args| args == ["--ctstate", "ESTABLISHED,RELATED"]) + }) + .ok_or_else(|| Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "find IPv6 established INPUT return rule", + message: "rule was not installed".to_owned(), + })?; + assert!(neighbor_solicitation_position < ipv6_input_established_position); + assert!(ipv6_input_established_position < input_drop_position); assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-D") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "DOCKER-USER") })); From c54c06042d31161e0d3347cc90ca926c3ac46f47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:16:50 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 084/184] test(egress): extract input rule assertions into a helper Split the input and return rule checks out of the native controller allowlist test into a dedicated assert_input_return_rules helper, and added assertions covering DOCKER-USER rule deletion, network removal, and consistent docker invocation through the unix socket. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 35 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 24be7ae1..7ca72163 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -353,6 +353,26 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() message: "rule was not installed".to_owned(), })?; assert!(established_position < forward_drop_position); + assert_input_return_rules(&commands, &names)?; + assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-D") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "DOCKER-USER") + })); + assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.network) + })); + assert!( + commands + .iter() + .filter(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "docker")) + .all(|argv| { + argv.first().is_some_and(|arg| arg == "env") + && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "unix:///var/run/docker.sock") + }) + ); + Ok(()) +} + +fn assert_input_return_rules(commands: &[Vec], names: &NetworkNames) -> Result<()> { let input_established_position = commands .iter() .position(|argv| { @@ -425,21 +445,6 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() })?; assert!(neighbor_solicitation_position < ipv6_input_established_position); assert!(ipv6_input_established_position < input_drop_position); - assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { - argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-D") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "DOCKER-USER") - })); - assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { - argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.network) - })); - assert!( - commands - .iter() - .filter(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "docker")) - .all(|argv| { - argv.first().is_some_and(|arg| arg == "env") - && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "unix:///var/run/docker.sock") - }) - ); Ok(()) } From 50d033d0676f1cf5cfd924c8b57c5e6aef4ca229 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:17:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 085/184] docs: clarify egress enforcement comments and contract wording Reword the IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation comment and the contract spec to describe the firewall behaviour more accurately: new host-bound traffic is dropped while established and related traffic is permitted so replies to host-initiated connections, including published-port requests, can flow. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 4 ++-- docs/specs/contract-1-19.md | 10 +++++----- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 418ae853..b4f0b631 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -432,8 +432,8 @@ async fn install_family( } if ipv6 { // IPv6 needs Neighbor Solicitation to resolve the bridge gateway's - // link-layer address. Permit only this control message to the host; - // all other managed-bridge INPUT traffic remains dropped. + // link-layer address. Permit this control message; established replies + // are added below, while new host-bound traffic remains dropped. firewall_success( host, firewall, diff --git a/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md b/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md index 9d79c53c..3702be2a 100644 --- a/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md +++ b/docs/specs/contract-1-19.md @@ -57,11 +57,11 @@ Docker documents `--dns` as a per-container resolver setting, and its [embedded DNS security advisory](https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-mq39-4gv4-mvpx) explains that a custom upstream forces external lookups to originate from the container network namespace. -All other traffic from that bridge to the Docker host is dropped; IPv6 -Neighbor Solicitation is permitted for bridge-gateway address resolution. -Published-port replies are allowed only when connection tracking marks them -`ESTABLISHED` or `RELATED`. The ordinary Docker sandbox continues to refuse -allowlists unless this controller is installed. +New traffic from that bridge to the Docker host is dropped, except IPv6 +Neighbor Solicitation for bridge-gateway address resolution. Existing +`ESTABLISHED` or `RELATED` traffic is allowed so host-initiated connections, +including published-port requests, can receive replies. The ordinary Docker +sandbox continues to refuse allowlists unless this controller is installed. Docker Desktop, Windows, remote or unknown Hosts, rootless daemons, and daemons without the required firewall support refuse `Allowlist` as Unsupported. From 704000d8be5674c738427f464887e432c07d427d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:20:40 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 086/184] test(tinybox-docker): retry reads on connection reset in live test The live Docker test now treats a connection reset before the deadline as a retryable condition and sleeps briefly between attempts, so transient resets while waiting for the published-port response no longer fail the test. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 9a152f2c..6f0b55dc 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -138,6 +138,12 @@ fn exchange_before(address: SocketAddr, deadline: Instant) -> Result> { { continue; } + Err(error) + if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionReset + && Instant::now() < deadline => + { + break; + } Err(error) => { return Err(Error::io("read published-port response", &error)); } @@ -153,6 +159,7 @@ fn exchange_before(address: SocketAddr, deadline: Instant) -> Result> { return Ok(response); } } + thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); } Err(error) if matches!( From f75425b18794edcdfb5e1515a7df837a49877bdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:20:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 087/184] test(tinybox-docker): start published-port httpd detached via docker exec The live allowlist test now writes the response file through a checked sandbox exec and starts httpd with a detached docker exec instead of backgrounding it inside the shell, so a failed file setup is reported rather than silently ignored. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 30 +++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 6f0b55dc..35554440 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -574,7 +574,8 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( })?; let resolver: Arc = Arc::new(FixedResolver(vec![ipv4, ipv6])); - let sandbox = sandbox(&format!("ns-egress-{}", &suffix[..8]))? + let namespace = format!("ns-egress-{}", &suffix[..8]); + let sandbox = sandbox(&namespace)? .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(resolver))); let allowlist = EgressAllowlist::new(["listener.test"], [18373]); let info = sandbox @@ -586,16 +587,31 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( .await?; let probes = async { - sandbox + let file_setup = sandbox .exec( &info.id, - &ExecRequest::new([ - "sh", - "-c", - "printf 'published-ok\\n' >/tmp/index.html; httpd -f -p 18375 -h /tmp >/dev/null 2>&1 &", - ]), + &ExecRequest::new(["sh", "-c", "printf 'published-ok\\n' >/tmp/index.html"]), ) .await?; + if file_setup.exit_code != 0 { + return Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "prepare the published-port response", + message: file_setup.stderr_lossy(), + }); + } + let container = format!("tinybox-{namespace}-{}", info.id); + docker_command(&[ + "exec", + "-d", + &container, + "httpd", + "-f", + "-p", + "0.0.0.0:18375", + "-h", + "/tmp", + ])?; let published_port = sandbox .published_ports(&info.id) .await? From 0ffed939bef53ec8492be1125fd2bd345d30761d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:21:01 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 088/184] test(tinybox-docker): fix stderr_lossy ownership in live test The published-port response error path passed a borrowed Cow where an owned String was expected, so the live allowlist test failed to compile. Calling into_owned on the stderr output resolves the type mismatch. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 35554440..8b995cad 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( return Err(Error::Backend { sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), operation: "prepare the published-port response", - message: file_setup.stderr_lossy(), + message: file_setup.stderr_lossy().into_owned(), }); } let container = format!("tinybox-{namespace}-{}", info.id); From e3c2f8ce529cc60fa42b54a104e45f593a9f1f10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:24:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 089/184] test(live-docker): serve published port with nc loop Replace the httpd-based published-port probe with a shell loop that pipes a fixed response through nc, removing the separate file setup step so the test no longer depends on httpd being present in the image. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 22 +++------------------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 8b995cad..a47feab7 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -587,30 +587,14 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( .await?; let probes = async { - let file_setup = sandbox - .exec( - &info.id, - &ExecRequest::new(["sh", "-c", "printf 'published-ok\\n' >/tmp/index.html"]), - ) - .await?; - if file_setup.exit_code != 0 { - return Err(Error::Backend { - sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), - operation: "prepare the published-port response", - message: file_setup.stderr_lossy().into_owned(), - }); - } let container = format!("tinybox-{namespace}-{}", info.id); docker_command(&[ "exec", "-d", &container, - "httpd", - "-f", - "-p", - "0.0.0.0:18375", - "-h", - "/tmp", + "sh", + "-c", + "while true; do printf 'published-ok\\n' | nc -l -p 18375; done", ])?; let published_port = sandbox .published_ports(&info.id) From 1eedbc9ece9736bb646fc6bb6885dd9bd373cf85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:24:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 090/184] test(tinybox-docker): simplify published-port probe payload Replace the HTTP request written to the published port with a plain probe line, since the test only needs to confirm the port is reachable and not to exercise an HTTP exchange. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index a47feab7..85b560ac 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -121,9 +121,7 @@ fn exchange_before(address: SocketAddr, deadline: Instant) -> Result> { .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_millis(100))) .map_err(|error| Error::io("set published-port read timeout", &error))?; stream - .write_all( - b"GET /index.html HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: localhost\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n", - ) + .write_all(b"published-port probe\n") .map_err(|error| Error::io("request published-port response", &error))?; let mut response = Vec::new(); let mut chunk = [0; 1024]; From a292574ce2fac43a922545360ccc3d1ea47c99c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:26:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 091/184] test(tinybox-docker): cover both listener probe ports in allowlist Extract the allowlist construction used by the live egress test into a shared helper and add a unit test asserting it contains both listener probe ports, so a missing port is caught without a live Docker run. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 85b560ac..62672d7f 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -478,6 +478,17 @@ fn ipv6_address_inspect_template(network: &str) -> String { format!("{{{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks \"{network}\").GlobalIPv6Address}}}}") } +fn allowlist_probe_ports() -> tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist { + tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["listener.test"], [18373]) +} + +#[test] +fn live_allowlist_covers_both_listener_probe_ports() { + let allowlist = allowlist_probe_ports(); + assert!(allowlist.ports.contains(&18373)); + assert!(allowlist.ports.contains(&18376)); +} + #[test] fn ipv6_address_inspect_template_quotes_the_network_name() { assert_eq!( @@ -575,7 +586,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( let namespace = format!("ns-egress-{}", &suffix[..8]); let sandbox = sandbox(&namespace)? .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(resolver))); - let allowlist = EgressAllowlist::new(["listener.test"], [18373]); + let allowlist = allowlist_probe_ports(); let info = sandbox .create( &spec()? From 40e98f7b3822b6823d287ab01391f7abb7b90ed7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:26:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 092/184] test(tinybox-docker): cover additional allowlist probe port Extend the live Docker allowlist probe to include port 18376 alongside the existing 18373, and drop the now-unused EgressAllowlist import from the test's use list. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 62672d7f..116c6549 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ use std::{ }; use tinybox_core::{ - BoxSpec, EgressAllowlist, Error, ExecRequest, Host as _, HostRef, MemoryStore, NetworkPolicy, - Placement, PortMapping, Result, Sandbox, SandboxRef, WorkspaceSource, + BoxSpec, Error, ExecRequest, Host as _, HostRef, MemoryStore, NetworkPolicy, Placement, + PortMapping, Result, Sandbox, SandboxRef, WorkspaceSource, }; use tinybox_docker::{DockerSandbox, EgressResolver, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController}; use tinybox_host::LocalHost; @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ fn ipv6_address_inspect_template(network: &str) -> String { } fn allowlist_probe_ports() -> tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist { - tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["listener.test"], [18373]) + tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["listener.test"], [18373, 18376]) } #[test] From 42a115b4d5790ec8944b59d4bda2144f6348f963 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:27:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 093/184] test(docker): cover cleanup refusing a foreign network owner Add a test asserting that cleanup fails and leaves firewall rules untouched when the inspected network belongs to a different box. The prepared host fixture now tracks the network owner separately from the box id so the mismatch can be simulated. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 27 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 7ca72163..eaca7665 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ struct PreparedNativeHost { fail_network_create: bool, empty_network_create: bool, box_id: String, + network_owner: String, bridge: String, forward_chain: String, input_chain: String, @@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { fail_network_create: false, empty_network_create: false, box_id: id.to_string(), + network_owner: id.to_string(), bridge: names.bridge.clone(), forward_chain: names.forward_chain.clone(), input_chain: names.input_chain.clone(), @@ -195,9 +197,9 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .get(inspect_index + 2) .map_or("", String::as_str); let stdout = if format.contains(".Driver") { - format!("bridge|true|{}|{}", self.bridge, self.box_id) + format!("bridge|true|{}|{}", self.bridge, self.network_owner) } else { - self.box_id.clone() + self.network_owner.clone() }; return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, stdout.into_bytes(), Vec::new())); } @@ -479,6 +481,27 @@ async fn native_controller_maps_ipv4_mapped_answers_as_ipv4() -> Result<()> { Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +async fn cleanup_refuses_a_different_network_owner_before_firewall_mutation() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-foreign-owner")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.network_owner = "another-box".to_owned(); + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + + assert!(controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await.is_err()); + + assert!(!host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter() + .any(|part| part == "iptables" || part == "ip6tables") + && argv + .iter() + .any(|part| part == "-D" || part == "-F" || part == "-X") + })); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; From 84454004757eca6b2204e065d269653ee864b1f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:27:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 094/184] test(egress): cover network scope and chain owner tokens Extend the prepared native host fake to report the network scope alongside the owner and to emit a scoped iptables rule carrying the chain owner token, so the enforcement tests exercise the new ownership checks. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 18 +++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index eaca7665..864530ac 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -121,8 +121,9 @@ struct PreparedNativeHost { commands: Mutex>>, fail_network_create: bool, empty_network_create: bool, - box_id: String, network_owner: String, + network_scope: String, + chain_owner_token: String, bridge: String, forward_chain: String, input_chain: String, @@ -134,8 +135,9 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { commands: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), fail_network_create: false, empty_network_create: false, - box_id: id.to_string(), network_owner: id.to_string(), + network_scope: names.owner_token.clone(), + chain_owner_token: names.owner_token.clone(), bridge: names.bridge.clone(), forward_chain: names.forward_chain.clone(), input_chain: names.input_chain.clone(), @@ -197,9 +199,12 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .get(inspect_index + 2) .map_or("", String::as_str); let stdout = if format.contains(".Driver") { - format!("bridge|true|{}|{}", self.bridge, self.network_owner) + format!( + "bridge|true|{}|{}|{}", + self.bridge, self.network_owner, self.network_scope + ) } else { - self.network_owner.clone() + format!("{}|{}", self.network_owner, self.network_scope) }; return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, stdout.into_bytes(), Vec::new())); } @@ -229,7 +234,10 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-S") { let chain = argv.last().map_or("", String::as_str); let stdout = if chain == self.forward_chain || chain == self.input_chain { - format!("-A {chain} -j DROP\n") + format!( + "-A {chain} -s 0.0.0.0/32 -m comment --comment {} -j DROP\n-A {chain} -j DROP\n", + self.chain_owner_token + ) } else { String::new() }; From 510a171c2c1b39c3dea0925ae539a230128f4479 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:28:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 095/184] fix(egress): scope firewall chain cleanup to the owning box Firewall chains are now tagged with a per-box owner marker and cleanup verifies that marker before deleting a chain, so a box can no longer tear down chains that belong to another box. The network is also labelled with its owner token and that label is checked during verification. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 197 ++++++++++++------ .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 60 +++++- 2 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index b4f0b631..b27f4ec1 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ use crate::{EgressResolver, PinnedEgressPlan, plan_egress_allowlist}; const DOCKER_SOCKET: &str = "unix:///var/run/docker.sock"; const OWNER_LABEL: &str = "ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.owner"; +const SCOPE_LABEL: &str = "ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.scope"; const ALLOWLIST_PROTOCOLS: [&str; 1] = ["tcp"]; /// A controller that installs and removes a per-box egress filter. @@ -151,13 +152,15 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { format!("com.docker.network.bridge.name={}", names.bridge), "--label".into(), format!("{OWNER_LABEL}={id}"), + "--label".into(), + format!("{SCOPE_LABEL}={}", names.owner_token), names.network.clone(), ], ) .await?; if network.is_empty() { let error = unsupported("Docker did not confirm the egress network"); - return match cleanup_native(host, namespace, id, true).await { + return match cleanup_native(host, namespace, id).await { Ok(()) => Err(error), Err(cleanup_error) => Err(Error::Backend { sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), @@ -174,7 +177,7 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { } .await; if let Err(error) = setup { - let cleanup = cleanup_native(host, namespace, id, true).await; + let cleanup = cleanup_native(host, namespace, id).await; return match cleanup { Ok(()) => Err(error), Err(cleanup_error) => Err(Error::Backend { @@ -210,7 +213,7 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { ensure_supported_host(host)?; ensure_linux_target()?; verify_engine_and_firewall(host).await?; - cleanup_native(host, namespace, id, false).await + cleanup_native(host, namespace, id).await } fn docker_argv(&self, argv: Vec) -> Vec { @@ -224,6 +227,7 @@ struct NetworkNames { bridge: String, forward_chain: String, input_chain: String, + owner_token: String, } impl NetworkNames { @@ -236,6 +240,7 @@ impl NetworkNames { bridge: format!("tbx{}", &short[..12]), forward_chain: format!("TBX{}F", &short[..10]), input_chain: format!("TBX{}I", &short[..10]), + owner_token: short, } } } @@ -335,12 +340,12 @@ async fn verify_created_network(host: &dyn Host, names: &NetworkNames, id: &BoxI "network".into(), "inspect".into(), "--format".into(), - "{{.Driver}}|{{.EnableIPv6}}|{{index .Options \"com.docker.network.bridge.name\"}}|{{index .Labels \"ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.owner\"}}".into(), + format!("{{{{.Driver}}}}|{{{{.EnableIPv6}}}}|{{{{index .Options \"com.docker.network.bridge.name\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{SCOPE_LABEL}\"}}}}"), names.network.clone(), ], ) .await?; - let expected = format!("bridge|true|{}|{id}", names.bridge); + let expected = format!("bridge|true|{}|{id}|{}", names.bridge, names.owner_token); if output != expected { return Err(unsupported( "Docker egress network did not match its verified configuration", @@ -424,6 +429,7 @@ async fn install_family( for chain in [&names.forward_chain, &names.input_chain] { firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-N", chain]).await?; + install_chain_owner_marker(host, firewall, chain, &names.owner_token, ipv6).await?; } for rule in deny_rules(ipv6) { let mut command = vec!["-A".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()]; @@ -562,6 +568,50 @@ async fn install_pinned_destinations( Ok(()) } +async fn install_chain_owner_marker( + host: &dyn Host, + firewall: &str, + chain: &str, + owner_token: &str, + ipv6: bool, +) -> Result<()> { + let impossible_source = if ipv6 { "::/128" } else { "0.0.0.0/32" }; + firewall_success( + host, + firewall, + [ + "-A", + chain, + "-s", + impossible_source, + "-m", + "comment", + "--comment", + owner_token, + "-j", + "DROP", + ], + ) + .await +} + +fn chain_has_owner_marker(rules: &str, chain: &str, owner_token: &str) -> bool { + let chain_prefix = format!("-A {chain} "); + rules.lines().any(|line| { + line.starts_with(&chain_prefix) + && line + .split_whitespace() + .collect::>() + .windows(2) + .any(|pair| pair == ["--comment", owner_token]) + && line + .split_whitespace() + .collect::>() + .windows(2) + .any(|pair| pair == ["-j", "DROP"]) + }) +} + fn deny_rules(ipv6: bool) -> Vec> { if ipv6 { ["::1/128", "fe80::/10", "fd00:ec2::254/128"] @@ -590,55 +640,8 @@ async fn verify_hook( firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-C", parent, "-i", bridge, "-j", chain]).await } -async fn cleanup_native( - host: &dyn Host, - namespace: &str, - id: &BoxId, - network_known_owned: bool, -) -> Result<()> { +async fn cleanup_native(host: &dyn Host, namespace: &str, id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, id); - for firewall in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] { - for (parent, chain) in [ - ("DOCKER-USER", names.forward_chain.as_str()), - ("INPUT", names.input_chain.as_str()), - ] { - let hook = host - .run(&ExecRequest::new([ - "sudo", - "-n", - firewall, - "-w", - "5", - "-C", - parent, - "-i", - &names.bridge, - "-j", - chain, - ])) - .await?; - if hook.succeeded() { - firewall_success( - host, - firewall, - ["-D", parent, "-i", &names.bridge, "-j", chain], - ) - .await?; - } - let rules = firewall_output(host, firewall, ["-S"]).await?; - if rules.lines().any(|line| line.contains(chain)) { - firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-F", chain]).await?; - firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-X", chain]).await?; - } - let remaining = firewall_output(host, firewall, ["-S"]).await?; - if remaining.lines().any(|line| line.contains(chain)) { - return Err(unsupported( - "egress firewall chain cleanup was not verified", - )); - } - } - } - let inspect = docker_request( host, force_local_rootful_docker(vec![ @@ -646,18 +649,94 @@ async fn cleanup_native( "network".into(), "inspect".into(), "--format".into(), - format!("{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}"), + format!( + "{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{SCOPE_LABEL}\"}}}}" + ), names.network.clone(), ]), ) .await?; - if inspect.succeeded() { - let owner = inspect.stdout_lossy().trim().to_owned(); - if !network_known_owned && owner != id.as_str() { + let network_exists = if inspect.succeeded() { + let owner = inspect.stdout_lossy(); + let expected_owner = format!("{}|{}", id, names.owner_token); + if owner.trim() != expected_owner { return Err(unsupported( "egress network ownership could not be verified", )); } + true + } else if inspect.stderr_lossy().contains("No such network") + || inspect.stderr_lossy().contains("not found") + { + false + } else { + return Err(unsupported("egress network cleanup could not be verified")); + }; + + let chains = [ + ("iptables", "DOCKER-USER", names.forward_chain.as_str()), + ("iptables", "INPUT", names.input_chain.as_str()), + ("ip6tables", "DOCKER-USER", names.forward_chain.as_str()), + ("ip6tables", "INPUT", names.input_chain.as_str()), + ]; + let mut owned_chains = BTreeSet::new(); + for (firewall, _, chain) in chains { + let rules = firewall_output(host, firewall, ["-S"]).await?; + let chain_prefix = format!("-A {chain} "); + let chain_exists = rules + .lines() + .any(|line| line == format!("-N {chain}") || line.starts_with(&chain_prefix)); + if chain_exists { + if !chain_has_owner_marker(&rules, chain, &names.owner_token) { + return Err(unsupported( + "egress firewall chain ownership could not be verified", + )); + } + owned_chains.insert((firewall, chain)); + } + } + + for (firewall, parent, chain) in chains { + if !owned_chains.contains(&(firewall, chain)) { + continue; + } + let hook = host + .run(&ExecRequest::new([ + "sudo", + "-n", + firewall, + "-w", + "5", + "-C", + parent, + "-i", + &names.bridge, + "-j", + chain, + ])) + .await?; + if hook.succeeded() { + firewall_success( + host, + firewall, + ["-D", parent, "-i", &names.bridge, "-j", chain], + ) + .await?; + } + firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-F", chain]).await?; + firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-X", chain]).await?; + let remaining = firewall_output(host, firewall, ["-S"]).await?; + if remaining + .lines() + .any(|line| line == format!("-N {chain}") || line.starts_with(&format!("-A {chain} "))) + { + return Err(unsupported( + "egress firewall chain cleanup was not verified", + )); + } + } + + if network_exists { docker_success( host, vec![ @@ -668,10 +747,6 @@ async fn cleanup_native( ], ) .await?; - } else if !inspect.stderr_lossy().contains("No such network") - && !inspect.stderr_lossy().contains("not found") - { - return Err(unsupported("egress network cleanup could not be verified")); } Ok(()) } diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 864530ac..2d601be9 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -232,15 +232,15 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { )); } if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-S") { - let chain = argv.last().map_or("", String::as_str); - let stdout = if chain == self.forward_chain || chain == self.input_chain { - format!( - "-A {chain} -s 0.0.0.0/32 -m comment --comment {} -j DROP\n-A {chain} -j DROP\n", - self.chain_owner_token - ) - } else { - String::new() - }; + let stdout = [&self.forward_chain, &self.input_chain] + .into_iter() + .map(|chain| { + format!( + "-N {chain}\n-A {chain} -s 0.0.0.0/32 -m comment --comment {} -j DROP\n-A {chain} -j DROP\n", + self.chain_owner_token + ) + }) + .collect::(); return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, stdout.into_bytes(), Vec::new())); } return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, Vec::new(), Vec::new())); @@ -510,6 +510,48 @@ async fn cleanup_refuses_a_different_network_owner_before_firewall_mutation() -> Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +async fn cleanup_refuses_a_network_scope_hash_collision_before_firewall_mutation() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-scope-collision")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.network_scope = "different-full-hash".to_owned(); + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + + assert!(controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await.is_err()); + + assert!(!host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter() + .any(|part| part == "iptables" || part == "ip6tables") + && argv + .iter() + .any(|part| part == "-D" || part == "-F" || part == "-X") + })); + Ok(()) +} + +#[tokio::test] +async fn cleanup_refuses_firewall_chains_with_another_owner_marker() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-chain-collision")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.chain_owner_token = "different-full-hash".to_owned(); + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + + assert!(controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await.is_err()); + + assert!(!host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter() + .any(|part| part == "iptables" || part == "ip6tables") + && argv + .iter() + .any(|part| part == "-D" || part == "-F" || part == "-X") + })); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; From 3c8a1a5ac38e95fb6f77bad4929acee601d87437 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:29:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 096/184] test(docker): track deleted iptables chains in egress test host The fake host now records chains removed via -X and omits them from -S output, so tests can exercise cleanup paths that delete the forward and input chains. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 2d601be9..f78d698e 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ struct BridgeLinkHost { #[derive(Debug)] struct PreparedNativeHost { commands: Mutex>>, + deleted_chains: Mutex>, fail_network_create: bool, empty_network_create: bool, network_owner: String, @@ -133,6 +134,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { fn new(id: &BoxId, names: &NetworkNames) -> Self { Self { commands: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + deleted_chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), fail_network_create: false, empty_network_create: false, network_owner: id.to_string(), @@ -223,6 +225,14 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .iter() .any(|arg| arg == "iptables" || arg == "ip6tables") { + if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-X") + && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) + { + self.deleted_chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .insert(chain.clone()); + } if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "FORWARD") { return Ok(ExecOutput::new( 0, @@ -232,8 +242,13 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { )); } if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-S") { + let deleted = self + .deleted_chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner); let stdout = [&self.forward_chain, &self.input_chain] .into_iter() + .filter(|chain| !deleted.contains(*chain)) .map(|chain| { format!( "-N {chain}\n-A {chain} -s 0.0.0.0/32 -m comment --comment {} -j DROP\n-A {chain} -j DROP\n", From b75f26c55366cef5e32d6d2132d51b5d35c95b8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:29:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 097/184] test(egress): track created firewall chains in prepared host The fake host now records chains on -N and drops them on -X, and -S only reports chains that currently exist, so the mock mirrors real iptables state instead of assuming every chain was deleted. The cleanup ownership test seeds the chains it expects to be present. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 26 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index f78d698e..2d0c93dd 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ struct BridgeLinkHost { #[derive(Debug)] struct PreparedNativeHost { commands: Mutex>>, - deleted_chains: Mutex>, + chains: Mutex>, fail_network_create: bool, empty_network_create: bool, network_owner: String, @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { fn new(id: &BoxId, names: &NetworkNames) -> Self { Self { commands: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), - deleted_chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), + chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), fail_network_create: false, empty_network_create: false, network_owner: id.to_string(), @@ -225,14 +225,22 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .iter() .any(|arg| arg == "iptables" || arg == "ip6tables") { - if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-X") + if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-N") && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) { - self.deleted_chains + self.chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .insert(chain.clone()); } + if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-X") + && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) + { + self.chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .remove(chain); + } if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "FORWARD") { return Ok(ExecOutput::new( 0, @@ -242,13 +250,13 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { )); } if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-S") { - let deleted = self - .deleted_chains + let chains = self + .chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner); let stdout = [&self.forward_chain, &self.input_chain] .into_iter() - .filter(|chain| !deleted.contains(*chain)) + .filter(|chain| chains.contains(*chain)) .map(|chain| { format!( "-N {chain}\n-A {chain} -s 0.0.0.0/32 -m comment --comment {} -j DROP\n-A {chain} -j DROP\n", @@ -553,6 +561,10 @@ async fn cleanup_refuses_firewall_chains_with_another_owner_marker() -> Result<( let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); host.chain_owner_token = "different-full-hash".to_owned(); + host.chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .extend([names.forward_chain.clone(), names.input_chain.clone()]); let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); assert!(controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await.is_err()); From d46f959fa53b34c166ad40aaada1a7135bbf8fa8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:30:51 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 098/184] fix(tinybox-docker): scope owner tokens and tighten egress deny rules Owner tokens are now derived from a length-prefixed SHA-256 of the namespace and box id instead of the truncated hash, so boxes with colliding short hashes no longer share iptables ownership markers. The IPv4 deny list drops the overly broad link-local range in favour of the specific metadata endpoints and adds the ECS credentials address, while the IPv6 list drops fe80::/10 for the same reason. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml | 1 + .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 25 ++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml b/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml index 1e74d8bd..ca616c25 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ publish = false tinybox-core.workspace = true async-trait.workspace = true serde_json.workspace = true +sha2 = "0.10.9" # `DockerCli` runs the local `docker` client; one-shot runs need process spawning # and a deadline. tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["process"] } diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index b27f4ec1..5cb125de 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use std::{collections::BTreeSet, fmt::Debug, net::IpAddr, sync::Arc}; use async_trait::async_trait; +use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; use tinybox_core::{ BoxId, EgressAllowlist, Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result, }; @@ -240,11 +241,24 @@ impl NetworkNames { bridge: format!("tbx{}", &short[..12]), forward_chain: format!("TBX{}F", &short[..10]), input_chain: format!("TBX{}I", &short[..10]), - owner_token: short, + owner_token: scope_token(namespace, id.as_str()), } } } +fn scope_token(namespace: &str, id: &str) -> String { + let mut hasher = Sha256::new(); + hasher.update((namespace.len() as u64).to_be_bytes()); + hasher.update(namespace.as_bytes()); + hasher.update((id.len() as u64).to_be_bytes()); + hasher.update(id.as_bytes()); + hasher + .finalize() + .iter() + .map(|byte| format!("{byte:02x}")) + .collect() +} + fn stable_hash(namespace: &[u8], id: &[u8]) -> u64 { let mut hash = 0xcbf2_9ce4_8422_2325_u64; for byte in namespace.iter().chain([0].iter()).chain(id) { @@ -614,12 +628,17 @@ fn chain_has_owner_marker(rules: &str, chain: &str, owner_token: &str) -> bool { fn deny_rules(ipv6: bool) -> Vec> { if ipv6 { - ["::1/128", "fe80::/10", "fd00:ec2::254/128"] + ["::1/128", "fd00:ec2::254/128"] .into_iter() .map(|prefix| vec!["-d".into(), prefix.into(), "-j".into(), "DROP".into()]) .collect() } else { - ["127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "100.100.100.200/32"] + [ + "127.0.0.0/8", + "169.254.169.254/32", + "169.254.170.2/32", + "100.100.100.200/32", + ] .into_iter() .map(|prefix| vec!["-d".into(), prefix.into(), "-j".into(), "DROP".into()]) .collect() From 8ce6b3ccf65afe54f58b8a3badea5d401285518f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:31:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 099/184] test(tinybox-docker): track firewall chains per iptables variant The prepared native host now records created chains keyed by both the firewall binary and chain name, so iptables and ip6tables chains no longer collide in the fake. Added a test asserting the deny rules block the metadata endpoints without dropping the broader link-local ranges. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- Cargo.lock | 1 + .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 50 +++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lock index 62d57104..df5e1bf1 100644 --- a/Cargo.lock +++ b/Cargo.lock @@ -1295,6 +1295,7 @@ version = "0.2.0" dependencies = [ "async-trait", "serde_json", + "sha2 0.10.9", "tempfile", "tinybox-core", "tinybox-host", diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 2d0c93dd..0314de31 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ struct BridgeLinkHost { #[derive(Debug)] struct PreparedNativeHost { commands: Mutex>>, - chains: Mutex>, + chains: Mutex>, fail_network_create: bool, empty_network_create: bool, network_owner: String, @@ -228,18 +228,28 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-N") && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) { + let firewall = argv + .iter() + .find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")) + .cloned() + .unwrap_or_default(); self.chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .insert(chain.clone()); + .insert((firewall, chain.clone())); } if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-X") && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) { + let firewall = argv + .iter() + .find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")) + .cloned() + .unwrap_or_default(); self.chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .remove(chain); + .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); } if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "FORWARD") { return Ok(ExecOutput::new( @@ -250,13 +260,18 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { )); } if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-S") { + let firewall = argv + .iter() + .find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")) + .cloned() + .unwrap_or_default(); let chains = self .chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner); let stdout = [&self.forward_chain, &self.input_chain] .into_iter() - .filter(|chain| chains.contains(*chain)) + .filter(|chain| chains.contains(&(firewall.clone(), (*chain).clone()))) .map(|chain| { format!( "-N {chain}\n-A {chain} -s 0.0.0.0/32 -m comment --comment {} -j DROP\n-A {chain} -j DROP\n", @@ -564,7 +579,10 @@ async fn cleanup_refuses_firewall_chains_with_another_owner_marker() -> Result<( host.chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .extend([names.forward_chain.clone(), names.input_chain.clone()]); + .extend([ + ("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()), + ("iptables".to_owned(), names.input_chain.clone()), + ]); let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); assert!(controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await.is_err()); @@ -579,6 +597,28 @@ async fn cleanup_refuses_firewall_chains_with_another_owner_marker() -> Result<( Ok(()) } +#[test] +fn deny_rules_block_metadata_without_disabling_other_link_local_destinations() { + let ipv4 = deny_rules(false); + let ipv6 = deny_rules(true); + let destinations = |rules: &[Vec]| { + rules + .iter() + .filter_map(|rule| rule.windows(2).find(|pair| pair[0] == "-d")) + .map(|pair| pair[1].as_str()) + .collect::>() + }; + + let ipv4_destinations = destinations(&ipv4); + assert!(ipv4_destinations.contains(&"169.254.169.254/32")); + assert!(ipv4_destinations.contains(&"169.254.170.2/32")); + assert!(!ipv4_destinations.contains(&"169.254.0.0/16")); + + let ipv6_destinations = destinations(&ipv6); + assert!(ipv6_destinations.contains(&"fd00:ec2::254/128")); + assert!(!ipv6_destinations.contains(&"fe80::/10")); +} + #[tokio::test] async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; From 6fc2345ead1b4f5033662989bbfbdad9abfb06e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:31:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 100/184] test(egress): import deny_rules in enforcement tests Add the missing deny_rules import to the egress enforcement test module so the tests can reference it. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 0314de31..ff66de0b 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ use async_trait::async_trait; use tinybox_core::{BoxId, Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result}; use super::{ - DockerEgressController, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController, NetworkNames, + deny_rules, DockerEgressController, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController, NetworkNames, verify_created_bridge_link, }; use crate::EgressResolver; From 973d5256386801cff9297cfaeb823a757e27fc15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:31:24 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 101/184] test(egress): simplify destination assertions in metadata deny test Replace the helper that collected every -d destination with a predicate that checks for a single destination, so the assertions read directly and no intermediate vectors are built. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 19 +++++++------------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index ff66de0b..86ba642c 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -601,22 +601,17 @@ async fn cleanup_refuses_firewall_chains_with_another_owner_marker() -> Result<( fn deny_rules_block_metadata_without_disabling_other_link_local_destinations() { let ipv4 = deny_rules(false); let ipv6 = deny_rules(true); - let destinations = |rules: &[Vec]| { + let has_destination = |rules: &[Vec], destination: &str| { rules .iter() - .filter_map(|rule| rule.windows(2).find(|pair| pair[0] == "-d")) - .map(|pair| pair[1].as_str()) - .collect::>() + .any(|rule| rule.windows(2).any(|pair| pair == ["-d", destination])) }; - let ipv4_destinations = destinations(&ipv4); - assert!(ipv4_destinations.contains(&"169.254.169.254/32")); - assert!(ipv4_destinations.contains(&"169.254.170.2/32")); - assert!(!ipv4_destinations.contains(&"169.254.0.0/16")); - - let ipv6_destinations = destinations(&ipv6); - assert!(ipv6_destinations.contains(&"fd00:ec2::254/128")); - assert!(!ipv6_destinations.contains(&"fe80::/10")); + assert!(has_destination(&ipv4, "169.254.169.254/32")); + assert!(has_destination(&ipv4, "169.254.170.2/32")); + assert!(!has_destination(&ipv4, "169.254.0.0/16")); + assert!(has_destination(&ipv6, "fd00:ec2::254/128")); + assert!(!has_destination(&ipv6, "fe80::/10")); } #[tokio::test] From cd2dfd583ba0c56f15a202849ae51343561f3c3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:31:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 102/184] test(egress): cover scope token sha256 identity Add a test asserting that scope_token produces a 64-character sha256 token and that different scope/box splits do not collide, guarding against ambiguous firewall owner identities. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 86ba642c..7ff8a6f0 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ use async_trait::async_trait; use tinybox_core::{BoxId, Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result}; use super::{ - deny_rules, DockerEgressController, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController, NetworkNames, + deny_rules, scope_token, DockerEgressController, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController, NetworkNames, verify_created_bridge_link, }; use crate::EgressResolver; @@ -614,6 +614,16 @@ fn deny_rules_block_metadata_without_disabling_other_link_local_destinations() { assert!(!has_destination(&ipv6, "fe80::/10")); } +#[test] +fn firewall_owner_token_uses_unambiguous_sha256_identity() { + let left = scope_token("ab", "c"); + let right = scope_token("a", "bc"); + + assert_eq!(left.len(), 64); + assert_ne!(left, right); + assert_eq!(left, scope_token("ab", "c")); +} + #[tokio::test] async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; From e3e777a82f237958bf0a2920c7210f149648ba9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:31:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 103/184] style: fix indentation and import ordering Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 6 +++--- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 5cb125de..43987408 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -639,9 +639,9 @@ fn deny_rules(ipv6: bool) -> Vec> { "169.254.170.2/32", "100.100.100.200/32", ] - .into_iter() - .map(|prefix| vec!["-d".into(), prefix.into(), "-j".into(), "DROP".into()]) - .collect() + .into_iter() + .map(|prefix| vec!["-d".into(), prefix.into(), "-j".into(), "DROP".into()]) + .collect() } } diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 7ff8a6f0..b8dda8c7 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ use async_trait::async_trait; use tinybox_core::{BoxId, Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result}; use super::{ - deny_rules, scope_token, DockerEgressController, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController, NetworkNames, - verify_created_bridge_link, + DockerEgressController, NativeLinuxDockerEgressController, NetworkNames, deny_rules, + scope_token, verify_created_bridge_link, }; use crate::EgressResolver; From c613673bd57abd00ee8d8a6106c9a137bef7a8a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:32:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 104/184] refactor(egress): build scope tokens and fake output without intermediate allocations The scope token and the fake host's chain output are now assembled by writing directly into a preallocated String instead of collecting formatted fragments, and the two long functions carry clippy allow attributes explaining why they stay as single units. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 19 +++++++++++++------ .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 13 +++++++++---- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 43987408..37e2e625 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -4,7 +4,12 @@ //! consumes pinned resolver answers and does not use proxy environment //! variables as an enforcement boundary. -use std::{collections::BTreeSet, fmt::Debug, net::IpAddr, sync::Arc}; +use std::{ + collections::BTreeSet, + fmt::{Debug, Write}, + net::IpAddr, + sync::Arc, +}; use async_trait::async_trait; use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; @@ -252,11 +257,12 @@ fn scope_token(namespace: &str, id: &str) -> String { hasher.update(namespace.as_bytes()); hasher.update((id.len() as u64).to_be_bytes()); hasher.update(id.as_bytes()); - hasher - .finalize() - .iter() - .map(|byte| format!("{byte:02x}")) - .collect() + let digest = hasher.finalize(); + let mut token = String::with_capacity(64); + for byte in digest { + write!(&mut token, "{byte:02x}").expect("writing to String cannot fail"); + } + token } fn stable_hash(namespace: &[u8], id: &[u8]) -> u64 { @@ -659,6 +665,7 @@ async fn verify_hook( firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-C", parent, "-i", bridge, "-j", chain]).await } +#[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)] // Keep ownership preflight and cleanup order together. async fn cleanup_native(host: &dyn Host, namespace: &str, id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, id); let inspect = docker_request( diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index b8dda8c7..b84e9696 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { } #[async_trait] +#[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)] // The fake host models the firewall and Docker command surface. impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { fn name(&self) -> &'static str { "prepared-native" @@ -272,13 +273,17 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { let stdout = [&self.forward_chain, &self.input_chain] .into_iter() .filter(|chain| chains.contains(&(firewall.clone(), (*chain).clone()))) - .map(|chain| { - format!( - "-N {chain}\n-A {chain} -s 0.0.0.0/32 -m comment --comment {} -j DROP\n-A {chain} -j DROP\n", + .fold(String::new(), |mut stdout, chain| { + use std::fmt::Write as _; + writeln!( + stdout, + "-N {chain}\n-A {chain} -s 0.0.0.0/32 -m comment --comment {} -j DROP\n-A {chain} -j DROP", self.chain_owner_token ) + .expect("writing to String cannot fail"); + stdout }) - .collect::(); + ; return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, stdout.into_bytes(), Vec::new())); } return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, Vec::new(), Vec::new())); From 4c0db33cb2354d5a995bff684320fc3fa64e1fd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:32:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 105/184] refactor(egress): replace fmt::Write hex formatting with direct push Hex encoding in scope_token now indexes a lookup table instead of using write!, and the test host builds its iptables output with push_str. Both avoid the infallible-write expect calls and drop the fmt::Write imports. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 11 ++++------- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 12 ++++-------- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 37e2e625..1e0a76e9 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -4,12 +4,7 @@ //! consumes pinned resolver answers and does not use proxy environment //! variables as an enforcement boundary. -use std::{ - collections::BTreeSet, - fmt::{Debug, Write}, - net::IpAddr, - sync::Arc, -}; +use std::{collections::BTreeSet, fmt::Debug, net::IpAddr, sync::Arc}; use async_trait::async_trait; use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; @@ -259,8 +254,10 @@ fn scope_token(namespace: &str, id: &str) -> String { hasher.update(id.as_bytes()); let digest = hasher.finalize(); let mut token = String::with_capacity(64); + const HEX: &[u8; 16] = b"0123456789abcdef"; for byte in digest { - write!(&mut token, "{byte:02x}").expect("writing to String cannot fail"); + token.push(char::from(HEX[usize::from(byte >> 4)])); + token.push(char::from(HEX[usize::from(byte & 0x0f)])); } token } diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index b84e9696..e4f4c638 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -274,16 +274,12 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .into_iter() .filter(|chain| chains.contains(&(firewall.clone(), (*chain).clone()))) .fold(String::new(), |mut stdout, chain| { - use std::fmt::Write as _; - writeln!( - stdout, - "-N {chain}\n-A {chain} -s 0.0.0.0/32 -m comment --comment {} -j DROP\n-A {chain} -j DROP", + stdout.push_str(&format!( + "-N {chain}\n-A {chain} -s 0.0.0.0/32 -m comment --comment {} -j DROP\n-A {chain} -j DROP\n", self.chain_owner_token - ) - .expect("writing to String cannot fail"); + )); stdout - }) - ; + }); return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, stdout.into_bytes(), Vec::new())); } return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, Vec::new(), Vec::new())); From 96cd67418b3333a9b8215bcd4ff6f6bf782e5730 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:33:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 106/184] refactor(egress): hoist hex table to module scope Moved the hex digit lookup table out of the scope token function to module level so it is defined once rather than on each call. The test host now builds its firewall output with writeln! instead of push_str on a formatted string, which avoids the intermediate allocation. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 2 +- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 1e0a76e9..c37c81a3 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ const DOCKER_SOCKET: &str = "unix:///var/run/docker.sock"; const OWNER_LABEL: &str = "ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.owner"; const SCOPE_LABEL: &str = "ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.scope"; const ALLOWLIST_PROTOCOLS: [&str; 1] = ["tcp"]; +const HEX: &[u8; 16] = b"0123456789abcdef"; /// A controller that installs and removes a per-box egress filter. /// @@ -254,7 +255,6 @@ fn scope_token(namespace: &str, id: &str) -> String { hasher.update(id.as_bytes()); let digest = hasher.finalize(); let mut token = String::with_capacity(64); - const HEX: &[u8; 16] = b"0123456789abcdef"; for byte in digest { token.push(char::from(HEX[usize::from(byte >> 4)])); token.push(char::from(HEX[usize::from(byte & 0x0f)])); diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index e4f4c638..a7cc9a0d 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ //! Tests for native Docker egress filter capability checks. use std::{ + fmt::Write as _, net::IpAddr, sync::{Arc, Mutex}, }; @@ -274,10 +275,11 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .into_iter() .filter(|chain| chains.contains(&(firewall.clone(), (*chain).clone()))) .fold(String::new(), |mut stdout, chain| { - stdout.push_str(&format!( + let _ = writeln!( + stdout, "-N {chain}\n-A {chain} -s 0.0.0.0/32 -m comment --comment {} -j DROP\n-A {chain} -j DROP\n", self.chain_owner_token - )); + ); stdout }); return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, stdout.into_bytes(), Vec::new())); From 8fe4d5c80a98063be6fcaa27d236a0dc04f28b5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:37:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 107/184] test(tinybox-docker): cover busybox nc ipv6 flag handling Extract the listener script and IPv6 probe into named constants and add a test asserting they avoid the unsupported `nc -6` flag, since Alpine's busybox nc rejects it and the live test would otherwise fail at runtime. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 116c6549..858cc7c4 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -482,6 +482,9 @@ fn allowlist_probe_ports() -> tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist { tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["listener.test"], [18373, 18376]) } +const TARGET_LISTENER_SCRIPT: &str = "(while true; do nc -l -p 18373 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed; done) & (while true; do nc -l -p 18374 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/blocked; done) & (while true; do nc -6 -l -p 18376 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed-v6; done) & (while true; do nc -u -l -p 53 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/dns; done) & wait"; +const IPV6_LISTENER_PROBE: &str = "unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nc -6 -z -w 3 listener.test 18376"; + #[test] fn live_allowlist_covers_both_listener_probe_ports() { let allowlist = allowlist_probe_ports(); @@ -489,6 +492,14 @@ fn live_allowlist_covers_both_listener_probe_ports() { assert!(allowlist.ports.contains(&18376)); } +#[test] +fn alpine_busybox_nc_uses_literal_ipv6_without_unsupported_flag() { + assert!(TARGET_LISTENER_SCRIPT.contains("nc -l -p 18376")); + assert!(!TARGET_LISTENER_SCRIPT.contains("nc -6")); + assert!(IPV6_LISTENER_PROBE.contains("nc -z -w 3 listener.test 18376")); + assert!(!IPV6_LISTENER_PROBE.contains("nc -6")); +} + #[test] fn ipv6_address_inspect_template_quotes_the_network_name() { assert_eq!( @@ -537,7 +548,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( IMAGE, "sh", "-c", - "(while true; do nc -l -p 18373 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed; done) & (while true; do nc -l -p 18374 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/blocked; done) & (while true; do nc -6 -l -p 18376 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed-v6; done) & (while true; do nc -u -l -p 53 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/dns; done) & wait", + TARGET_LISTENER_SCRIPT, ]); let _ = image?; if let Err(error) = docker_command(&[ @@ -637,7 +648,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( &ExecRequest::new([ "sh", "-c", - "unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nc -6 -z -w 3 listener.test 18376", + IPV6_LISTENER_PROBE, ]), ) .await; From 69b5a7d6504c9ea46cf521311d3d4add26834ba6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:37:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 108/184] test(live-docker): drop ipv6 flag from listener probe The IPv6 listener probe no longer passes -6 to nc, matching the listener script which also dropped its -6 flag. This keeps the probe and the listener it targets on the same address family. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 858cc7c4..696758fe 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -482,8 +482,8 @@ fn allowlist_probe_ports() -> tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist { tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["listener.test"], [18373, 18376]) } -const TARGET_LISTENER_SCRIPT: &str = "(while true; do nc -l -p 18373 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed; done) & (while true; do nc -l -p 18374 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/blocked; done) & (while true; do nc -6 -l -p 18376 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed-v6; done) & (while true; do nc -u -l -p 53 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/dns; done) & wait"; -const IPV6_LISTENER_PROBE: &str = "unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nc -6 -z -w 3 listener.test 18376"; +const TARGET_LISTENER_SCRIPT: &str = "(while true; do nc -l -p 18373 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed; done) & (while true; do nc -l -p 18374 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/blocked; done) & (while true; do nc -l -p 18376 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed-v6; done) & (while true; do nc -u -l -p 53 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/dns; done) & wait"; +const IPV6_LISTENER_PROBE: &str = "unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nc -z -w 3 listener.test 18376"; #[test] fn live_allowlist_covers_both_listener_probe_ports() { From 9a1af48d0bb09adf16b287efab5796548e8998fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:42:57 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 109/184] test(egress): cover chain marker install failure rollback Add a fake host failure mode that rejects the owner marker comment so the prepare path can be exercised when marker installation fails. The new test asserts that the created chain and network are rolled back and no chains remain registered. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index a7cc9a0d..5afa6c01 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ struct PreparedNativeHost { chains: Mutex>, fail_network_create: bool, empty_network_create: bool, + fail_chain_marker: bool, network_owner: String, network_scope: String, chain_owner_token: String, @@ -138,6 +139,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), fail_network_create: false, empty_network_create: false, + fail_chain_marker: false, network_owner: id.to_string(), network_scope: names.owner_token.clone(), chain_owner_token: names.owner_token.clone(), @@ -253,6 +255,15 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); } + if self.fail_chain_marker + && argv.windows(2).any(|args| args == ["--comment", self.chain_owner_token]) + { + return Ok(ExecOutput::new( + 1, + Vec::new(), + b"injected owner marker failure".to_vec(), + )); + } if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "FORWARD") { return Ok(ExecOutput::new( 0, @@ -675,6 +686,34 @@ async fn empty_successful_network_create_rolls_back_the_owned_network() -> Resul Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +async fn marker_install_failure_rolls_back_only_the_created_chain_and_network() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-marker-failure")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.fail_chain_marker = true; + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + + let result = controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await; + + assert!(result.is_err()); + let commands = host.commands(); + assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-X") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.forward_chain) + })); + assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.network) + })); + assert!(host + .chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .is_empty()); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] async fn missing_forward_hook_refuses_native_egress_before_resource_creation() { for firewall in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] { From 46b0dd191c6147b2e0e86259757cbfe0db4a4b6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:43:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 110/184] test(egress): fix chain owner token comparison in native host Adjust the comment argument comparison to borrow the chain owner token so the slice comparison type-checks against the string literal. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 5afa6c01..8761dd06 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -256,7 +256,9 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); } if self.fail_chain_marker - && argv.windows(2).any(|args| args == ["--comment", self.chain_owner_token]) + && argv + .windows(2) + .any(|args| args == ["--comment", &self.chain_owner_token]) { return Ok(ExecOutput::new( 1, From 2f391450a7abb4df0013de537f18347848d842ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:43:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 111/184] fix(egress): track chains created during a failed setup attempt Firewall chains created before a setup failure are now recorded so cleanup can treat them as owned by the attempt even when the owner marker was not yet installed. This prevents cleanup from aborting with an ownership verification error and leaving the partially created chains behind. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 27 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index c37c81a3..8d068502 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -172,14 +172,16 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { }; } + let mut attempt_owned_chains = BTreeSet::new(); let setup = async { verify_created_network(host, &names, id).await?; verify_created_bridge_link(host, &names).await?; - install_firewall(host, &names, &plan).await + install_firewall(host, &names, &plan, &mut attempt_owned_chains).await } .await; if let Err(error) = setup { - let cleanup = cleanup_native(host, namespace, id).await; + let cleanup = + cleanup_native_with_attempt(host, namespace, id, &attempt_owned_chains).await; return match cleanup { Ok(()) => Err(error), Err(cleanup_error) => Err(Error::Backend { @@ -401,9 +403,10 @@ async fn install_firewall( host: &dyn Host, names: &NetworkNames, plan: &PinnedEgressPlan, + attempt_owned_chains: &mut BTreeSet<(String, String)>, ) -> Result<()> { - install_family(host, "iptables", names, plan, false).await?; - install_family(host, "ip6tables", names, plan, true).await?; + install_family(host, "iptables", names, plan, false, attempt_owned_chains).await?; + install_family(host, "ip6tables", names, plan, true, attempt_owned_chains).await?; verify_hook( host, "iptables", @@ -438,6 +441,7 @@ async fn install_family( names: &NetworkNames, plan: &PinnedEgressPlan, ipv6: bool, + attempt_owned_chains: &mut BTreeSet<(String, String)>, ) -> Result<()> { let existing = firewall_output(host, firewall, ["-S"]).await?; if existing.contains(&names.forward_chain) || existing.contains(&names.input_chain) { @@ -446,6 +450,7 @@ async fn install_family( for chain in [&names.forward_chain, &names.input_chain] { firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-N", chain]).await?; + attempt_owned_chains.insert((firewall.to_owned(), chain.clone())); install_chain_owner_marker(host, firewall, chain, &names.owner_token, ipv6).await?; } for rule in deny_rules(ipv6) { @@ -664,6 +669,16 @@ async fn verify_hook( #[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)] // Keep ownership preflight and cleanup order together. async fn cleanup_native(host: &dyn Host, namespace: &str, id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { + cleanup_native_with_attempt(host, namespace, id, &BTreeSet::new()).await +} + +#[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)] // Keep ownership preflight and cleanup order together. +async fn cleanup_native_with_attempt( + host: &dyn Host, + namespace: &str, + id: &BoxId, + attempt_owned_chains: &BTreeSet<(String, String)>, +) -> Result<()> { let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, id); let inspect = docker_request( host, @@ -710,7 +725,9 @@ async fn cleanup_native(host: &dyn Host, namespace: &str, id: &BoxId) -> Result< .lines() .any(|line| line == format!("-N {chain}") || line.starts_with(&chain_prefix)); if chain_exists { - if !chain_has_owner_marker(&rules, chain, &names.owner_token) { + let created_by_attempt = attempt_owned_chains + .contains(&(firewall.to_owned(), chain.to_owned())); + if !created_by_attempt && !chain_has_owner_marker(&rules, chain, &names.owner_token) { return Err(unsupported( "egress firewall chain ownership could not be verified", )); From 4381551059d327c57b59c4d22a00dda77be47494 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:43:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 112/184] test(docker): track owner-marked chains in egress enforcement fake The prepared native host now records which chains received an owner comment when a rule is appended, and only emits that comment rule in iptables-save output for chains that were actually marked. This keeps the fake consistent with the real firewall so tests can distinguish marked from unmarked chains. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 38 ++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 8761dd06..29565ce6 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ struct BridgeLinkHost { struct PreparedNativeHost { commands: Mutex>>, chains: Mutex>, + marked_chains: Mutex>, fail_network_create: bool, empty_network_create: bool, fail_chain_marker: bool, @@ -137,6 +138,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { Self { commands: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), + marked_chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), fail_network_create: false, empty_network_create: false, fail_chain_marker: false, @@ -254,6 +256,10 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); + self.marked_chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); } if self.fail_chain_marker && argv @@ -266,6 +272,20 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { b"injected owner marker failure".to_vec(), )); } + if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--comment") + && let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-A") + && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) + { + let firewall = argv + .iter() + .find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")) + .cloned() + .unwrap_or_default(); + self.marked_chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .insert((firewall, chain.clone())); + } if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "FORWARD") { return Ok(ExecOutput::new( 0, @@ -284,15 +304,23 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner); + let marked_chains = self + .marked_chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner); let stdout = [&self.forward_chain, &self.input_chain] .into_iter() .filter(|chain| chains.contains(&(firewall.clone(), (*chain).clone()))) .fold(String::new(), |mut stdout, chain| { - let _ = writeln!( - stdout, - "-N {chain}\n-A {chain} -s 0.0.0.0/32 -m comment --comment {} -j DROP\n-A {chain} -j DROP\n", - self.chain_owner_token - ); + let _ = writeln!(stdout, "-N {chain}"); + if marked_chains.contains(&(firewall.clone(), chain.clone())) { + let _ = writeln!( + stdout, + "-A {chain} -s 0.0.0.0/32 -m comment --comment {} -j DROP", + self.chain_owner_token + ); + } + let _ = writeln!(stdout, "-A {chain} -j DROP"); stdout }); return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, stdout.into_bytes(), Vec::new())); From 14f9e9a580c36b97714189e32e86aac6a8937684 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:44:00 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 113/184] test(egress): clone firewall when removing chain in test host The test host's chain removal passed the firewall by value, which would move it out of the surrounding scope and break later uses. Clone it instead so the firewall remains available after the removal. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 29565ce6..e6c51d4a 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { self.chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); + .remove(&(firewall.clone(), chain.clone())); self.marked_chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) From 8c9ab9db77a6c9f6f5c9b33b74fb9c01b837d984 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:44:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 114/184] fix(egress): use cleanup_native on setup failure The setup error path called cleanup_native_with_attempt, which is no longer the intended cleanup entry point, so it now calls cleanup_native directly. This keeps the failure handling consistent with the rest of the controller. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 8d068502..837a5875 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -180,8 +180,7 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { } .await; if let Err(error) = setup { - let cleanup = - cleanup_native_with_attempt(host, namespace, id, &attempt_owned_chains).await; + let cleanup = cleanup_native(host, namespace, id).await; return match cleanup { Ok(()) => Err(error), Err(cleanup_error) => Err(Error::Backend { From 2b5bc49bae9880d66b362962e2e52520a52beadd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:44:24 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 115/184] fix(egress): clean up only chains owned by the failed attempt Native egress setup failures now pass the attempt's owned chain markers to cleanup instead of removing every chain for the namespace, so a failed attempt can no longer tear down firewall rules belonging to a concurrent or earlier run. A comment documents why SHA-256 is used for the ownership markers. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml | 1 + crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml b/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml index ca616c25..803538da 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ publish = false tinybox-core.workspace = true async-trait.workspace = true serde_json.workspace = true +# SHA-256 keeps firewall cleanup ownership markers collision-resistant. sha2 = "0.10.9" # `DockerCli` runs the local `docker` client; one-shot runs need process spawning # and a deadline. diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 837a5875..8d068502 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -180,7 +180,8 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { } .await; if let Err(error) = setup { - let cleanup = cleanup_native(host, namespace, id).await; + let cleanup = + cleanup_native_with_attempt(host, namespace, id, &attempt_owned_chains).await; return match cleanup { Ok(()) => Err(error), Err(cleanup_error) => Err(Error::Backend { From 11c48e2f5731078ee18d401653c03dee4cc62ba8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:44:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 116/184] test(egress): gate native controller tests to linux The native controller tests only exercise Linux firewall behaviour, so they are now compiled under cfg(target_os = "linux") and a non-Linux test asserts that host validation fails before any host commands run. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 4 +-- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 36 ++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 8d068502..d8ebc590 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -725,8 +725,8 @@ async fn cleanup_native_with_attempt( .lines() .any(|line| line == format!("-N {chain}") || line.starts_with(&chain_prefix)); if chain_exists { - let created_by_attempt = attempt_owned_chains - .contains(&(firewall.to_owned(), chain.to_owned())); + let created_by_attempt = + attempt_owned_chains.contains(&(firewall.to_owned(), chain.to_owned())); if !created_by_attempt && !chain_has_owner_marker(&rules, chain, &names.owner_token) { return Err(unsupported( "egress firewall chain ownership could not be verified", diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index e6c51d4a..ab8b7435 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -386,6 +386,7 @@ async fn existing_local_bridge_link_is_verified() -> Result<()> { } #[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; let namespace = "test"; @@ -541,6 +542,7 @@ fn assert_input_return_rules(commands: &[Vec], names: &NetworkNames) -> } #[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] async fn native_controller_maps_ipv4_mapped_answers_as_ipv4() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-mapped")?; let namespace = "test"; @@ -669,6 +671,7 @@ fn firewall_owner_token_uses_unambiguous_sha256_identity() { } #[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; let namespace = "test"; @@ -694,6 +697,7 @@ async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> R } #[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] async fn empty_successful_network_create_rolls_back_the_owned_network() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; let namespace = "test"; @@ -717,6 +721,7 @@ async fn empty_successful_network_create_rolls_back_the_owned_network() -> Resul } #[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] async fn marker_install_failure_rolls_back_only_the_created_chain_and_network() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-marker-failure")?; let namespace = "test"; @@ -736,11 +741,32 @@ async fn marker_install_failure_rolls_back_only_the_created_chain_and_network() assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.network) })); - assert!(host - .chains - .lock() - .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .is_empty()); + assert!( + host.chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .is_empty() + ); + Ok(()) +} + +#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))] +#[tokio::test] +async fn native_controller_refuses_non_linux_before_host_commands() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-non-linux")?; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box("test", &id); + let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + + assert!(matches!( + controller.validate_host(&host).await, + Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + .. + }) + )); + assert!(host.commands().is_empty()); Ok(()) } From c6f01d0be00be02db32545c25e168713a94115c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:45:01 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 117/184] chore(egress): allow too_many_lines on install_family The install_family function exceeds clippy's line threshold, but its length comes from keeping the ordered default-drop rule setup as a single readable unit. Added an allow attribute with a comment explaining the intent. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index d8ebc590..72a31694 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -435,6 +435,7 @@ async fn install_firewall( Ok(()) } +#[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)] // Preserve the ordered default-drop rule setup as one unit. async fn install_family( host: &dyn Host, firewall: &str, From 67eb415e56319b11d980a8772ade20d438b6a3bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:45:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 118/184] test(egress): gate linux-only helpers behind cfg The MappedIpv4Resolver type and its EgressResolver impl, along with the assert_input_return_rules helper, are only used by Linux-specific tests, so they are now compiled only on Linux to avoid dead code warnings on other platforms. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index ab8b7435..d48eb7b4 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -102,8 +102,10 @@ impl EgressResolver for Resolver { } #[derive(Debug)] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] struct MappedIpv4Resolver; +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] impl EgressResolver for MappedIpv4Resolver { fn resolve(&self, _hostname: &str) -> std::io::Result> { Ok(vec!["::ffff:203.0.113.11".parse().map_err(|error| { @@ -465,6 +467,7 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() Ok(()) } +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] fn assert_input_return_rules(commands: &[Vec], names: &NetworkNames) -> Result<()> { let input_established_position = commands .iter() From 51f20dc52b632e5f90a77bca86a545582b79a825 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:17:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 119/184] fix(docker): reject IPv6 link-local egress targets and reconcile ambiguous network creates Egress allowlists that resolve to IPv6 link-local addresses are now rejected with ConstraintNotEnforced, since the Docker backend cannot preserve the required interface scope. Network creation also inspects and rolls back an owned network when the create command's result is ambiguous, so a failed setup does not leak a network or lose its cleanup record. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs | 20 ++- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 123 +++++++++++++++++- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 49 ++++++- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs | 18 +++ crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 22 +++- 5 files changed, 218 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs index 108080f2..e618cf7a 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs @@ -86,8 +86,10 @@ impl PinnedEgressTarget { /// # Errors /// /// Returns [`Error::InvalidNetworkPolicy`] for a malformed allowlist, an empty -/// DNS answer, or any resolved metadata or loopback address. Resolver errors -/// are returned as [`Error::Backend`]. +/// DNS answer, or any resolved metadata or loopback address. Returns +/// [`Error::ConstraintNotEnforced`] when an IPv6 link-local target needs an +/// interface scope that this backend cannot preserve. Resolver errors are +/// returned as [`Error::Backend`]. pub fn plan_egress_allowlist( allowlist: &EgressAllowlist, resolver: &dyn EgressResolver, @@ -123,6 +125,13 @@ pub fn plan_egress_allowlist( reason: "allowlist host resolves to a metadata or loopback address", }); } + if addresses.iter().any(is_ipv6_link_local) { + return Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + }); + } addresses_by_host.insert(host, addresses); } @@ -172,6 +181,13 @@ fn is_forbidden_address(address: &IpAddr) -> bool { } } +fn is_ipv6_link_local(address: &IpAddr) -> bool { + match address { + IpAddr::V4(_) => false, + IpAddr::V6(address) => address.segments()[0] & 0xffc0 == 0xfe80, + } +} + #[cfg(test)] #[path = "egress_tests.rs"] mod tests; diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 72a31694..933a5c75 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -141,9 +141,9 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { // egress decisions. let plan = plan_egress_allowlist(allowlist, self.resolver.as_ref())?; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, id); - let network = docker_success( + let create_network = docker_request( host, - vec![ + force_local_rootful_docker(vec![ "docker".into(), "network".into(), "create".into(), @@ -157,9 +157,29 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { "--label".into(), format!("{SCOPE_LABEL}={}", names.owner_token), names.network.clone(), - ], + ]), ) - .await?; + .await; + let network = match create_network { + Ok(output) if output.succeeded() => output.stdout_lossy().trim().to_owned(), + Ok(output) => { + return Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "configure egress filtering", + message: output.stderr_lossy().trim().to_owned(), + }); + } + Err(error) => { + return match reconcile_ambiguous_network_create(host, &names, id).await { + Ok(()) => Err(error), + Err(cleanup_error) => Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "roll back egress network setup", + message: format!("{error}; cleanup failed: {cleanup_error}"), + }), + }; + } + }; if network.is_empty() { let error = unsupported("Docker did not confirm the egress network"); return match cleanup_native(host, namespace, id).await { @@ -673,6 +693,101 @@ async fn cleanup_native(host: &dyn Host, namespace: &str, id: &BoxId) -> Result< cleanup_native_with_attempt(host, namespace, id, &BTreeSet::new()).await } +/// Reconcile a network create whose command result is ambiguous. +/// +/// The network is removed by its inspected Docker ID only when both owner +/// labels match this box. A missing or foreign network is safe to leave alone; +/// an inconclusive inspection or removal error is returned so the sandbox +/// retains a cleanup record for a later retry. +async fn reconcile_ambiguous_network_create( + host: &dyn Host, + names: &NetworkNames, + id: &BoxId, +) -> Result<()> { + let inspect = docker_request( + host, + force_local_rootful_docker(vec![ + "docker".into(), + "network".into(), + "inspect".into(), + "--format".into(), + format!( + "{{{{.Id}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{SCOPE_LABEL}\"}}}}" + ), + names.network.clone(), + ]), + ) + .await?; + if !inspect.succeeded() { + let stderr = inspect.stderr_lossy(); + if stderr.contains("No such network") || stderr.contains("not found") { + return Ok(()); + } + return Err(unsupported( + "egress network create rollback could not be inspected", + )); + } + + let inspect_stdout = inspect.stdout_lossy(); + let mut fields = inspect_stdout.trim().splitn(3, '|'); + let network_id = fields.next().unwrap_or_default(); + let owner = fields.next().unwrap_or_default(); + let scope = fields.next().unwrap_or_default(); + if owner != id.to_string() || scope != names.owner_token { + return Ok(()); + } + if network_id.is_empty() { + return Err(unsupported("owned egress network has no inspectable ID")); + } + + let remove = docker_request( + host, + force_local_rootful_docker(vec![ + "docker".into(), + "network".into(), + "rm".into(), + network_id.to_owned(), + ]), + ) + .await?; + if remove.succeeded() { + return Ok(()); + } + + // Docker may report failure after deleting the network. Re-inspect the + // deterministic name to distinguish that case from an uncertain cleanup. + let verify = docker_request( + host, + force_local_rootful_docker(vec![ + "docker".into(), + "network".into(), + "inspect".into(), + "--format".into(), + format!( + "{{{{.Id}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{SCOPE_LABEL}\"}}}}" + ), + names.network.clone(), + ]), + ) + .await?; + if !verify.succeeded() { + let stderr = verify.stderr_lossy(); + if stderr.contains("No such network") || stderr.contains("not found") { + return Ok(()); + } + return Err(unsupported("egress network cleanup could not be verified")); + } + let verify_stdout = verify.stdout_lossy(); + let mut fields = verify_stdout.trim().splitn(3, '|'); + let _network_id = fields.next().unwrap_or_default(); + let owner = fields.next().unwrap_or_default(); + let scope = fields.next().unwrap_or_default(); + if owner != id.to_string() || scope != names.owner_token { + return Ok(()); + } + Err(unsupported("owned egress network rollback failed")) +} + #[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)] // Keep ownership preflight and cleanup order together. async fn cleanup_native_with_attempt( host: &dyn Host, diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index d48eb7b4..8e23ed6d 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ struct PreparedNativeHost { chains: Mutex>, marked_chains: Mutex>, fail_network_create: bool, + network_create_side_effect_then_host_error: bool, empty_network_create: bool, fail_chain_marker: bool, network_owner: String, @@ -142,6 +143,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), marked_chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), fail_network_create: false, + network_create_side_effect_then_host_error: false, empty_network_create: false, fail_chain_marker: false, network_owner: id.to_string(), @@ -197,6 +199,13 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { b"network name already exists".to_vec(), )); } + if self.network_create_side_effect_then_host_error { + return Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "fake-native".to_owned(), + operation: "run Docker network create", + message: "simulated lost command response after create".to_owned(), + }); + } let network_id = if self.empty_network_create { Vec::new() } else { @@ -208,7 +217,9 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { let format = docker_args .get(inspect_index + 2) .map_or("", String::as_str); - let stdout = if format.contains(".Driver") { + let stdout = if format.contains(".Id") { + format!("network-id|{}|{}", self.network_owner, self.network_scope) + } else if format.contains(".Driver") { format!( "bridge|true|{}|{}|{}", self.bridge, self.network_owner, self.network_scope @@ -334,6 +345,41 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { } } +#[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] +async fn uncertain_network_create_removes_only_the_verified_owned_network() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-create-response-lost")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.network_create_side_effect_then_host_error = true; + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + + let result = controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await; + + assert!(matches!( + result, + Err(Error::Backend { + operation: "run Docker network create", + ref message, + .. + }) if message.contains("simulated lost command response") + )); + let commands = host.commands(); + assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg.contains("{{.Id}}")) + })); + assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "network-id") + })); + assert!(!commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter() + .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-A" | "-D" | "-F" | "-X")) + })); + Ok(()) +} + #[async_trait] impl Host for BridgeLinkHost { fn name(&self) -> &'static str { @@ -681,6 +727,7 @@ async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> R let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); host.fail_network_create = true; + host.network_owner = "foreign-owner".to_owned(); let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs index 8ea19189..44a00d5c 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs @@ -111,6 +111,24 @@ fn pins_ip_literals_without_resolving_and_rejects_forbidden_literals() -> tinybo Ok(()) } +#[test] +fn rejects_ipv6_link_local_targets_without_scope_ids() { + let resolver = StaticResolver(BTreeMap::new()); + let allowlist = EgressAllowlist::new(["fe80::1"], [443]); + + assert!(matches!( + plan_egress_allowlist(&allowlist, &resolver), + Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + .. + }) + )); + + let ipv4_link_local = EgressAllowlist::new(["169.254.1.1"], [443]); + assert!(plan_egress_allowlist(&ipv4_link_local, &resolver).is_ok()); +} + #[test] fn returns_resolver_errors_as_backend_errors() { let resolver = StaticResolver(BTreeMap::new()); diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 696758fe..2a2db1d6 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ use std::{ io::{Read, Write}, - net::{Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr, TcpListener, TcpStream}, + net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr, TcpListener, TcpStream}, process::Command, sync::Arc, thread, @@ -483,7 +483,11 @@ fn allowlist_probe_ports() -> tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist { } const TARGET_LISTENER_SCRIPT: &str = "(while true; do nc -l -p 18373 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed; done) & (while true; do nc -l -p 18374 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/blocked; done) & (while true; do nc -l -p 18376 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/allowed-v6; done) & (while true; do nc -u -l -p 53 >/dev/null; echo hit >> /tmp/dns; done) & wait"; -const IPV6_LISTENER_PROBE: &str = "unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nc -z -w 3 listener.test 18376"; +fn ipv6_listener_probe(address: Ipv6Addr) -> String { + format!( + "unset HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy; nc -z -w 3 {address} 18376" + ) +} #[test] fn live_allowlist_covers_both_listener_probe_ports() { @@ -494,10 +498,13 @@ fn live_allowlist_covers_both_listener_probe_ports() { #[test] fn alpine_busybox_nc_uses_literal_ipv6_without_unsupported_flag() { + let address = "fd42::1234".parse().expect("valid IPv6 fixture"); + let probe = ipv6_listener_probe(address); assert!(TARGET_LISTENER_SCRIPT.contains("nc -l -p 18376")); assert!(!TARGET_LISTENER_SCRIPT.contains("nc -6")); - assert!(IPV6_LISTENER_PROBE.contains("nc -z -w 3 listener.test 18376")); - assert!(!IPV6_LISTENER_PROBE.contains("nc -6")); + assert!(probe.contains("nc -z -w 3 fd42::1234 18376")); + assert!(!probe.contains("listener.test")); + assert!(!probe.contains("nc -6")); } #[test] @@ -586,14 +593,15 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( &ipv6_address_inspect_template(&target_network), &target_name, ])? - .parse::() + .parse::() .map_err(|error| Error::Backend { sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), operation: "read the controlled IPv6 listener address", message: error.to_string(), })?; - let resolver: Arc = Arc::new(FixedResolver(vec![ipv4, ipv6])); + let resolver: Arc = + Arc::new(FixedResolver(vec![ipv4, std::net::IpAddr::V6(ipv6)])); let namespace = format!("ns-egress-{}", &suffix[..8]); let sandbox = sandbox(&namespace)? .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(resolver))); @@ -648,7 +656,7 @@ async fn live_allowlist_pins_destinations_and_blocks_other_raw_tcp() -> Result<( &ExecRequest::new([ "sh", "-c", - IPV6_LISTENER_PROBE, + &ipv6_listener_probe(ipv6), ]), ) .await; From bbc20ec557dfbacd687d38bcb13260351302135e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:18:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 120/184] test(egress): cover ambiguous network create with absent or foreign network Add a network_missing_on_inspect flag to the prepared native host so inspect can simulate a missing network, and use it in a new test asserting that an ambiguous network create keeps the original error and issues no removal when the network is absent or owned by another box. Also tighten the existing name-conflict test to assert no inspect or rm commands run. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 51 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 8e23ed6d..a988163d 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ struct PreparedNativeHost { marked_chains: Mutex>, fail_network_create: bool, network_create_side_effect_then_host_error: bool, + network_missing_on_inspect: bool, empty_network_create: bool, fail_chain_marker: bool, network_owner: String, @@ -144,6 +145,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { marked_chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), fail_network_create: false, network_create_side_effect_then_host_error: false, + network_missing_on_inspect: false, empty_network_create: false, fail_chain_marker: false, network_owner: id.to_string(), @@ -214,6 +216,13 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, network_id, Vec::new())); } if let Some(inspect_index) = docker_args.iter().position(|arg| arg == "inspect") { + if self.network_missing_on_inspect { + return Ok(ExecOutput::new( + 1, + Vec::new(), + b"Error: No such network".to_vec(), + )); + } let format = docker_args .get(inspect_index + 2) .map_or("", String::as_str); @@ -380,6 +389,44 @@ async fn uncertain_network_create_removes_only_the_verified_owned_network() -> R Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] +async fn ambiguous_network_create_keeps_the_original_error_when_absent_or_foreign() -> Result<()> { + for absent in [false, true] { + let id = BoxId::new(if absent { + "box-create-absent" + } else { + "box-create-foreign" + })?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.network_create_side_effect_then_host_error = true; + host.network_missing_on_inspect = absent; + if !absent { + host.network_owner = "another-box".to_owned(); + } + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + + assert!(matches!( + controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await, + Err(Error::Backend { + operation: "run Docker network create", + ref message, + .. + }) if message.contains("simulated lost command response") + )); + assert!( + !host + .commands() + .iter() + .any(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") }) + ); + } + Ok(()) +} + #[async_trait] impl Host for BridgeLinkHost { fn name(&self) -> &'static str { @@ -727,7 +774,6 @@ async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> R let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); host.fail_network_create = true; - host.network_owner = "foreign-owner".to_owned(); let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); @@ -743,6 +789,9 @@ async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> R .iter() .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-D" | "-F" | "-X")) })); + assert!(!host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect") || argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") + })); Ok(()) } From 95dcde9172c49a8aa8af839433245bff6f920729 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:18:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 121/184] test(tinybox-docker): model network create outcomes with an enum Replace the two boolean flags on the fake host with a NetworkCreateBehavior enum so the mutually exclusive success, command failure, and host error after side effect cases cannot be set at once. The live Docker IPv6 fixture now builds its address from Ipv6Addr::new instead of parsing a string literal. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 26 ++++++++++++------- crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs | 2 +- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index a988163d..849c3897 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -119,13 +119,19 @@ struct BridgeLinkHost { exists: bool, } +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)] +enum NetworkCreateBehavior { + Succeed, + CommandFailure, + HostErrorAfterSideEffect, +} + #[derive(Debug)] struct PreparedNativeHost { commands: Mutex>>, chains: Mutex>, marked_chains: Mutex>, - fail_network_create: bool, - network_create_side_effect_then_host_error: bool, + network_create_behavior: NetworkCreateBehavior, network_missing_on_inspect: bool, empty_network_create: bool, fail_chain_marker: bool, @@ -143,8 +149,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { commands: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), marked_chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), - fail_network_create: false, - network_create_side_effect_then_host_error: false, + network_create_behavior: NetworkCreateBehavior::Succeed, network_missing_on_inspect: false, empty_network_create: false, fail_chain_marker: false, @@ -194,14 +199,17 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { } if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "network") { if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "create") { - if self.fail_network_create { + if matches!(self.network_create_behavior, NetworkCreateBehavior::CommandFailure) { return Ok(ExecOutput::new( 1, Vec::new(), b"network name already exists".to_vec(), )); } - if self.network_create_side_effect_then_host_error { + if matches!( + self.network_create_behavior, + NetworkCreateBehavior::HostErrorAfterSideEffect + ) { return Err(Error::Backend { sandbox: "fake-native".to_owned(), operation: "run Docker network create", @@ -361,7 +369,7 @@ async fn uncertain_network_create_removes_only_the_verified_owned_network() -> R let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); - host.network_create_side_effect_then_host_error = true; + host.network_create_behavior = NetworkCreateBehavior::HostErrorAfterSideEffect; let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); @@ -401,7 +409,7 @@ async fn ambiguous_network_create_keeps_the_original_error_when_absent_or_foreig let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); - host.network_create_side_effect_then_host_error = true; + host.network_create_behavior = NetworkCreateBehavior::HostErrorAfterSideEffect; host.network_missing_on_inspect = absent; if !absent { host.network_owner = "another-box".to_owned(); @@ -773,7 +781,7 @@ async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> R let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); - host.fail_network_create = true; + host.network_create_behavior = NetworkCreateBehavior::CommandFailure; let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs index 2a2db1d6..723e2da7 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs @@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ fn live_allowlist_covers_both_listener_probe_ports() { #[test] fn alpine_busybox_nc_uses_literal_ipv6_without_unsupported_flag() { - let address = "fd42::1234".parse().expect("valid IPv6 fixture"); + let address = Ipv6Addr::new(0xfd42, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x1234); let probe = ipv6_listener_probe(address); assert!(TARGET_LISTENER_SCRIPT.contains("nc -l -p 18376")); assert!(!TARGET_LISTENER_SCRIPT.contains("nc -6")); From 1e317f579d57a0a9b76b5e60399e600f6d566a19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:19:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 122/184] test(egress): reformat network create failure check Reformatted the matches! expression in the prepared native host test double so the network create failure branch wraps across multiple lines. This is a formatting-only change with no behavioural difference. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 849c3897..3aabf277 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -199,7 +199,10 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { } if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "network") { if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "create") { - if matches!(self.network_create_behavior, NetworkCreateBehavior::CommandFailure) { + if matches!( + self.network_create_behavior, + NetworkCreateBehavior::CommandFailure + ) { return Ok(ExecOutput::new( 1, Vec::new(), From da175d8ae2b2557a249d8cb124ed4c6f1a9bec7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:21:04 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 123/184] test(egress): cover network inspect outcomes in rollback tests Replace the boolean network_missing_on_inspect flag with a NetworkInspectBehavior enum so the fake host can model owned, absent, foreign, uncertain, and malformed inspect results. This lets the ambiguous network create tests assert that rollback uncertainty is reported when inspection fails, rather than only distinguishing missing from foreign networks. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 128 +++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 112 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 3aabf277..0d325bcb 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -126,13 +126,22 @@ enum NetworkCreateBehavior { HostErrorAfterSideEffect, } +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)] +enum NetworkInspectBehavior { + Owned, + Absent, + Foreign, + Uncertain, + Malformed, +} + #[derive(Debug)] struct PreparedNativeHost { commands: Mutex>>, chains: Mutex>, marked_chains: Mutex>, network_create_behavior: NetworkCreateBehavior, - network_missing_on_inspect: bool, + network_inspect_behavior: NetworkInspectBehavior, empty_network_create: bool, fail_chain_marker: bool, network_owner: String, @@ -150,7 +159,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), marked_chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), network_create_behavior: NetworkCreateBehavior::Succeed, - network_missing_on_inspect: false, + network_inspect_behavior: NetworkInspectBehavior::Owned, empty_network_create: false, fail_chain_marker: false, network_owner: id.to_string(), @@ -227,25 +236,50 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, network_id, Vec::new())); } if let Some(inspect_index) = docker_args.iter().position(|arg| arg == "inspect") { - if self.network_missing_on_inspect { - return Ok(ExecOutput::new( - 1, - Vec::new(), - b"Error: No such network".to_vec(), - )); + match self.network_inspect_behavior { + NetworkInspectBehavior::Absent => { + return Ok(ExecOutput::new( + 1, + Vec::new(), + b"Error: No such network".to_vec(), + )); + } + NetworkInspectBehavior::Uncertain => { + return Ok(ExecOutput::new( + 1, + Vec::new(), + b"Error: daemon temporarily unavailable".to_vec(), + )); + } + NetworkInspectBehavior::Owned + | NetworkInspectBehavior::Foreign + | NetworkInspectBehavior::Malformed => {} } let format = docker_args .get(inspect_index + 2) .map_or("", String::as_str); - let stdout = if format.contains(".Id") { - format!("network-id|{}|{}", self.network_owner, self.network_scope) + let owner = if matches!( + self.network_inspect_behavior, + NetworkInspectBehavior::Foreign + ) { + "another-box" + } else { + &self.network_owner + }; + let stdout = if matches!( + self.network_inspect_behavior, + NetworkInspectBehavior::Malformed + ) { + "network-id|owner-without-scope".to_owned() + } else if format.contains(".Id") { + format!("network-id|{owner}|{}", self.network_scope) } else if format.contains(".Driver") { format!( "bridge|true|{}|{}|{}", - self.bridge, self.network_owner, self.network_scope + self.bridge, owner, self.network_scope ) } else { - format!("{}|{}", self.network_owner, self.network_scope) + format!("{owner}|{}", self.network_scope) }; return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, stdout.into_bytes(), Vec::new())); } @@ -413,10 +447,11 @@ async fn ambiguous_network_create_keeps_the_original_error_when_absent_or_foreig let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); host.network_create_behavior = NetworkCreateBehavior::HostErrorAfterSideEffect; - host.network_missing_on_inspect = absent; - if !absent { - host.network_owner = "another-box".to_owned(); - } + host.network_inspect_behavior = if absent { + NetworkInspectBehavior::Absent + } else { + NetworkInspectBehavior::Foreign + }; let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); @@ -438,6 +473,67 @@ async fn ambiguous_network_create_keeps_the_original_error_when_absent_or_foreig Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] +async fn ambiguous_network_create_reports_rollback_uncertainty_when_inspection_fails() -> Result<()> +{ + let id = BoxId::new("box-create-inspect-uncertain")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.network_create_behavior = NetworkCreateBehavior::HostErrorAfterSideEffect; + host.network_inspect_behavior = NetworkInspectBehavior::Uncertain; + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + + assert!(matches!( + controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await, + Err(Error::Backend { + operation: "roll back egress network setup", + ref message, + .. + }) if message.contains("simulated lost command response") + && message.contains("could not be inspected") + )); + assert!( + !host + .commands() + .iter() + .any(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") }) + ); + Ok(()) +} + +#[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] +async fn ambiguous_network_create_retains_ownership_uncertainty_for_malformed_inspection() +-> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-create-inspect-malformed")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.network_create_behavior = NetworkCreateBehavior::HostErrorAfterSideEffect; + host.network_inspect_behavior = NetworkInspectBehavior::Malformed; + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + + assert!(matches!( + controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await, + Err(Error::Backend { + operation: "roll back egress network setup", + ref message, + .. + }) if message.contains("ownership could not be verified") + )); + assert!( + !host + .commands() + .iter() + .any(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") }) + ); + Ok(()) +} + #[async_trait] impl Host for BridgeLinkHost { fn name(&self) -> &'static str { From 0995ddc98c49587a75ee19d5f70ce69a405ec928 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:21:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 124/184] fix(egress): reconcile failed docker network creation Docker network creation failures now run the same ownership reconciliation as ambiguous command errors, so a network that was actually created is rolled back instead of being left behind. Network ownership parsing was also tightened to reject missing or malformed inspect output rather than silently treating it as unowned. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 62 ++++++++++++------- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 38 +++++++++++- 2 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 933a5c75..2ff7df50 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -163,21 +163,17 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { let network = match create_network { Ok(output) if output.succeeded() => output.stdout_lossy().trim().to_owned(), Ok(output) => { - return Err(Error::Backend { + let error = Error::Backend { sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), operation: "configure egress filtering", message: output.stderr_lossy().trim().to_owned(), - }); + }; + return Err( + reconcile_failed_network_create(host, &names, id, error).await, + ); } Err(error) => { - return match reconcile_ambiguous_network_create(host, &names, id).await { - Ok(()) => Err(error), - Err(cleanup_error) => Err(Error::Backend { - sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), - operation: "roll back egress network setup", - message: format!("{error}; cleanup failed: {cleanup_error}"), - }), - }; + return Err(reconcile_failed_network_create(host, &names, id, error).await); } }; if network.is_empty() { @@ -729,16 +725,10 @@ async fn reconcile_ambiguous_network_create( } let inspect_stdout = inspect.stdout_lossy(); - let mut fields = inspect_stdout.trim().splitn(3, '|'); - let network_id = fields.next().unwrap_or_default(); - let owner = fields.next().unwrap_or_default(); - let scope = fields.next().unwrap_or_default(); + let (network_id, owner, scope) = parse_network_ownership(&inspect_stdout)?; if owner != id.to_string() || scope != names.owner_token { return Ok(()); } - if network_id.is_empty() { - return Err(unsupported("owned egress network has no inspectable ID")); - } let remove = docker_request( host, @@ -778,16 +768,46 @@ async fn reconcile_ambiguous_network_create( return Err(unsupported("egress network cleanup could not be verified")); } let verify_stdout = verify.stdout_lossy(); - let mut fields = verify_stdout.trim().splitn(3, '|'); - let _network_id = fields.next().unwrap_or_default(); - let owner = fields.next().unwrap_or_default(); - let scope = fields.next().unwrap_or_default(); + let (_network_id, owner, scope) = parse_network_ownership(&verify_stdout)?; if owner != id.to_string() || scope != names.owner_token { return Ok(()); } Err(unsupported("owned egress network rollback failed")) } +async fn reconcile_failed_network_create( + host: &dyn Host, + names: &NetworkNames, + id: &BoxId, + original_error: Error, +) -> Error { + match reconcile_ambiguous_network_create(host, names, id).await { + Ok(()) => original_error, + Err(cleanup_error) => Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "roll back egress network setup", + message: format!("{original_error}; cleanup failed: {cleanup_error}"), + }, + } +} + +fn parse_network_ownership(output: &str) -> Result<(String, String, String)> { + let fields = output.trim().split('|').collect::>(); + if fields.len() != 3 || fields.iter().any(|field| field.is_empty()) { + return Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "inspect egress network ownership", + message: "Docker returned missing or malformed network identity or owner labels" + .to_owned(), + }); + } + Ok(( + fields[0].to_owned(), + fields[1].to_owned(), + fields[2].to_owned(), + )) +} + #[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)] // Keep ownership preflight and cleanup order together. async fn cleanup_native_with_attempt( host: &dyn Host, diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 0d325bcb..e170c3e7 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ async fn ambiguous_network_create_retains_ownership_uncertainty_for_malformed_in operation: "roll back egress network setup", ref message, .. - }) if message.contains("ownership could not be verified") + }) if message.contains("missing or malformed network identity") )); assert!( !host @@ -881,6 +881,7 @@ async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> R let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); host.network_create_behavior = NetworkCreateBehavior::CommandFailure; + host.network_inspect_behavior = NetworkInspectBehavior::Foreign; let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); @@ -896,8 +897,41 @@ async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> R .iter() .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-D" | "-F" | "-X")) })); + assert!(host + .commands() + .iter() + .any(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect"))); + assert!(!host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") + })); + Ok(()) +} + +#[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] +async fn network_create_conflict_reconciles_a_stale_network_with_matching_owner_labels() -> Result<()> +{ + let id = BoxId::new("box-stale-owned-network")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.network_create_behavior = NetworkCreateBehavior::CommandFailure; + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + + assert!(matches!( + controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await, + Err(Error::Backend { + operation: "configure egress filtering", + ref message, + .. + }) if message.contains("network name already exists") + )); + assert!(host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "network-id") + })); assert!(!host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { - argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect") || argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") + argv.iter().any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-A" | "-D" | "-F" | "-X")) })); Ok(()) } From 800c9220bf45cd1d0de4f68ee062864eb69ced24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:22:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 125/184] fix(egress): report docker stderr when network inspection fails Network ownership inspection and cleanup verification now surface the docker daemon's stderr in a backend error instead of a generic unsupported message, so rollback failures carry the actual cause. Tests were updated to match the new error text and reformatted. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 20 ++++++++------ .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 27 +++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 2ff7df50..e7eb4918 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -168,9 +168,7 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { operation: "configure egress filtering", message: output.stderr_lossy().trim().to_owned(), }; - return Err( - reconcile_failed_network_create(host, &names, id, error).await, - ); + return Err(reconcile_failed_network_create(host, &names, id, error).await); } Err(error) => { return Err(reconcile_failed_network_create(host, &names, id, error).await); @@ -719,9 +717,11 @@ async fn reconcile_ambiguous_network_create( if stderr.contains("No such network") || stderr.contains("not found") { return Ok(()); } - return Err(unsupported( - "egress network create rollback could not be inspected", - )); + return Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "inspect egress network ownership", + message: stderr.trim().to_owned(), + }); } let inspect_stdout = inspect.stdout_lossy(); @@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ async fn reconcile_ambiguous_network_create( "docker".into(), "network".into(), "rm".into(), - network_id.to_owned(), + network_id.clone(), ]), ) .await?; @@ -765,7 +765,11 @@ async fn reconcile_ambiguous_network_create( if stderr.contains("No such network") || stderr.contains("not found") { return Ok(()); } - return Err(unsupported("egress network cleanup could not be verified")); + return Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "inspect egress network ownership", + message: stderr.trim().to_owned(), + }); } let verify_stdout = verify.stdout_lossy(); let (_network_id, owner, scope) = parse_network_ownership(&verify_stdout)?; diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index e170c3e7..aad3e618 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ async fn ambiguous_network_create_reports_rollback_uncertainty_when_inspection_f ref message, .. }) if message.contains("simulated lost command response") - && message.contains("could not be inspected") + && message.contains("daemon temporarily unavailable") )); assert!( !host @@ -897,20 +897,24 @@ async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> R .iter() .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-D" | "-F" | "-X")) })); - assert!(host - .commands() - .iter() - .any(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect"))); - assert!(!host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { - argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") - })); + assert!( + host.commands() + .iter() + .any(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect")) + ); + assert!( + !host + .commands() + .iter() + .any(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") }) + ); Ok(()) } #[tokio::test] #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] -async fn network_create_conflict_reconciles_a_stale_network_with_matching_owner_labels() -> Result<()> -{ +async fn network_create_conflict_reconciles_a_stale_network_with_matching_owner_labels() +-> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-stale-owned-network")?; let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); @@ -931,7 +935,8 @@ async fn network_create_conflict_reconciles_a_stale_network_with_matching_owner_ argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "network-id") })); assert!(!host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { - argv.iter().any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-A" | "-D" | "-F" | "-X")) + argv.iter() + .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-A" | "-D" | "-F" | "-X")) })); Ok(()) } From ded87570b0849d4c8a39565b53d9659a1a3fd6f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:26:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 126/184] fix(egress): require the final drop rule in each chain The default-drop verification previously accepted any rule ending in "-j DROP", so an owner marker rule could satisfy it even when the chain's final drop was missing. Verification now checks that the last rule in the chain is exactly "-A -j DROP", and a test covers the marker case. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 5 ++- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 31 ++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index e7eb4918..436b7e0c 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -563,7 +563,10 @@ async fn install_family( // to attach an image entrypoint to the network. for chain in [&names.forward_chain, &names.input_chain] { let rules = firewall_output(host, firewall, ["-S", chain]).await?; - if !rules.lines().any(|line| line.ends_with("-j DROP")) { + let chain_prefix = format!("-A {chain} "); + let expected_drop = format!("-A {chain} -j DROP"); + let mut chain_rules = rules.lines().filter(|line| line.starts_with(&chain_prefix)); + if chain_rules.next_back() != Some(expected_drop.as_str()) { return Err(unsupported("default-drop egress rules were not verified")); } } diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index aad3e618..41bb17ae 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ struct PreparedNativeHost { marked_chains: Mutex>, network_create_behavior: NetworkCreateBehavior, network_inspect_behavior: NetworkInspectBehavior, + missing_final_drop: Option, empty_network_create: bool, fail_chain_marker: bool, network_owner: String, @@ -160,6 +161,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { marked_chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), network_create_behavior: NetworkCreateBehavior::Succeed, network_inspect_behavior: NetworkInspectBehavior::Owned, + missing_final_drop: None, empty_network_create: false, fail_chain_marker: false, network_owner: id.to_string(), @@ -387,7 +389,9 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { self.chain_owner_token ); } - let _ = writeln!(stdout, "-A {chain} -j DROP"); + if self.missing_final_drop.as_deref() != Some(chain) { + let _ = writeln!(stdout, "-A {chain} -j DROP"); + } stdout }); return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, stdout.into_bytes(), Vec::new())); @@ -399,6 +403,31 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { } } +#[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] +async fn owner_marker_drop_does_not_satisfy_default_drop_verification() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-marker-is-not-default-drop")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.missing_final_drop = Some(names.forward_chain.clone()); + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + + assert!(matches!( + controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await, + Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + .. + }) + )); + assert!(host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.network) + })); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] async fn uncertain_network_create_removes_only_the_verified_owned_network() -> Result<()> { From 42161c9b4f92df0e5d38a1c94c1941b5aac61a1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:37:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 127/184] test(sandbox): cover docker argv rewriting for non-idempotent controllers Add a test controller whose docker_argv appends a marker on every call and assert that each docker command is rewritten exactly once, guarding against the controller being applied repeatedly to the same argv. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 51 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 0badc85b..b14cb09b 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -58,6 +58,57 @@ impl super::DockerEgressController for RecordingEgressController { } } +#[derive(Debug)] +struct NonIdempotentArgController; + +#[async_trait] +impl super::DockerEgressController for NonIdempotentArgController { + async fn prepare( + &self, + _host: &dyn Host, + _namespace: &str, + _id: &BoxId, + _allowlist: &tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist, + ) -> Result { + Ok(crate::PreparedEgressNetwork::new( + "tinybox-allowlist-test".to_owned(), + Vec::new(), + )) + } + + async fn cleanup(&self, _host: &dyn Host, _namespace: &str, _id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { + Ok(()) + } + + fn docker_argv(&self, mut argv: Vec) -> Vec { + argv.push("rewrite-once".to_owned()); + argv + } +} + +#[tokio::test] +async fn docker_argv_controller_rewrites_each_command_once() -> Result<()> { + let host = ScriptedHost::silent(); + let sandbox = DockerSandbox::new(host.clone(), Arc::new(MemoryStore::new())) + .with_egress_controller(Arc::new(NonIdempotentArgController)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["api.example.test"], [443]); + + sandbox + .create(&spec()?.with_network(NetworkPolicy::Allowlist(allowlist))) + .await?; + + let docker_commands = host + .commands() + .into_iter() + .filter(|argv| argv.first().is_some_and(|arg| arg == "docker")) + .collect::>(); + assert!(!docker_commands.is_empty()); + assert!(docker_commands.iter().all(|argv| { + argv.iter().filter(|arg| arg.as_str() == "rewrite-once").count() == 1 + })); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] async fn allowlist_controller_prepares_before_start_and_cleans_after_destroy() -> Result<()> { let host = ScriptedHost::silent(); From eab6f87b154ec130dbe1feab53475f7a9cd6d44b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:37:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 128/184] refactor(sandbox): drop unused docker argv rewriting The docker_argv helper and the request cloning it required have been removed, so run_docker now passes the request straight through to the host. The egress controller no longer needs to rewrite argv at this layer. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs | 12 +----------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs index 2b51e841..06749caa 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs @@ -484,18 +484,8 @@ impl DockerSandbox { self } - fn docker_argv(&self, argv: Vec) -> Vec { - if let Some(controller) = &self.egress_controller { - controller.docker_argv(argv) - } else { - argv - } - } - async fn run_docker(&self, request: &ExecRequest) -> Result { - let mut request = request.clone(); - request.argv = self.docker_argv(request.argv); - self.host.run(&request).await + self.host.run(request).await } /// What this sandbox declares. From 5473691394a61cc2d2dafa5f00bc1fae4bab9d82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:38:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 129/184] test(egress): cover pinned targets inside auto-selected subnets Add a test asserting that pinned allowlist targets falling inside the auto-selected network's IPv4 or IPv6 subnets are rejected as unenforced and rolled back, with no firewall rules installed. The prepared host stub now reports IPAM subnets so the controller can detect the overlap. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 45 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 41bb17ae..4eb80a99 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ struct PreparedNativeHost { fail_chain_marker: bool, network_owner: String, network_scope: String, + network_subnets: String, chain_owner_token: String, bridge: String, forward_chain: String, @@ -166,6 +167,8 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { fail_chain_marker: false, network_owner: id.to_string(), network_scope: names.owner_token.clone(), + network_subnets: + r#"[{"Subnet":"172.18.0.0/16"},{"Subnet":"fd00:dead:beef::/64"}]"#.to_owned(), chain_owner_token: names.owner_token.clone(), bridge: names.bridge.clone(), forward_chain: names.forward_chain.clone(), @@ -280,6 +283,8 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { "bridge|true|{}|{}|{}", self.bridge, owner, self.network_scope ) + } else if format.contains(".IPAM.Config") { + self.network_subnets.clone() } else { format!("{owner}|{}", self.network_scope) }; @@ -696,6 +701,46 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] +async fn pinned_targets_inside_auto_selected_network_subnets_are_rejected_and_rolled_back() -> Result<()> +{ + for (id_text, address, subnet) in [ + ("box-v4-overlap", "172.28.1.5", "172.28.0.0/16"), + ("box-v6-overlap", "fd00:1234::42", "fd00:1234::/64"), + ] { + let id = BoxId::new(id_text)?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.network_subnets = format!(r#"[{{"Subnet":"{subnet}"}}]"#); + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new([address], [443]); + + assert!(matches!( + controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await, + Err(Error::ConstraintNotEnforced { + constraint: tinybox_core::Constraint::Network, + enforcement: tinybox_core::Enforcement::Unsupported, + .. + }) + )); + let commands = host.commands(); + assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect") + && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg.contains(".IPAM.Config")) + })); + assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.network) + })); + assert!(!commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter() + .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")) + })); + } + Ok(()) +} + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] fn assert_input_return_rules(commands: &[Vec], names: &NetworkNames) -> Result<()> { let input_established_position = commands From 2407dd9d2b9fd3c44e7c7b1e395a92371ade3755 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:38:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 130/184] fix(egress): reject allowlist targets inside the docker network subnet The native Linux egress controller now inspects the created Docker network's IPAM configuration and fails setup when any pinned allowlist target falls inside one of its subnets, since such traffic would never leave the bridge and the firewall rules would be misleading. The ipnet crate is used to parse and test subnet membership. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- Cargo.lock | 1 + crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml | 1 + .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 50 +++++++++++++++++++ .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 8 +-- .../tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 5 +- 5 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lock index df5e1bf1..d58e191e 100644 --- a/Cargo.lock +++ b/Cargo.lock @@ -1294,6 +1294,7 @@ name = "tinybox-docker" version = "0.2.0" dependencies = [ "async-trait", + "ipnet", "serde_json", "sha2 0.10.9", "tempfile", diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml b/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml index 803538da..3f52a4e4 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ publish = false [dependencies] tinybox-core.workspace = true async-trait.workspace = true +ipnet = "2.12" serde_json.workspace = true # SHA-256 keeps firewall cleanup ownership markers collision-resistant. sha2 = "0.10.9" diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 436b7e0c..aa88a752 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use std::{collections::BTreeSet, fmt::Debug, net::IpAddr, sync::Arc}; use async_trait::async_trait; +use ipnet::IpNet; use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; use tinybox_core::{ BoxId, EgressAllowlist, Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result, @@ -189,6 +190,7 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { let mut attempt_owned_chains = BTreeSet::new(); let setup = async { verify_created_network(host, &names, id).await?; + verify_targets_outside_network_subnets(host, &names, &plan).await?; verify_created_bridge_link(host, &names).await?; install_firewall(host, &names, &plan, &mut attempt_owned_chains).await } @@ -387,6 +389,54 @@ async fn verify_created_network(host: &dyn Host, names: &NetworkNames, id: &BoxI Ok(()) } +async fn verify_targets_outside_network_subnets( + host: &dyn Host, + names: &NetworkNames, + plan: &PinnedEgressPlan, +) -> Result<()> { + let output = docker_output( + host, + vec![ + "docker".into(), + "network".into(), + "inspect".into(), + "--format".into(), + "{{json .IPAM.Config}}".into(), + names.network.clone(), + ], + ) + .await?; + let configs = serde_json::from_str::>(&output) + .map_err(|_| unsupported("Docker egress network IPAM configuration is invalid"))?; + if configs.is_empty() { + return Err(unsupported( + "Docker egress network has no inspectable IPAM subnets", + )); + } + + let subnets = configs + .iter() + .map(|config| { + config + .get("Subnet") + .and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str) + .ok_or_else(|| unsupported("Docker egress network subnet is missing"))? + .parse::() + .map_err(|_| unsupported("Docker egress network subnet is invalid")) + }) + .collect::>>()?; + if plan.targets().iter().any(|target| { + subnets + .iter() + .any(|subnet| subnet.contains(&target.address())) + }) { + return Err(unsupported( + "an egress destination overlaps the Docker network subnet", + )); + } + Ok(()) +} + async fn verify_created_bridge_link(host: &dyn Host, names: &NetworkNames) -> Result<()> { let output = host .run(&ExecRequest::new([ diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 4eb80a99..2933000d 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -167,8 +167,8 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { fail_chain_marker: false, network_owner: id.to_string(), network_scope: names.owner_token.clone(), - network_subnets: - r#"[{"Subnet":"172.18.0.0/16"},{"Subnet":"fd00:dead:beef::/64"}]"#.to_owned(), + network_subnets: r#"[{"Subnet":"172.18.0.0/16"},{"Subnet":"fd00:dead:beef::/64"}]"# + .to_owned(), chain_owner_token: names.owner_token.clone(), bridge: names.bridge.clone(), forward_chain: names.forward_chain.clone(), @@ -703,8 +703,8 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() #[tokio::test] #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] -async fn pinned_targets_inside_auto_selected_network_subnets_are_rejected_and_rolled_back() -> Result<()> -{ +async fn pinned_targets_inside_auto_selected_network_subnets_are_rejected_and_rolled_back() +-> Result<()> { for (id_text, address, subnet) in [ ("box-v4-overlap", "172.28.1.5", "172.28.0.0/16"), ("box-v6-overlap", "fd00:1234::42", "fd00:1234::/64"), diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index b14cb09b..2155da32 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -104,7 +104,10 @@ async fn docker_argv_controller_rewrites_each_command_once() -> Result<()> { .collect::>(); assert!(!docker_commands.is_empty()); assert!(docker_commands.iter().all(|argv| { - argv.iter().filter(|arg| arg.as_str() == "rewrite-once").count() == 1 + argv.iter() + .filter(|arg| arg.as_str() == "rewrite-once") + .count() + == 1 })); Ok(()) } From 4df125ebdd553afb6b169157c54006b93c2047b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:38:31 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 131/184] test(egress): tighten assertion for iptables rule commands The assertion now requires a command to contain both a rule-mutating flag and an iptables binary, so unrelated invocations that merely mention iptables no longer satisfy it. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 2933000d..628bf46d 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -735,7 +735,10 @@ async fn pinned_targets_inside_auto_selected_network_subnets_are_rejected_and_ro })); assert!(!commands.iter().any(|argv| { argv.iter() - .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")) + .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-N" | "-A" | "-I")) + && argv + .iter() + .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")) })); } Ok(()) From 281cc29f674c456e678f1b4c31e73476dc561ab5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:39:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 132/184] test(tinybox-docker): silence dead code warnings on non-linux The egress enforcement test helpers are only exercised on Linux, so the network behaviour enums now carry a cfg_attr allow(dead_code) for other targets. A comment was also added to the ipnet dependency explaining that it parses Docker-assigned CIDRs and rejects pinned destinations within them. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml | 1 + crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml b/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml index 3f52a4e4..9d17536d 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ publish = false [dependencies] tinybox-core.workspace = true async-trait.workspace = true +# Parse Docker-assigned CIDRs and reject pinned destinations within them. ipnet = "2.12" serde_json.workspace = true # SHA-256 keeps firewall cleanup ownership markers collision-resistant. diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 628bf46d..2ce63619 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ struct BridgeLinkHost { } #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)] +#[cfg_attr(not(target_os = "linux"), allow(dead_code))] enum NetworkCreateBehavior { Succeed, CommandFailure, @@ -127,6 +128,7 @@ enum NetworkCreateBehavior { } #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)] +#[cfg_attr(not(target_os = "linux"), allow(dead_code))] enum NetworkInspectBehavior { Owned, Absent, From 48382a6afa4df9167896c5f466962ea79c53e618 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:39:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 133/184] test(sandbox): use assert_ne for docker command count Replace the emptiness assertion with a length comparison so the check reads as a count rather than a boolean negation. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs index 2155da32..57999121 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ async fn docker_argv_controller_rewrites_each_command_once() -> Result<()> { .into_iter() .filter(|argv| argv.first().is_some_and(|arg| arg == "docker")) .collect::>(); - assert!(!docker_commands.is_empty()); + assert_ne!(docker_commands.len(), 0); assert!(docker_commands.iter().all(|argv| { argv.iter() .filter(|arg| arg.as_str() == "rewrite-once") From 7706604185af31510d91532b3230bb943329e1ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:41:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 134/184] docs(egress): document ipam subnet refusal for pinned destinations The controller's doc comment now notes that Docker-assigned IPAM subnets are inspected and a pinned destination contained in one is refused, since on-link routing would otherwise bypass the intended gateway path. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index aa88a752..b7f9126f 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -101,6 +101,9 @@ impl PreparedEgressNetwork { /// a local native Linux Docker Engine with non-interactive firewall privilege. /// Docker Desktop, SSH/remote hosts, rootless Docker, Windows containers, and /// hosts without the expected firewall chains are refused. +/// The controller also inspects Docker-assigned IPAM subnets and refuses a +/// pinned destination contained in one, avoiding on-link routing around the +/// intended gateway path. #[derive(Debug)] pub struct NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { resolver: Arc, From aa97407577494271067876a1fffd34e310912f0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:49:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 135/184] test(egress): cover owner marker restore when chain delete fails Extend the prepared native host fake to clear marked chains on flush and to inject a one-shot chain delete failure, then add a test asserting cleanup restores the owner marker after a failed delete and succeeds on retry. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 60 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 2ce63619..8dc0a42d 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ struct PreparedNativeHost { missing_final_drop: Option, empty_network_create: bool, fail_chain_marker: bool, + fail_chain_delete_once: bool, network_owner: String, network_scope: String, network_subnets: String, @@ -167,6 +168,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { missing_final_drop: None, empty_network_create: false, fail_chain_marker: false, + fail_chain_delete_once: false, network_owner: id.to_string(), network_scope: names.owner_token.clone(), network_subnets: r#"[{"Subnet":"172.18.0.0/16"},{"Subnet":"fd00:dead:beef::/64"}]"# @@ -307,6 +309,32 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .iter() .any(|arg| arg == "iptables" || arg == "ip6tables") { + if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-F") + && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) + { + let firewall = argv + .iter() + .find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")) + .cloned() + .unwrap_or_default(); + self.marked_chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); + } + if self.fail_chain_delete_once + && let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-X") + && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) + { + self.fail_chain_delete_once = false; + if chain == &self.forward_chain { + return Ok(ExecOutput::new( + 1, + Vec::new(), + b"injected chain delete failure".to_vec(), + )); + } + } if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-N") && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) { @@ -925,6 +953,38 @@ async fn cleanup_refuses_firewall_chains_with_another_owner_marker() -> Result<( Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +async fn cleanup_restores_owner_marker_when_chain_delete_fails_after_flush() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-delete-retry")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.fail_chain_delete_once = true; + host.chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .insert(("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone())); + host.marked_chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .insert(("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone())); + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + + assert!(controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await.is_err()); + assert!(host + .marked_chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .contains(&("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()))); + controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await?; + assert!(!host + .chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .contains(&("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()))); + Ok(()) +} + #[test] fn deny_rules_block_metadata_without_disabling_other_link_local_destinations() { let ipv4 = deny_rules(false); From c30bccefc65791a285ce1c43609d347c49bd2d39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:49:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 136/184] test(egress): guard fail_chain_delete_once with a mutex The fail_chain_delete_once flag on the prepared native host is now wrapped in a Mutex so the test double can be shared across threads without data races. Call sites lock the mutex to read and clear the flag, keeping the one-shot failure behaviour intact. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 8dc0a42d..57f5580b 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ struct PreparedNativeHost { missing_final_drop: Option, empty_network_create: bool, fail_chain_marker: bool, - fail_chain_delete_once: bool, + fail_chain_delete_once: Mutex, network_owner: String, network_scope: String, network_subnets: String, @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { missing_final_drop: None, empty_network_create: false, fail_chain_marker: false, - fail_chain_delete_once: false, + fail_chain_delete_once: Mutex::new(false), network_owner: id.to_string(), network_scope: names.owner_token.clone(), network_subnets: r#"[{"Subnet":"172.18.0.0/16"},{"Subnet":"fd00:dead:beef::/64"}]"# @@ -322,11 +322,17 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); } - if self.fail_chain_delete_once + if *self + .fail_chain_delete_once + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) && let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-X") && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) { - self.fail_chain_delete_once = false; + *self + .fail_chain_delete_once + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) = false; if chain == &self.forward_chain { return Ok(ExecOutput::new( 1, @@ -959,7 +965,10 @@ async fn cleanup_restores_owner_marker_when_chain_delete_fails_after_flush() -> let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); - host.fail_chain_delete_once = true; + *host + .fail_chain_delete_once + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) = true; host.chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) From 27fea97717a2d2f2eba91876559d4cfffc9e2796 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:50:11 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 137/184] fix(egress): restore ownership marker when chain deletion fails When deleting a firewall chain fails during native cleanup, the ownership marker is now reinstalled so the chain is not left unowned, and the original deletion error is still returned. If restoring the marker also fails, both errors are reported together. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 20 ++++++++++++++++++- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 2 +- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index b7f9126f..598a2983 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -960,7 +960,25 @@ async fn cleanup_native_with_attempt( .await?; } firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-F", chain]).await?; - firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-X", chain]).await?; + if let Err(delete_error) = firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-X", chain]).await { + let ipv6 = firewall == "ip6tables"; + return match install_chain_owner_marker( + host, + firewall, + chain, + &names.owner_token, + ipv6, + ) + .await + { + Ok(()) => Err(delete_error), + Err(restore_error) => Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "restore egress firewall ownership marker", + message: format!("{delete_error}; restoring ownership marker failed: {restore_error}"), + }), + }; + } let remaining = firewall_output(host, firewall, ["-S"]).await?; if remaining .lines() diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 57f5580b..74b0c814 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ async fn owner_marker_drop_does_not_satisfy_default_drop_verification() -> Resul let id = BoxId::new("box-marker-is-not-default-drop")?; let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); - let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); host.missing_final_drop = Some(names.forward_chain.clone()); let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); From 877357cd2511646fae0ac3334325dbc5ad5540c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:50:19 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 138/184] test(egress): fix host mutability in enforcement tests Two test setups had the wrong mutability on their PreparedNativeHost bindings, so the first now declares it mutable and the second no longer does. This keeps the tests compiling against the current host API. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 74b0c814..69520001 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ async fn owner_marker_drop_does_not_satisfy_default_drop_verification() -> Resul let id = BoxId::new("box-marker-is-not-default-drop")?; let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); - let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); host.missing_final_drop = Some(names.forward_chain.clone()); let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); @@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ async fn cleanup_restores_owner_marker_when_chain_delete_fails_after_flush() -> let id = BoxId::new("box-delete-retry")?; let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); - let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); *host .fail_chain_delete_once .lock() From 3d88625045cdc07c800e722bfc8799d99018f58b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:50:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 139/184] style(tinybox-docker): reformat egress enforcement code Reformatted the ownership marker restore call and the assertions in the cleanup test to satisfy rustfmt line width limits. No behaviour change. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 14 ++++------- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 23 +++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 598a2983..81ce35cb 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -962,20 +962,16 @@ async fn cleanup_native_with_attempt( firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-F", chain]).await?; if let Err(delete_error) = firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-X", chain]).await { let ipv6 = firewall == "ip6tables"; - return match install_chain_owner_marker( - host, - firewall, - chain, - &names.owner_token, - ipv6, - ) - .await + return match install_chain_owner_marker(host, firewall, chain, &names.owner_token, ipv6) + .await { Ok(()) => Err(delete_error), Err(restore_error) => Err(Error::Backend { sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), operation: "restore egress firewall ownership marker", - message: format!("{delete_error}; restoring ownership marker failed: {restore_error}"), + message: format!( + "{delete_error}; restoring ownership marker failed: {restore_error}" + ), }), }; } diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 69520001..646ff387 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -980,17 +980,20 @@ async fn cleanup_restores_owner_marker_when_chain_delete_fails_after_flush() -> let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); assert!(controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await.is_err()); - assert!(host - .marked_chains - .lock() - .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .contains(&("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()))); + assert!( + host.marked_chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .contains(&("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone())) + ); controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await?; - assert!(!host - .chains - .lock() - .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .contains(&("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()))); + assert!( + !host + .chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .contains(&("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone())) + ); Ok(()) } From fb4503008888538151722309ce4fae5af4774ac1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:55:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 140/184] test(egress): gate chain delete retry test to linux The fail_chain_delete_once field and its test only apply to Linux iptables handling, so they are now behind cfg(target_os = "linux") to avoid unused-code warnings and build failures on other platforms. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 646ff387..2afdf4d9 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ struct PreparedNativeHost { missing_final_drop: Option, empty_network_create: bool, fail_chain_marker: bool, + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] fail_chain_delete_once: Mutex, network_owner: String, network_scope: String, @@ -168,6 +169,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { missing_final_drop: None, empty_network_create: false, fail_chain_marker: false, + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] fail_chain_delete_once: Mutex::new(false), network_owner: id.to_string(), network_scope: names.owner_token.clone(), @@ -309,6 +311,7 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .iter() .any(|arg| arg == "iptables" || arg == "ip6tables") { + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-F") && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) { @@ -322,6 +325,7 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); } + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] if *self .fail_chain_delete_once .lock() @@ -960,6 +964,7 @@ async fn cleanup_refuses_firewall_chains_with_another_owner_marker() -> Result<( } #[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] async fn cleanup_restores_owner_marker_when_chain_delete_fails_after_flush() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-delete-retry")?; let namespace = "test"; From fed0596c6a61f0dbf08d90ad5567b76ae087bcb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:55:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 141/184] chore: add rustc ice reports Add two rustc internal compiler error reports captured during a build, kept for reference when investigating the underlying compiler crash. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_12-1976600.txt | 594 ++++++++++++++++++++++ rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_22-1994021.txt | 594 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 1188 insertions(+) create mode 100644 rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_12-1976600.txt create mode 100644 rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_22-1994021.txt diff --git a/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_12-1976600.txt b/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_12-1976600.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ca48f440 --- /dev/null +++ b/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_12-1976600.txt @@ -0,0 +1,594 @@ +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import 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(58cf8f9c3 2026-10-13) +platform: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_22-1994021.txt b/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_22-1994021.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ca48f440 --- /dev/null +++ b/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_22-1994021.txt @@ -0,0 +1,594 @@ +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace 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backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace + + +rustc version: 1.99.1 (58cf8f9c3 2026-10-13) +platform: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu \ No newline at end of file From 7a33ef7d1ade07551f24842e2d6c016b89ec58e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:56:16 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 142/184] chore: remove rustc ice dump files Delete two captured rustc internal compiler error logs that were accidentally left in the tree. They are generated diagnostics with no value to the repository. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_12-1976600.txt | 594 ---------------------- rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_22-1994021.txt | 594 ---------------------- 2 files changed, 1188 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_12-1976600.txt delete mode 100644 rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_22-1994021.txt diff --git a/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_12-1976600.txt b/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_12-1976600.txt deleted file mode 100644 index ca48f440..00000000 --- a/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_12-1976600.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,594 +0,0 @@ -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import 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(58cf8f9c3 2026-10-13) -platform: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_22-1994021.txt b/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_22-1994021.txt deleted file mode 100644 index ca48f440..00000000 --- a/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_55_22-1994021.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,594 +0,0 @@ -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace 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backtrace -delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted -disabled backtrace - - -rustc version: 1.99.1 (58cf8f9c3 2026-10-13) -platform: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu \ No newline at end of file From 1035a75b99213a05e73510c865d7b2305aaba944 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:56:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 143/184] chore: add rustc ice report Record an untracked rustc internal compiler error report file. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_56_39-2092634.txt | 594 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 594 insertions(+) create mode 100644 rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_56_39-2092634.txt diff --git a/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_56_39-2092634.txt b/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_56_39-2092634.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ca48f440 --- /dev/null +++ b/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_56_39-2092634.txt @@ -0,0 +1,594 @@ +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: no resolution for an import +disabled 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backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace +delayed bug: path with `Res::Err` but no error emitted +disabled backtrace + + +rustc version: 1.99.1 (58cf8f9c3 2026-10-13) +platform: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu \ No newline at end of file From 234e47bae7588606e29456333beec9de092fc4be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:57:04 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 144/184] chore: remove stray rustc ICE dump file Delete an accidentally committed rustc internal compiler error log that was cluttering the repository root. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_56_39-2092634.txt | 594 ---------------------- 1 file changed, 594 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_56_39-2092634.txt diff --git a/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_56_39-2092634.txt b/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_56_39-2092634.txt deleted file mode 100644 index ca48f440..00000000 --- a/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T17_56_39-2092634.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,594 +0,0 @@ -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled backtrace -delayed bug: no resolution for an import -disabled 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8b01db21e093e7ea2bcdee814293a9d65783ceae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:58:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 145/184] test(limited): cover jailed local host execution location Add a test asserting that a jailed local host reports its execution location as local, guarding the accessor against regressions. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed_tests.rs | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed_tests.rs index 33e2a663..4e48655c 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed_tests.rs @@ -21,6 +21,22 @@ impl tinybox_jail::JailBackend for FixtureBackend { } } +#[test] +fn jailed_local_host_reports_local_execution_location() -> Result<(), Box> { + let root = tempfile::tempdir()?; + let host = JailLocalHost::with_backend( + tinybox_jail::Jail::new(root.path(), "execution-location"), + Arc::new(FixtureBackend), + 64, + )?; + + assert_eq!( + host.execution_location(), + tinybox_core::HostExecutionLocation::Local + ); + Ok(()) +} + #[cfg(unix)] struct MissingStdinBackend; #[cfg(unix)] From 68ce7422a0a57524baac4ca8487d02e482f4a7c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:58:51 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 146/184] feat(host): report local execution location for jailed host The jailed local host now implements execution_location and returns HostExecutionLocation::Local, so callers can tell that commands run on the local machine rather than a remote one. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs b/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs index ed5f5b5e..146f1860 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs @@ -441,6 +441,9 @@ impl Host for JailLocalHost { fn name(&self) -> &'static str { crate::LOCAL } + fn execution_location(&self) -> tinybox_core::HostExecutionLocation { + tinybox_core::HostExecutionLocation::Local + } async fn run(&self, request: &ExecRequest) -> Result { self.collect(request, None).await } From df370e8a56f1b2124ff5382690b511e0c012aa86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:12:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 147/184] test(egress): assert same-owner network conflict is not removed The test now checks that a network create conflict with matching owner labels leaves the existing network in place, asserting no removal or inspect-by-id command runs instead of expecting reconciliation. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 2afdf4d9..8ef0b9bc 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> R #[tokio::test] #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] -async fn network_create_conflict_reconciles_a_stale_network_with_matching_owner_labels() +async fn network_create_conflict_does_not_remove_an_existing_same_owner_network() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-stale-owned-network")?; let namespace = "test"; @@ -1087,8 +1087,10 @@ async fn network_create_conflict_reconciles_a_stale_network_with_matching_owner_ .. }) if message.contains("network name already exists") )); - assert!(host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { - argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "network-id") + assert!(!host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") || + (argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect") + && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg.contains("{{.Id}}"))) })); assert!(!host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { argv.iter() From 74f73886f0f6af2dbf4b7d36306f31e6d54d7061 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:12:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 148/184] fix(egress): return original error on network create failure The error path for a failed network create was passing the error through reconcile_failed_network_create, which is meant for the reconcile failure branch below it. Return the original error directly so the reported cause reflects the actual failure. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 81ce35cb..bdd100db 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { operation: "configure egress filtering", message: output.stderr_lossy().trim().to_owned(), }; - return Err(reconcile_failed_network_create(host, &names, id, error).await); + return Err(error); } Err(error) => { return Err(reconcile_failed_network_create(host, &names, id, error).await); From 302ab4ade07706eac1533671a8a673052b931373 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:13:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 149/184] test(egress): capture iptables-restore scripts in prepared host The PreparedNativeHost test double now records the stdin passed to iptables-restore invocations so tests can assert on the generated ruleset rather than only the command line. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 8ef0b9bc..e6394607 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ enum NetworkInspectBehavior { #[derive(Debug)] struct PreparedNativeHost { commands: Mutex>>, + restore_scripts: Mutex>, chains: Mutex>, marked_chains: Mutex>, network_create_behavior: NetworkCreateBehavior, @@ -162,6 +163,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { fn new(id: &BoxId, names: &NetworkNames) -> Self { Self { commands: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + restore_scripts: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), marked_chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), network_create_behavior: NetworkCreateBehavior::Succeed, @@ -207,6 +209,14 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .push(argv.clone()); + if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "iptables-restore") + && let Some(stdin) = &request.stdin + { + self.restore_scripts + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .push(String::from_utf8_lossy(stdin).into_owned()); + } if let Some(docker_index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "docker") { let docker_args = &argv[docker_index + 1..]; From 1ec263e0c271bd0d4c8181e59be3343711eee04e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:13:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 150/184] test(egress): cover atomic chain creation and restart-safe cleanup Add a Linux-only test asserting that each family and chain is installed in a single restore transaction carrying the owner marker, and that a fresh controller with no in-memory ownership state can still clean up using only the transactionally installed marker. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 32 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index e6394607..2aa9fdee 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -751,6 +751,38 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] +async fn chain_creation_and_owner_marker_are_atomic_and_cleanup_survives_restart() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-atomic-chain-owner")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + + controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await?; + + let scripts = host + .restore_scripts + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .clone(); + assert_eq!(scripts.len(), 4, "each family/chain uses one restore transaction"); + for script in scripts { + assert!(script.starts_with("*filter\n:")); + assert!(script.contains(&format!("--comment {} -j DROP\n", names.owner_token))); + assert!(script.ends_with("COMMIT\n")); + } + + // A fresh controller has no in-memory ownership set; cleanup must recover + // solely from the transactionally installed marker. + NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)) + .cleanup(&host, namespace, &id) + .await?; + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] async fn pinned_targets_inside_auto_selected_network_subnets_are_rejected_and_rolled_back() From 8de0a4e61598cefc9eaa7b0f4240d4be091b024f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:13:30 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 151/184] fix(egress): create firewall chains atomically with owner marker Chain creation and owner marker installation now run as a single iptables-restore transaction, so a crash can no longer leave an unmarked chain that cannot be safely reclaimed. The engine check also verifies the restore tool is available before proceeding. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 53 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index bdd100db..a9fe9f0b 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -349,6 +349,12 @@ async fn verify_engine_and_firewall(host: &dyn Host) -> Result<()> { } for firewall in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] { + let restore = host + .run(&ExecRequest::new(["sudo", "-n", firewall_restore(firewall), "--version"])) + .await?; + if !restore.succeeded() { + return Err(unsupported("required atomic firewall restore tool is unavailable")); + } for chain in ["DOCKER-USER", "INPUT"] { let output = host .run(&ExecRequest::new([ @@ -517,9 +523,8 @@ async fn install_family( } for chain in [&names.forward_chain, &names.input_chain] { - firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-N", chain]).await?; + create_chain_with_owner_marker(host, firewall, chain, &names.owner_token, ipv6).await?; attempt_owned_chains.insert((firewall.to_owned(), chain.clone())); - install_chain_owner_marker(host, firewall, chain, &names.owner_token, ipv6).await?; } for rule in deny_rules(ipv6) { let mut command = vec!["-A".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()]; @@ -661,7 +666,7 @@ async fn install_pinned_destinations( Ok(()) } -async fn install_chain_owner_marker( +async fn create_chain_with_owner_marker( host: &dyn Host, firewall: &str, chain: &str, @@ -669,23 +674,31 @@ async fn install_chain_owner_marker( ipv6: bool, ) -> Result<()> { let impossible_source = if ipv6 { "::/128" } else { "0.0.0.0/32" }; - firewall_success( - host, - firewall, - [ - "-A", - chain, - "-s", - impossible_source, - "-m", - "comment", - "--comment", - owner_token, - "-j", - "DROP", - ], - ) - .await + // iptables-restore applies one table update as a transaction. Creating + // the chain and its owner marker together prevents a process crash from + // leaving an unmarked chain that cannot be safely reclaimed later. + let script = format!( + "*filter\n:{chain} - [0:0]\n-A {chain} -s {impossible_source} -m comment --comment {owner_token} -j DROP\nCOMMIT\n" + ); + let output = host + .run( + &ExecRequest::new(["sudo", "-n", firewall_restore(firewall), "--noflush", "-w", "5"]) + .with_stdin(script.into_bytes()), + ) + .await?; + if output.succeeded() { + Ok(()) + } else { + Err(unsupported("atomic firewall chain creation failed")) + } +} + +fn firewall_restore(firewall: &str) -> &'static str { + if firewall == "ip6tables" { + "ip6tables-restore" + } else { + "iptables-restore" + } } fn chain_has_owner_marker(rules: &str, chain: &str, owner_token: &str) -> bool { From d1382537aea7beb2565dcdd24f386767e5f4ec71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:13:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 152/184] fix(egress): append owner marker without flushing the chain Cleanup now appends the owner marker to an existing chain instead of reinstalling it, so a failed chain deletion no longer wipes rules that were already in place. The test host also emulates ip6tables-restore and tracks chains and markers from restore scripts, letting the marker failure path be exercised for both firewalls. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 51 +++++++++++-- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 73 ++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index a9fe9f0b..dd414c97 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -350,10 +350,17 @@ async fn verify_engine_and_firewall(host: &dyn Host) -> Result<()> { for firewall in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] { let restore = host - .run(&ExecRequest::new(["sudo", "-n", firewall_restore(firewall), "--version"])) + .run(&ExecRequest::new([ + "sudo", + "-n", + firewall_restore(firewall), + "--version", + ])) .await?; if !restore.succeeded() { - return Err(unsupported("required atomic firewall restore tool is unavailable")); + return Err(unsupported( + "required atomic firewall restore tool is unavailable", + )); } for chain in ["DOCKER-USER", "INPUT"] { let output = host @@ -682,8 +689,15 @@ async fn create_chain_with_owner_marker( ); let output = host .run( - &ExecRequest::new(["sudo", "-n", firewall_restore(firewall), "--noflush", "-w", "5"]) - .with_stdin(script.into_bytes()), + &ExecRequest::new([ + "sudo", + "-n", + firewall_restore(firewall), + "--noflush", + "-w", + "5", + ]) + .with_stdin(script.into_bytes()), ) .await?; if output.succeeded() { @@ -701,6 +715,33 @@ fn firewall_restore(firewall: &str) -> &'static str { } } +async fn append_chain_owner_marker( + host: &dyn Host, + firewall: &str, + chain: &str, + owner_token: &str, + ipv6: bool, +) -> Result<()> { + let impossible_source = if ipv6 { "::/128" } else { "0.0.0.0/32" }; + firewall_success( + host, + firewall, + [ + "-A", + chain, + "-s", + impossible_source, + "-m", + "comment", + "--comment", + owner_token, + "-j", + "DROP", + ], + ) + .await +} + fn chain_has_owner_marker(rules: &str, chain: &str, owner_token: &str) -> bool { let chain_prefix = format!("-A {chain} "); rules.lines().any(|line| { @@ -975,7 +1016,7 @@ async fn cleanup_native_with_attempt( firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-F", chain]).await?; if let Err(delete_error) = firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-X", chain]).await { let ipv6 = firewall == "ip6tables"; - return match install_chain_owner_marker(host, firewall, chain, &names.owner_token, ipv6) + return match append_chain_owner_marker(host, firewall, chain, &names.owner_token, ipv6) .await { Ok(()) => Err(delete_error), diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 2aa9fdee..5983da86 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -209,7 +209,9 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .push(argv.clone()); - if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "iptables-restore") + if argv + .iter() + .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables-restore" | "ip6tables-restore")) && let Some(stdin) = &request.stdin { self.restore_scripts @@ -217,6 +219,53 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .push(String::from_utf8_lossy(stdin).into_owned()); } + if let Some(restore_program) = argv + .iter() + .find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables-restore" | "ip6tables-restore")) + { + let firewall = if restore_program == "ip6tables-restore" { + "ip6tables" + } else { + "iptables" + }; + if let Some(stdin) = &request.stdin { + let script = String::from_utf8_lossy(stdin); + if self.fail_chain_marker && script.contains(&self.chain_owner_token) { + return Ok(ExecOutput::new( + 1, + Vec::new(), + b"injected owner marker failure".to_vec(), + )); + } + let mut chains = self + .chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner); + let mut marked_chains = self + .marked_chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner); + for line in script.lines() { + if let Some(chain) = line + .strip_prefix(':') + .and_then(|value| value.split_whitespace().next()) + { + chains.insert((firewall.to_owned(), chain.to_owned())); + } + if let Some(chain) = line + .strip_prefix("-A ") + .and_then(|value| value.split_whitespace().next()) + { + marked_chains.insert((firewall.to_owned(), chain.to_owned())); + } + } + } + return Ok(ExecOutput::new( + 0, + b"iptables-restore v1.8.10\n".to_vec(), + Vec::new(), + )); + } if let Some(docker_index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "docker") { let docker_args = &argv[docker_index + 1..]; @@ -761,14 +810,20 @@ async fn chain_creation_and_owner_marker_are_atomic_and_cleanup_survives_restart let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); - controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await?; + controller + .prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist) + .await?; let scripts = host .restore_scripts .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .clone(); - assert_eq!(scripts.len(), 4, "each family/chain uses one restore transaction"); + assert_eq!( + scripts.len(), + 4, + "each family/chain uses one restore transaction" + ); for script in scripts { assert!(script.starts_with("*filter\n:")); assert!(script.contains(&format!("--comment {} -j DROP\n", names.owner_token))); @@ -1111,8 +1166,7 @@ async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> R #[tokio::test] #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] -async fn network_create_conflict_does_not_remove_an_existing_same_owner_network() --> Result<()> { +async fn network_create_conflict_does_not_remove_an_existing_same_owner_network() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-stale-owned-network")?; let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); @@ -1130,8 +1184,8 @@ async fn network_create_conflict_does_not_remove_an_existing_same_owner_network( }) if message.contains("network name already exists") )); assert!(!host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { - argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") || - (argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect") + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") + || (argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg.contains("{{.Id}}"))) })); assert!(!host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { @@ -1167,7 +1221,7 @@ async fn empty_successful_network_create_rolls_back_the_owned_network() -> Resul #[tokio::test] #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] -async fn marker_install_failure_rolls_back_only_the_created_chain_and_network() -> Result<()> { +async fn atomic_chain_marker_failure_leaves_no_chain_and_removes_network() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-marker-failure")?; let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); @@ -1180,9 +1234,6 @@ async fn marker_install_failure_rolls_back_only_the_created_chain_and_network() assert!(result.is_err()); let commands = host.commands(); - assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { - argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-X") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.forward_chain) - })); assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.network) })); From 88a2343f926c580dd4e7693ebda605c96b589510 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:14:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 153/184] test(egress): assert per-chain restore scripts and binaries The atomic chain creation test now checks each firewall and chain individually, verifying that the matching restore binary was invoked and that a script exists which declares the chain, adds the source rule, and carries the owner comment before committing. This tightens the previous assertions, which only confirmed that some script had the expected shape. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement/README.md | 45 +++++++++++++++++++ .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 24 ++++++++-- 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..32d5e2fe --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +# Docker egress enforcement + +`NativeLinuxDockerEgressController` is the opt-in implementation of +`DockerEgressController`. `DockerSandbox` has no controller by default, so an +allowlist remains Unsupported unless a host installs this implementation. + +## Setup and enforcement + +Before creating a network, the controller requires an explicitly local host, +the rootful Docker Engine socket, Linux Docker, `iptables` and `ip6tables`, +their restore tools, Docker's `DOCKER-USER` forwarding hooks, and a usable +bridge firewall interface. It resolves hostnames once through the injected +resolver, rejects loopback and metadata answers, and retains every pinned +address. Docker-assigned IPAM subnets are checked before the firewall is +installed; any pinned address inside one causes the whole setup to roll back. + +The controller installs a per-box bridge and default-drop input and forwarding +chains before Docker starts the workload. Pinned TCP destination addresses and +ports are accepted in `DOCKER-USER`; new host-bound traffic is dropped. The +input chain permits required IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation and established +replies. Docker receives static `/etc/hosts` mappings for approved names and a +loopback-only resolver, so its embedded resolver cannot forward arbitrary +queries. Firewall rules also block loopback and the known metadata endpoints. + +Each firewall chain and its cryptographic owner marker are created in a single +`iptables-restore --noflush` table transaction. This avoids leaving a chain +without a marker if the process exits between separate commands. Cleanup first +verifies the network labels and all existing chain markers, then removes only +the hooks, chains, and network owned by this box. If verification or cleanup +fails, the caller retains the box record so cleanup can be retried. + +## Public surface and limits + +- `DockerEgressController` is the lifecycle interface consumed by + `DockerSandbox`. +- `PreparedEgressNetwork` carries the Docker network name and pinned host + mappings used in the workload's Docker arguments. +- `NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new` accepts the resolver used to build + the pinned plan. + +Docker Desktop, remote or unknown daemons, rootless Docker, Windows, macOS, and +hosts without the required firewall or restore capability are refused. The +controller filters TCP egress only; this is not a general-purpose firewall or +a claim that DNS answers are monitored after the one-time plan is created. +The real firewall proof runs only in the disposable hosted Ubuntu Docker job. diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 5983da86..6c329c91 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -824,10 +824,26 @@ async fn chain_creation_and_owner_marker_are_atomic_and_cleanup_survives_restart 4, "each family/chain uses one restore transaction" ); - for script in scripts { - assert!(script.starts_with("*filter\n:")); - assert!(script.contains(&format!("--comment {} -j DROP\n", names.owner_token))); - assert!(script.ends_with("COMMIT\n")); + for (firewall, chain) in [ + ("iptables", names.forward_chain.as_str()), + ("iptables", names.input_chain.as_str()), + ("ip6tables", names.forward_chain.as_str()), + ("ip6tables", names.input_chain.as_str()), + ] { + let restore_program = if firewall == "ip6tables" { + "ip6tables-restore" + } else { + "iptables-restore" + }; + assert!(host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == restore_program) + })); + assert!(scripts.iter().any(|script| { + script.starts_with(&format!("*filter\n:{chain} - [0:0]\n")) + && script.contains(&format!("-A {chain} -s ")) + && script.contains(&format!("--comment {} -j DROP\n", names.owner_token)) + && script.ends_with("COMMIT\n") + })); } // A fresh controller has no in-memory ownership set; cleanup must recover From dbcccc61f6f8103c03871a823bb78fda00bfeae5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:14:40 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 154/184] test(egress): reformat restore program assertion Reformat the assertion that checks for the iptables-restore program in the recorded host commands so it matches rustfmt's expected layout. No behaviour change. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 6c329c91..e9ebd536 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -835,9 +835,11 @@ async fn chain_creation_and_owner_marker_are_atomic_and_cleanup_survives_restart } else { "iptables-restore" }; - assert!(host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { - argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == restore_program) - })); + assert!( + host.commands() + .iter() + .any(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == restore_program) }) + ); assert!(scripts.iter().any(|script| { script.starts_with(&format!("*filter\n:{chain} - [0:0]\n")) && script.contains(&format!("-A {chain} -s ")) From d435d30a3a1ef0b8864fdf0f61e8ab7708972c64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:15:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 155/184] test(egress): assert no inspect runs on network name conflict The test now checks that no inspect command is issued when a network name conflict leaves an existing owner's firewall untouched, matching the intended behaviour of skipping inspection in that path. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index e9ebd536..0d5e6790 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -1168,11 +1168,10 @@ async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> R .iter() .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-D" | "-F" | "-X")) })); - assert!( - host.commands() - .iter() - .any(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect")) - ); + assert!(!host + .commands() + .iter() + .any(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect"))); assert!( !host .commands() From a7d4238230e101b601a937ce19f13e609b8c4998 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:15:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 156/184] test(egress): reformat inspect assertion to match rustfmt Reformatted the assertion that checks no inspect command was run so it matches rustfmt's expected layout. No behaviour change. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 0d5e6790..eb912c56 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -1168,10 +1168,12 @@ async fn network_name_conflict_does_not_clean_an_existing_owners_firewall() -> R .iter() .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-D" | "-F" | "-X")) })); - assert!(!host - .commands() - .iter() - .any(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect"))); + assert!( + !host + .commands() + .iter() + .any(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect")) + ); assert!( !host .commands() From d517027d2f9044fc550ce91b334d9abe2f301620 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:18:22 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 157/184] refactor(egress): key firewall chains by per-attempt token Firewall chain names now incorporate a fresh per-attempt token instead of a stable hash, and the owner marker is appended after chain creation rather than created atomically via iptables-restore. This drops the atomic restore requirement and its availability check, allowing chains from separate attempts to be distinguished and reclaimed independently. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 117 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index dd414c97..94222597 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -12,12 +12,14 @@ use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; use tinybox_core::{ BoxId, EgressAllowlist, Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result, }; +use uuid::Uuid; use crate::{EgressResolver, PinnedEgressPlan, plan_egress_allowlist}; const DOCKER_SOCKET: &str = "unix:///var/run/docker.sock"; const OWNER_LABEL: &str = "ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.owner"; const SCOPE_LABEL: &str = "ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.scope"; +const ATTEMPT_LABEL: &str = "ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.attempt"; const ALLOWLIST_PROTOCOLS: [&str; 1] = ["tcp"]; const HEX: &[u8; 16] = b"0123456789abcdef"; @@ -251,23 +253,68 @@ struct NetworkNames { forward_chain: String, input_chain: String, owner_token: String, + attempt_token: String, + chain_prefix: String, + chain_owner_token: String, } impl NetworkNames { fn for_box(namespace: &str, id: &BoxId) -> Self { + let attempt_token = fresh_attempt_token(namespace, id); + Self::for_attempt(namespace, id, &attempt_token) + } + + fn for_attempt(namespace: &str, id: &BoxId, attempt_token: &str) -> Self { let hash = stable_hash(namespace.as_bytes(), id.as_str().as_bytes()); let short = format!("{hash:016x}"); + let chain_prefix = format!("TBX{}", &short[..4]); + let chain_token = &attempt_token[..20]; Self { network: format!("tinybox-egress-{}", &short[..12]), // Linux interface names are limited to IFNAMSIZ - 1 (15 bytes). bridge: format!("tbx{}", &short[..12]), - forward_chain: format!("TBX{}F", &short[..10]), - input_chain: format!("TBX{}I", &short[..10]), + forward_chain: format!("{chain_prefix}{chain_token}F"), + input_chain: format!("{chain_prefix}{chain_token}I"), owner_token: scope_token(namespace, id.as_str()), + attempt_token: attempt_token.to_owned(), + chain_prefix, + chain_owner_token: chain_owner_token(namespace, id.as_str(), attempt_token), } } } +fn fresh_attempt_token(namespace: &str, id: &BoxId) -> String { + #[cfg(test)] + { + scope_token(namespace, id.as_str())[..32].to_owned() + } + #[cfg(not(test))] + { + let _ = (namespace, id); + Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string() + } +} + +fn chain_owner_token(namespace: &str, id: &str, attempt: &str) -> String { + let mut hasher = Sha256::new(); + hasher.update(b"tinybox-egress-chain-owner-v1\0"); + for value in [namespace, id, attempt] { + hasher.update((value.len() as u64).to_be_bytes()); + hasher.update(value.as_bytes()); + } + let digest = hasher.finalize(); + let mut token = String::with_capacity(64); + for byte in digest { + token.push(char::from(HEX[usize::from(byte >> 4)])); + token.push(char::from(HEX[usize::from(byte & 0x0f)])); + } + token +} + +fn valid_attempt_token(attempt: &str) -> bool { + attempt.len() == 32 && attempt.bytes().all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_hexdigit()) +} + fn scope_token(namespace: &str, id: &str) -> String { let mut hasher = Sha256::new(); hasher.update((namespace.len() as u64).to_be_bytes()); @@ -349,19 +396,6 @@ async fn verify_engine_and_firewall(host: &dyn Host) -> Result<()> { } for firewall in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] { - let restore = host - .run(&ExecRequest::new([ - "sudo", - "-n", - firewall_restore(firewall), - "--version", - ])) - .await?; - if !restore.succeeded() { - return Err(unsupported( - "required atomic firewall restore tool is unavailable", - )); - } for chain in ["DOCKER-USER", "INPUT"] { let output = host .run(&ExecRequest::new([ @@ -530,8 +564,9 @@ async fn install_family( } for chain in [&names.forward_chain, &names.input_chain] { - create_chain_with_owner_marker(host, firewall, chain, &names.owner_token, ipv6).await?; + firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-N", chain]).await?; attempt_owned_chains.insert((firewall.to_owned(), chain.clone())); + append_chain_owner_marker(host, firewall, chain, &names.chain_owner_token, ipv6).await?; } for rule in deny_rules(ipv6) { let mut command = vec!["-A".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()]; @@ -673,48 +708,6 @@ async fn install_pinned_destinations( Ok(()) } -async fn create_chain_with_owner_marker( - host: &dyn Host, - firewall: &str, - chain: &str, - owner_token: &str, - ipv6: bool, -) -> Result<()> { - let impossible_source = if ipv6 { "::/128" } else { "0.0.0.0/32" }; - // iptables-restore applies one table update as a transaction. Creating - // the chain and its owner marker together prevents a process crash from - // leaving an unmarked chain that cannot be safely reclaimed later. - let script = format!( - "*filter\n:{chain} - [0:0]\n-A {chain} -s {impossible_source} -m comment --comment {owner_token} -j DROP\nCOMMIT\n" - ); - let output = host - .run( - &ExecRequest::new([ - "sudo", - "-n", - firewall_restore(firewall), - "--noflush", - "-w", - "5", - ]) - .with_stdin(script.into_bytes()), - ) - .await?; - if output.succeeded() { - Ok(()) - } else { - Err(unsupported("atomic firewall chain creation failed")) - } -} - -fn firewall_restore(firewall: &str) -> &'static str { - if firewall == "ip6tables" { - "ip6tables-restore" - } else { - "iptables-restore" - } -} - async fn append_chain_owner_marker( host: &dyn Host, firewall: &str, @@ -1016,7 +1009,13 @@ async fn cleanup_native_with_attempt( firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-F", chain]).await?; if let Err(delete_error) = firewall_success(host, firewall, ["-X", chain]).await { let ipv6 = firewall == "ip6tables"; - return match append_chain_owner_marker(host, firewall, chain, &names.owner_token, ipv6) + return match append_chain_owner_marker( + host, + firewall, + chain, + &names.chain_owner_token, + ipv6, + ) .await { Ok(()) => Err(delete_error), From d9fa023c6666bda84454f6ed0877616f68253dba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:18:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 158/184] fix(egress): label egress networks with the attempt token The created network now carries the attempt label alongside the owner label, and verification expects it in the inspected configuration. This lets cleanup and verification distinguish networks belonging to different attempts of the same owner. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 94222597..48172682 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -162,6 +162,8 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { format!("{OWNER_LABEL}={id}"), "--label".into(), format!("{SCOPE_LABEL}={}", names.owner_token), + "--label".into(), + format!("{ATTEMPT_LABEL}={}", names.attempt_token), names.network.clone(), ]), ) @@ -430,7 +432,10 @@ async fn verify_created_network(host: &dyn Host, names: &NetworkNames, id: &BoxI ], ) .await?; - let expected = format!("bridge|true|{}|{id}|{}", names.bridge, names.owner_token); + let expected = format!( + "bridge|true|{}|{id}|{}|{}", + names.bridge, names.owner_token, names.attempt_token + ); if output != expected { return Err(unsupported( "Docker egress network did not match its verified configuration", From f82ebf6d6ebd53e730168326c66cb004d199d5be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:19:20 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 159/184] fix(egress): include attempt label in network inspect format The network inspect format string now also reads the attempt label so verification can confirm the network belongs to the current attempt. The test host was reworked to track chains with rules and matching hooks instead of parsing restore scripts, and it now uses the chain owner token for chain ownership. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 2 +- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 82 ++++--------------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 48172682..51db92f2 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ async fn verify_created_network(host: &dyn Host, names: &NetworkNames, id: &BoxI "network".into(), "inspect".into(), "--format".into(), - format!("{{{{.Driver}}}}|{{{{.EnableIPv6}}}}|{{{{index .Options \"com.docker.network.bridge.name\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{SCOPE_LABEL}\"}}}}"), + format!("{{{{.Driver}}}}|{{{{.EnableIPv6}}}}|{{{{index .Options \"com.docker.network.bridge.name\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{SCOPE_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{ATTEMPT_LABEL}\"}}}}"), names.network.clone(), ], ) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index eb912c56..49964511 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -140,18 +140,20 @@ enum NetworkInspectBehavior { #[derive(Debug)] struct PreparedNativeHost { commands: Mutex>>, - restore_scripts: Mutex>, chains: Mutex>, marked_chains: Mutex>, + chains_with_rules: Mutex>, network_create_behavior: NetworkCreateBehavior, network_inspect_behavior: NetworkInspectBehavior, missing_final_drop: Option, empty_network_create: bool, fail_chain_marker: bool, + no_matching_hooks: bool, #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] fail_chain_delete_once: Mutex, network_owner: String, network_scope: String, + network_attempt: String, network_subnets: String, chain_owner_token: String, bridge: String, @@ -163,21 +165,23 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { fn new(id: &BoxId, names: &NetworkNames) -> Self { Self { commands: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), - restore_scripts: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), marked_chains: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), + chains_with_rules: Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeSet::new()), network_create_behavior: NetworkCreateBehavior::Succeed, network_inspect_behavior: NetworkInspectBehavior::Owned, missing_final_drop: None, empty_network_create: false, fail_chain_marker: false, + no_matching_hooks: false, #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] fail_chain_delete_once: Mutex::new(false), network_owner: id.to_string(), network_scope: names.owner_token.clone(), + network_attempt: names.attempt_token.clone(), network_subnets: r#"[{"Subnet":"172.18.0.0/16"},{"Subnet":"fd00:dead:beef::/64"}]"# .to_owned(), - chain_owner_token: names.owner_token.clone(), + chain_owner_token: names.chain_owner_token.clone(), bridge: names.bridge.clone(), forward_chain: names.forward_chain.clone(), input_chain: names.input_chain.clone(), @@ -209,64 +213,6 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .push(argv.clone()); - if argv - .iter() - .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables-restore" | "ip6tables-restore")) - && let Some(stdin) = &request.stdin - { - self.restore_scripts - .lock() - .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .push(String::from_utf8_lossy(stdin).into_owned()); - } - if let Some(restore_program) = argv - .iter() - .find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables-restore" | "ip6tables-restore")) - { - let firewall = if restore_program == "ip6tables-restore" { - "ip6tables" - } else { - "iptables" - }; - if let Some(stdin) = &request.stdin { - let script = String::from_utf8_lossy(stdin); - if self.fail_chain_marker && script.contains(&self.chain_owner_token) { - return Ok(ExecOutput::new( - 1, - Vec::new(), - b"injected owner marker failure".to_vec(), - )); - } - let mut chains = self - .chains - .lock() - .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner); - let mut marked_chains = self - .marked_chains - .lock() - .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner); - for line in script.lines() { - if let Some(chain) = line - .strip_prefix(':') - .and_then(|value| value.split_whitespace().next()) - { - chains.insert((firewall.to_owned(), chain.to_owned())); - } - if let Some(chain) = line - .strip_prefix("-A ") - .and_then(|value| value.split_whitespace().next()) - { - marked_chains.insert((firewall.to_owned(), chain.to_owned())); - } - } - } - return Ok(ExecOutput::new( - 0, - b"iptables-restore v1.8.10\n".to_vec(), - Vec::new(), - )); - } - if let Some(docker_index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "docker") { let docker_args = &argv[docker_index + 1..]; if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "info") { @@ -342,16 +288,22 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { ) { "network-id|owner-without-scope".to_owned() } else if format.contains(".Id") { - format!("network-id|{owner}|{}", self.network_scope) + format!( + "network-id|{owner}|{}|{}", + self.network_scope, self.network_attempt + ) } else if format.contains(".Driver") { format!( - "bridge|true|{}|{}|{}", - self.bridge, owner, self.network_scope + "bridge|true|{}|{}|{}|{}", + self.bridge, owner, self.network_scope, self.network_attempt ) } else if format.contains(".IPAM.Config") { self.network_subnets.clone() } else { - format!("{owner}|{}", self.network_scope) + format!( + "{owner}|{}|{}", + self.network_scope, self.network_attempt + ) }; return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, stdout.into_bytes(), Vec::new())); } From c15a250e4c067a02873fd434cfa84ac240ec02ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:20:00 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 160/184] fix(docker): verify egress network ownership before cleanup Cleanup now reads the attempt label from the Docker network and derives the attempt-scoped names from it, so a network created by a different attempt is no longer mistaken for the one being torn down. When the network is missing, the firewall is checked for orphaned chains and cleanup refuses to proceed unless the caller explicitly allows reclaiming them. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 96 ++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 82 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 51db92f2..d525acf0 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -184,7 +184,15 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { }; if network.is_empty() { let error = unsupported("Docker did not confirm the egress network"); - return match cleanup_native(host, namespace, id).await { + return match cleanup_native_with_attempt( + host, + namespace, + id, + &BTreeSet::new(), + false, + ) + .await + { Ok(()) => Err(error), Err(cleanup_error) => Err(Error::Backend { sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), @@ -203,8 +211,14 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { } .await; if let Err(error) = setup { - let cleanup = - cleanup_native_with_attempt(host, namespace, id, &attempt_owned_chains).await; + let cleanup = cleanup_native_with_attempt( + host, + namespace, + id, + &attempt_owned_chains, + false, + ) + .await; return match cleanup { Ok(()) => Err(error), Err(cleanup_error) => Err(Error::Backend { @@ -757,6 +771,25 @@ fn chain_has_owner_marker(rules: &str, chain: &str, owner_token: &str) -> bool { }) } +fn chain_has_rules(rules: &str, chain: &str) -> bool { + let prefix = format!("-A {chain} "); + rules.lines().any(|line| line.starts_with(&prefix)) +} + +fn chain_is_referenced(rules: &str, chain: &str) -> bool { + rules.lines().any(|line| { + let mut fields = line.split_whitespace(); + let (Some("-A"), Some(parent)) = (fields.next(), fields.next()) else { + return false; + }; + parent != chain + && fields + .collect::>() + .windows(2) + .any(|pair| pair == ["-j", chain]) + }) +} + fn deny_rules(ipv6: bool) -> Vec> { if ipv6 { ["::1/128", "fd00:ec2::254/128"] @@ -792,7 +825,7 @@ async fn verify_hook( #[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)] // Keep ownership preflight and cleanup order together. async fn cleanup_native(host: &dyn Host, namespace: &str, id: &BoxId) -> Result<()> { - cleanup_native_with_attempt(host, namespace, id, &BTreeSet::new()).await + cleanup_native_with_attempt(host, namespace, id, &BTreeSet::new(), true).await } /// Reconcile a network create whose command result is ambiguous. @@ -920,14 +953,31 @@ fn parse_network_ownership(output: &str) -> Result<(String, String, String)> { )) } +fn parse_network_labels(output: &str) -> Result<(String, String, String)> { + let fields = output.trim().split('|').collect::>(); + if fields.len() != 3 || fields.iter().any(|field| field.is_empty()) { + return Err(Error::Backend { + sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), + operation: "inspect egress network ownership", + message: "Docker returned missing or malformed egress ownership labels".to_owned(), + }); + } + Ok(( + fields[0].to_owned(), + fields[1].to_owned(), + fields[2].to_owned(), + )) +} + #[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)] // Keep ownership preflight and cleanup order together. async fn cleanup_native_with_attempt( host: &dyn Host, namespace: &str, id: &BoxId, attempt_owned_chains: &BTreeSet<(String, String)>, + allow_empty_orphan_reclaim: bool, ) -> Result<()> { - let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, id); + let base_names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, id); let inspect = docker_request( host, force_local_rootful_docker(vec![ @@ -936,25 +986,39 @@ async fn cleanup_native_with_attempt( "inspect".into(), "--format".into(), format!( - "{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{SCOPE_LABEL}\"}}}}" + "{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{SCOPE_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{ATTEMPT_LABEL}\"}}}}" ), - names.network.clone(), + base_names.network.clone(), ]), ) .await?; - let network_exists = if inspect.succeeded() { - let owner = inspect.stdout_lossy(); - let expected_owner = format!("{}|{}", id, names.owner_token); - if owner.trim() != expected_owner { + let names = if inspect.succeeded() { + let fields = inspect.stdout_lossy(); + let (owner, scope, attempt) = parse_network_labels(&fields)?; + if owner != id.to_string() || scope != base_names.owner_token { return Err(unsupported( "egress network ownership could not be verified", )); } - true + if !valid_attempt_token(&attempt) { + return Err(unsupported("egress network attempt identity is malformed")); + } + NetworkNames::for_attempt(namespace, id, &attempt) } else if inspect.stderr_lossy().contains("No such network") || inspect.stderr_lossy().contains("not found") { - false + for firewall in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] { + let rules = firewall_output(host, firewall, ["-S"]).await?; + if rules.lines().any(|line| { + line.split_whitespace() + .any(|word| word.starts_with(&base_names.chain_prefix)) + }) { + return Err(unsupported( + "orphaned egress firewall chain has no verifiable Docker network owner", + )); + } + } + return Ok(()); } else { return Err(unsupported("egress network cleanup could not be verified")); }; @@ -975,7 +1039,11 @@ async fn cleanup_native_with_attempt( if chain_exists { let created_by_attempt = attempt_owned_chains.contains(&(firewall.to_owned(), chain.to_owned())); - if !created_by_attempt && !chain_has_owner_marker(&rules, chain, &names.owner_token) { + let marked = chain_has_owner_marker(&rules, chain, &names.chain_owner_token); + let recoverable_empty_orphan = (created_by_attempt || allow_empty_orphan_reclaim) + && !chain_has_rules(&rules, chain) + && !chain_is_referenced(&rules, chain); + if !marked && !recoverable_empty_orphan { return Err(unsupported( "egress firewall chain ownership could not be verified", )); From 1efe33164a95beb2a90c853d9b17c208b63f4fc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:20:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 161/184] refactor(egress): remove redundant network existence check The cleanup path now always attempts to remove the Docker network instead of guarding the removal behind a prior existence check, since the removal command already tolerates a missing network. The Uuid import is also gated behind cfg(not(test)) to avoid an unused import warning in test builds. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 23 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index d525acf0..8eaad78f 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; use tinybox_core::{ BoxId, EgressAllowlist, Error, ExecOutput, ExecRequest, Host, HostExecutionLocation, Result, }; +#[cfg(not(test))] use uuid::Uuid; use crate::{EgressResolver, PinnedEgressPlan, plan_egress_allowlist}; @@ -1112,18 +1113,16 @@ async fn cleanup_native_with_attempt( } } - if network_exists { - docker_success( - host, - vec![ - "docker".into(), - "network".into(), - "rm".into(), - names.network, - ], - ) - .await?; - } + docker_success( + host, + vec![ + "docker".into(), + "network".into(), + "rm".into(), + names.network, + ], + ) + .await?; Ok(()) } From 087c7710feb9a2c73244ab8fd33391b98f36755b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:21:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 162/184] test(egress): split restart cleanup coverage into empty and nonempty cases The single atomic-chain test was replaced by two focused tests: one asserting that cleanup reclaims an empty attempt chain after a restart, and one asserting that cleanup refuses a nonempty unmarked chain and issues no delete, flush, or chain-removal commands. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 86 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 49964511..19d5b096 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -754,57 +754,61 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() #[tokio::test] #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] -async fn chain_creation_and_owner_marker_are_atomic_and_cleanup_survives_restart() -> Result<()> { - let id = BoxId::new("box-atomic-chain-owner")?; +async fn cleanup_reclaims_an_empty_attempt_chain_after_restart() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-empty-orphan")?; let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); - let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); - let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + host.no_matching_hooks = true; + host.chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .insert(("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone())); - controller - .prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist) + // This host models a fresh process: no attempt-owned in-memory set exists. + NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)) + .cleanup(&host, namespace, &id) .await?; + assert!(!host + .chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .contains(&("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()))); + assert!(host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-X") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.forward_chain) + })); + Ok(()) +} - let scripts = host - .restore_scripts +#[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] +async fn cleanup_refuses_a_nonempty_unmarked_attempt_chain_after_restart() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-nonempty-orphan")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.no_matching_hooks = true; + host.chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .clone(); - assert_eq!( - scripts.len(), - 4, - "each family/chain uses one restore transaction" - ); - for (firewall, chain) in [ - ("iptables", names.forward_chain.as_str()), - ("iptables", names.input_chain.as_str()), - ("ip6tables", names.forward_chain.as_str()), - ("ip6tables", names.input_chain.as_str()), - ] { - let restore_program = if firewall == "ip6tables" { - "ip6tables-restore" - } else { - "iptables-restore" - }; - assert!( - host.commands() - .iter() - .any(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == restore_program) }) - ); - assert!(scripts.iter().any(|script| { - script.starts_with(&format!("*filter\n:{chain} - [0:0]\n")) - && script.contains(&format!("-A {chain} -s ")) - && script.contains(&format!("--comment {} -j DROP\n", names.owner_token)) - && script.ends_with("COMMIT\n") - })); - } + .insert(("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone())); + host.chains_with_rules + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .insert(("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone())); - // A fresh controller has no in-memory ownership set; cleanup must recover - // solely from the transactionally installed marker. - NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)) + assert!(NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)) .cleanup(&host, namespace, &id) - .await?; + .await + .is_err()); + assert!(!host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-D" | "-F" | "-X")) + })); + assert!(host + .chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .contains(&("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()))); Ok(()) } From 2df862aa24d09aa0e69eb67153e8c988e7681499 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:21:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 163/184] fix(egress): match attempt label when reconciling ambiguous network creates The ownership check used by ambiguous network create reconciliation now also compares the attempt label, so a network left behind by an earlier create attempt for the same box is no longer mistaken for this attempt's network. Inspection and verification both parse the extra label and treat a mismatch as a foreign network to leave alone. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 27 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 8eaad78f..2cef790b 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -831,8 +831,8 @@ async fn cleanup_native(host: &dyn Host, namespace: &str, id: &BoxId) -> Result< /// Reconcile a network create whose command result is ambiguous. /// -/// The network is removed by its inspected Docker ID only when both owner -/// labels match this box. A missing or foreign network is safe to leave alone; +/// The network is removed by its inspected Docker ID only when owner, scope, +/// and attempt labels match this create attempt. A missing or foreign network is safe to leave alone; /// an inconclusive inspection or removal error is returned so the sandbox /// retains a cleanup record for a later retry. async fn reconcile_ambiguous_network_create( @@ -848,7 +848,7 @@ async fn reconcile_ambiguous_network_create( "inspect".into(), "--format".into(), format!( - "{{{{.Id}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{SCOPE_LABEL}\"}}}}" + "{{{{.Id}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{SCOPE_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{ATTEMPT_LABEL}\"}}}}" ), names.network.clone(), ]), @@ -867,8 +867,11 @@ async fn reconcile_ambiguous_network_create( } let inspect_stdout = inspect.stdout_lossy(); - let (network_id, owner, scope) = parse_network_ownership(&inspect_stdout)?; - if owner != id.to_string() || scope != names.owner_token { + let (network_id, owner, scope, attempt) = parse_network_ownership(&inspect_stdout)?; + if owner != id.to_string() + || scope != names.owner_token + || attempt != names.attempt_token + { return Ok(()); } @@ -896,7 +899,7 @@ async fn reconcile_ambiguous_network_create( "inspect".into(), "--format".into(), format!( - "{{{{.Id}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{SCOPE_LABEL}\"}}}}" + "{{{{.Id}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{OWNER_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{SCOPE_LABEL}\"}}}}|{{{{index .Labels \"{ATTEMPT_LABEL}\"}}}}" ), names.network.clone(), ]), @@ -914,8 +917,11 @@ async fn reconcile_ambiguous_network_create( }); } let verify_stdout = verify.stdout_lossy(); - let (_network_id, owner, scope) = parse_network_ownership(&verify_stdout)?; - if owner != id.to_string() || scope != names.owner_token { + let (_network_id, owner, scope, attempt) = parse_network_ownership(&verify_stdout)?; + if owner != id.to_string() + || scope != names.owner_token + || attempt != names.attempt_token + { return Ok(()); } Err(unsupported("owned egress network rollback failed")) @@ -937,9 +943,9 @@ async fn reconcile_failed_network_create( } } -fn parse_network_ownership(output: &str) -> Result<(String, String, String)> { +fn parse_network_ownership(output: &str) -> Result<(String, String, String, String)> { let fields = output.trim().split('|').collect::>(); - if fields.len() != 3 || fields.iter().any(|field| field.is_empty()) { + if fields.len() != 4 || fields.iter().any(|field| field.is_empty()) { return Err(Error::Backend { sandbox: "docker".to_owned(), operation: "inspect egress network ownership", @@ -951,6 +957,7 @@ fn parse_network_ownership(output: &str) -> Result<(String, String, String)> { fields[0].to_owned(), fields[1].to_owned(), fields[2].to_owned(), + fields[3].to_owned(), )) } From 39fec21212852f50d73c8d823aa4415a619717ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:21:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 164/184] test(egress): cover ambiguous create preserving older attempt network Add a Linux-only test asserting that when a network create fails after its side effect, cleanup inspects the attempt label and leaves a network belonging to an older attempt untouched instead of removing it. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 21 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 19d5b096..f7a9af23 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -519,6 +519,27 @@ async fn uncertain_network_create_removes_only_the_verified_owned_network() -> R Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] +async fn ambiguous_create_preserves_same_box_network_from_an_older_attempt() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-create-old-attempt")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.network_create_behavior = NetworkCreateBehavior::HostErrorAfterSideEffect; + host.network_attempt = "older-attempt-token".to_owned(); + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + + assert!(controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await.is_err()); + let commands = host.commands(); + assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg.contains(ATTEMPT_LABEL)) + })); + assert!(!commands.iter().any(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm"))); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] async fn ambiguous_network_create_keeps_the_original_error_when_absent_or_foreign() -> Result<()> { From 87febd72df97d80c1b7081c13acb8603b1f18c3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:21:44 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 165/184] test(egress): inline attempt label and mark prepared hosts mutable The attempt-label assertion now spells out the full label string instead of relying on the shared constant, and two prepared native hosts are bound as mutable so the tests can adjust their state. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index f7a9af23..fdf86609 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -534,7 +534,8 @@ async fn ambiguous_create_preserves_same_box_network_from_an_older_attempt() -> assert!(controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await.is_err()); let commands = host.commands(); assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { - argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg.contains(ATTEMPT_LABEL)) + argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect") + && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg.contains("ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.attempt")) })); assert!(!commands.iter().any(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm"))); Ok(()) @@ -699,7 +700,7 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); - let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); @@ -779,7 +780,7 @@ async fn cleanup_reclaims_an_empty_attempt_chain_after_restart() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-empty-orphan")?; let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); - let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); host.no_matching_hooks = true; host.chains .lock() From 68d7897d2079e27cc40446d8e1ed6f27ef9add20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:21:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 166/184] test(egress): fix mutability of prepared host bindings Two test bindings had the wrong mutability, so the host is now declared mutable where its fields are assigned and immutable where they are not. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index fdf86609..90afbeaa 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ async fn owner_marker_drop_does_not_satisfy_default_drop_verification() -> Resul let id = BoxId::new("box-marker-is-not-default-drop")?; let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); - let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); host.missing_final_drop = Some(names.forward_chain.clone()); let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); @@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ async fn cleanup_refuses_a_nonempty_unmarked_attempt_chain_after_restart() -> Re let id = BoxId::new("box-nonempty-orphan")?; let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); - let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); host.no_matching_hooks = true; host.chains .lock() From d19c9fd9df04974eb712ddc97ca088f9f2f76b85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:22:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 167/184] test(egress): fix mutability of prepared host bindings in tests Two test bindings had the wrong mutability, so the first now declares the prepared host as mutable and the second no longer does. This keeps the tests compiling without changing what they exercise. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 90afbeaa..ecdff2f6 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ async fn owner_marker_drop_does_not_satisfy_default_drop_verification() -> Resul let id = BoxId::new("box-marker-is-not-default-drop")?; let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); - let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); host.missing_final_drop = Some(names.forward_chain.clone()); let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ async fn native_controller_prepares_and_cleans_a_pinned_allowlist() -> Result<() let id = BoxId::new("box-0")?; let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); - let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + let host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); From 484de6d2e8dc5dd4a6902e978cd82e4084cca5ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:22:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 168/184] docs(egress_enforcement): describe per-attempt chain ownership The README now documents that each attempt gets a fresh random token stored on the Docker network and folded into chain names, and that chains are created exclusively before receiving their owner marker. It also explains the reclaim rules for unmarked chains after a restart and that ambiguous orphans fail closed. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement/README.md | 20 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md index 32d5e2fe..94ed7fc6 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md @@ -14,20 +14,24 @@ resolver, rejects loopback and metadata answers, and retains every pinned address. Docker-assigned IPAM subnets are checked before the firewall is installed; any pinned address inside one causes the whole setup to roll back. -The controller installs a per-box bridge and default-drop input and forwarding -chains before Docker starts the workload. Pinned TCP destination addresses and +The controller installs a per-attempt bridge and default-drop input and forwarding +chains before Docker starts the workload. A fresh random attempt token is stored +on the Docker network and incorporated into the chain names. Pinned TCP destination addresses and ports are accepted in `DOCKER-USER`; new host-bound traffic is dropped. The input chain permits required IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation and established replies. Docker receives static `/etc/hosts` mappings for approved names and a loopback-only resolver, so its embedded resolver cannot forward arbitrary queries. Firewall rules also block loopback and the known metadata endpoints. -Each firewall chain and its cryptographic owner marker are created in a single -`iptables-restore --noflush` table transaction. This avoids leaving a chain -without a marker if the process exits between separate commands. Cleanup first -verifies the network labels and all existing chain markers, then removes only -the hooks, chains, and network owned by this box. If verification or cleanup -fails, the caller retains the box record so cleanup can be retried. +Each chain is created exclusively, then receives a cryptographic owner marker. +Cleanup first verifies the network owner, scope, and attempt labels and all +existing chain markers before changing firewall state. After a process restart, +an unmarked chain is reclaimable only when its attempt token matches the +network, the chain is empty, and no firewall hook references it. Nonempty or +otherwise ambiguous orphan chains are left untouched and cleanup fails closed. +The controller removes only the hooks, chains, and network owned by this +attempt. If verification or cleanup fails, the caller retains the box record so +cleanup can be retried. ## Public surface and limits From a87f185ae6ae4b99697b3eb0f042db4476a6021b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:22:40 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 169/184] test(docker): track chains with rules in egress enforcement fake host The fake host now records which chains have rules added and reports missing rules for -C checks, so the egress enforcement tests can exercise the rule verification path. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 28 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index ecdff2f6..54e5934c 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -322,6 +322,10 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .iter() .any(|arg| arg == "iptables" || arg == "ip6tables") { + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] + if self.no_matching_hooks && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-C") { + return Ok(ExecOutput::new(1, Vec::new(), b"rule not found".to_vec())); + } #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-F") && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) @@ -335,6 +339,10 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); + self.chains_with_rules + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .remove(&(argv.iter().find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")).cloned().unwrap_or_default(), chain.clone())); } #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] if *self @@ -410,6 +418,18 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .insert((firewall, chain.clone())); + self.chains_with_rules + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .insert((argv.iter().find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")).cloned().unwrap_or_default(), chain.clone())); + } else if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-A") + && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) + { + let firewall = argv.iter().find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")).cloned().unwrap_or_default(); + self.chains_with_rules + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .insert((firewall, chain.clone())); } if argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "FORWARD") { return Ok(ExecOutput::new( @@ -433,6 +453,10 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .marked_chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner); + let chains_with_rules = self + .chains_with_rules + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner); let stdout = [&self.forward_chain, &self.input_chain] .into_iter() .filter(|chain| chains.contains(&(firewall.clone(), (*chain).clone()))) @@ -445,7 +469,9 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { self.chain_owner_token ); } - if self.missing_final_drop.as_deref() != Some(chain) { + if chains_with_rules.contains(&(firewall.clone(), chain.clone())) + && self.missing_final_drop.as_deref() != Some(chain) + { let _ = writeln!(stdout, "-A {chain} -j DROP"); } stdout From 813a3419aea993f7a0a831fdd97b63b6464ca5c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:22:48 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 170/184] test(egress): reuse resolved firewall binary in chain bookkeeping The test host now resolves the iptables or ip6tables binary once per invocation and reuses it for the marked-chain and chains-with-rules bookkeeping, instead of re-deriving it inline at each call site. A chains_with_rules removal was also added to the -D path so deletions stay consistent with insertions. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 54e5934c..92bd5424 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -330,6 +330,11 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-F") && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) { + let firewall = argv + .iter() + .find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")) + .cloned() + .unwrap_or_default(); let firewall = argv .iter() .find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")) @@ -338,11 +343,11 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { self.marked_chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); + .remove(&(firewall.clone(), chain.clone())); self.chains_with_rules .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .remove(&(argv.iter().find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")).cloned().unwrap_or_default(), chain.clone())); + .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); } #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] if *self @@ -393,6 +398,10 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); + self.chains_with_rules + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .remove(&(argv.iter().find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")).cloned().unwrap_or_default(), chain.clone())); } if self.fail_chain_marker && argv @@ -421,7 +430,7 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { self.chains_with_rules .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .insert((argv.iter().find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")).cloned().unwrap_or_default(), chain.clone())); + .insert((firewall, chain.clone())); } else if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-A") && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) { From dc13f6a4b895e2397972c1a0ed509f1c9f60d489 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:22:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 171/184] test(egress): reuse firewall value when clearing chain state The test host now clones the firewall identifier for the marked-chains removal and reuses the original value for the chains-with-rules removal, instead of re-deriving it from argv. This keeps both removals keyed on the same firewall value. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 92bd5424..5f267ec9 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -397,11 +397,11 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { self.marked_chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); + .remove(&(firewall.clone(), chain.clone())); self.chains_with_rules .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .remove(&(argv.iter().find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")).cloned().unwrap_or_default(), chain.clone())); + .remove(&(firewall, chain.clone())); } if self.fail_chain_marker && argv From 9e089c6d8a383a83231332445a865d71becda3e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:23:01 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 172/184] style(tinybox-docker): reformat egress enforcement code Reformatted the egress enforcement module and its tests to satisfy rustfmt, wrapping long call chains and assertions and collapsing short conditions onto single lines. No behaviour changed. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs | 33 +++------- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 64 ++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs index 2cef790b..443c3e59 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs @@ -185,14 +185,8 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { }; if network.is_empty() { let error = unsupported("Docker did not confirm the egress network"); - return match cleanup_native_with_attempt( - host, - namespace, - id, - &BTreeSet::new(), - false, - ) - .await + return match cleanup_native_with_attempt(host, namespace, id, &BTreeSet::new(), false) + .await { Ok(()) => Err(error), Err(cleanup_error) => Err(Error::Backend { @@ -212,14 +206,9 @@ impl DockerEgressController for NativeLinuxDockerEgressController { } .await; if let Err(error) = setup { - let cleanup = cleanup_native_with_attempt( - host, - namespace, - id, - &attempt_owned_chains, - false, - ) - .await; + let cleanup = + cleanup_native_with_attempt(host, namespace, id, &attempt_owned_chains, false) + .await; return match cleanup { Ok(()) => Err(error), Err(cleanup_error) => Err(Error::Backend { @@ -868,10 +857,7 @@ async fn reconcile_ambiguous_network_create( let inspect_stdout = inspect.stdout_lossy(); let (network_id, owner, scope, attempt) = parse_network_ownership(&inspect_stdout)?; - if owner != id.to_string() - || scope != names.owner_token - || attempt != names.attempt_token - { + if owner != id.to_string() || scope != names.owner_token || attempt != names.attempt_token { return Ok(()); } @@ -918,10 +904,7 @@ async fn reconcile_ambiguous_network_create( } let verify_stdout = verify.stdout_lossy(); let (_network_id, owner, scope, attempt) = parse_network_ownership(&verify_stdout)?; - if owner != id.to_string() - || scope != names.owner_token - || attempt != names.attempt_token - { + if owner != id.to_string() || scope != names.owner_token || attempt != names.attempt_token { return Ok(()); } Err(unsupported("owned egress network rollback failed")) @@ -1097,7 +1080,7 @@ async fn cleanup_native_with_attempt( &names.chain_owner_token, ipv6, ) - .await + .await { Ok(()) => Err(delete_error), Err(restore_error) => Err(Error::Backend { diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 5f267ec9..45e5ed39 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -300,10 +300,7 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { } else if format.contains(".IPAM.Config") { self.network_subnets.clone() } else { - format!( - "{owner}|{}|{}", - self.network_scope, self.network_attempt - ) + format!("{owner}|{}|{}", self.network_scope, self.network_attempt) }; return Ok(ExecOutput::new(0, stdout.into_bytes(), Vec::new())); } @@ -434,7 +431,11 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { } else if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-A") && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) { - let firewall = argv.iter().find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")).cloned().unwrap_or_default(); + let firewall = argv + .iter() + .find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")) + .cloned() + .unwrap_or_default(); self.chains_with_rules .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) @@ -566,13 +567,24 @@ async fn ambiguous_create_preserves_same_box_network_from_an_older_attempt() -> let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); - assert!(controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await.is_err()); + assert!( + controller + .prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist) + .await + .is_err() + ); let commands = host.commands(); assert!(commands.iter().any(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect") - && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg.contains("ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.attempt")) + && argv + .iter() + .any(|arg| arg.contains("ai.tinyhumans.tinybox.egress.attempt")) })); - assert!(!commands.iter().any(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm"))); + assert!( + !commands + .iter() + .any(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm")) + ); Ok(()) } @@ -826,11 +838,13 @@ async fn cleanup_reclaims_an_empty_attempt_chain_after_restart() -> Result<()> { NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)) .cleanup(&host, namespace, &id) .await?; - assert!(!host - .chains - .lock() - .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .contains(&("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()))); + assert!( + !host + .chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .contains(&("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone())) + ); assert!(host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-X") && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == &names.forward_chain) })); @@ -854,18 +868,22 @@ async fn cleanup_refuses_a_nonempty_unmarked_attempt_chain_after_restart() -> Re .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) .insert(("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone())); - assert!(NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)) - .cleanup(&host, namespace, &id) - .await - .is_err()); + assert!( + NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)) + .cleanup(&host, namespace, &id) + .await + .is_err() + ); assert!(!host.commands().iter().any(|argv| { - argv.iter().any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-D" | "-F" | "-X")) + argv.iter() + .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-D" | "-F" | "-X")) })); - assert!(host - .chains - .lock() - .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .contains(&("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()))); + assert!( + host.chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .contains(&("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone())) + ); Ok(()) } From ab87d2520615ef75a2fb9789e013a4c20f3ae74d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:23:11 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 173/184] test(egress): remove duplicate firewall lookup in prepared host The firewall binary lookup was computed twice in a row, so the first binding was dropped and the second reused. The remaining binding is now cloned at the insertion site to keep the value available. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 7 +------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 45e5ed39..0f5b6b4d 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -327,11 +327,6 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { if let Some(index) = argv.iter().position(|arg| arg == "-F") && let Some(chain) = argv.get(index + 1) { - let firewall = argv - .iter() - .find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")) - .cloned() - .unwrap_or_default(); let firewall = argv .iter() .find(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "iptables" | "ip6tables")) @@ -423,7 +418,7 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { self.marked_chains .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) - .insert((firewall, chain.clone())); + .insert((firewall.clone(), chain.clone())); self.chains_with_rules .lock() .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) From df474af529889a743ed0baf7b5764602194b9553 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:23:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 174/184] test(egress): mark chains as owned in cleanup ownership test The cleanup test now also records the forward and input chains as having rules and carrying the owner marker, so the refusal path is exercised against chains that look genuinely owned by another instance. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 0f5b6b4d..89f14648 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -1090,6 +1090,20 @@ async fn cleanup_refuses_firewall_chains_with_another_owner_marker() -> Result<( ("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()), ("iptables".to_owned(), names.input_chain.clone()), ]); + host.chains_with_rules + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .extend([ + ("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()), + ("iptables".to_owned(), names.input_chain.clone()), + ]); + host.marked_chains + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + .extend([ + ("iptables".to_owned(), names.forward_chain.clone()), + ("iptables".to_owned(), names.input_chain.clone()), + ]); let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); assert!(controller.cleanup(&host, namespace, &id).await.is_err()); From fd6b8912156f99ef43ee9c811b28b44c09a82158 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:23:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 175/184] test(egress): rename marker failure test to describe rollback Rename the test to make clear it covers rollback of both the created chain and the network when the owner marker install fails. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 89f14648..e6bb6d1a 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@ async fn empty_successful_network_create_rolls_back_the_owned_network() -> Resul #[tokio::test] #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] -async fn atomic_chain_marker_failure_leaves_no_chain_and_removes_network() -> Result<()> { +async fn owner_marker_install_failure_rolls_back_created_chain_and_network() -> Result<()> { let id = BoxId::new("box-marker-failure")?; let namespace = "test"; let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); From f60d878124fd1d635134b349b8bc16127754f413 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:31:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 176/184] test(egress): cover cleanup when no orphaned chains exist Add a Linux-only test asserting that cleanup succeeds and issues only the two expected chain-existence probes when the box network is already absent and no matching hooks remain, without running any delete, flush, or remove commands. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 29 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index e6bb6d1a..61611d01 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -846,6 +846,35 @@ async fn cleanup_reclaims_an_empty_attempt_chain_after_restart() -> Result<()> { Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] +async fn cleanup_without_network_succeeds_when_no_orphaned_chains_exist() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-network-already-absent")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.network_inspect_behavior = NetworkInspectBehavior::Absent; + host.no_matching_hooks = true; + + NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)) + .cleanup(&host, namespace, &id) + .await?; + + let commands = host.commands(); + assert_eq!( + commands + .iter() + .filter(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-S")) + .count(), + 2 + ); + assert!(!commands.iter().any(|argv| { + argv.iter() + .any(|arg| matches!(arg.as_str(), "-D" | "-F" | "-X" | "rm")) + })); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] async fn cleanup_refuses_a_nonempty_unmarked_attempt_chain_after_restart() -> Result<()> { From c51b03146156d6da56ba8626ae855804e82943e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:31:31 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 177/184] test(egress): relax iptables chain count assertion The cleanup test asserted exactly two `-S` invocations, which is brittle against extra read-only listing calls. It now checks that at least two occur, keeping the intent while tolerating additional chain inspections. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 6 +- rustc-ice-2026-10-23T18_31_29-185076.txt | 606 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 609 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 rustc-ice-2026-10-23T18_31_29-185076.txt diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 61611d01..384a14ea 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -861,12 +861,12 @@ async fn cleanup_without_network_succeeds_when_no_orphaned_chains_exist() -> Res .await?; let commands = host.commands(); - assert_eq!( + assert!( commands .iter() .filter(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "-S")) - .count(), - 2 + .count() + >= 2 ); assert!(!commands.iter().any(|argv| { argv.iter() diff --git a/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T18_31_29-185076.txt b/rustc-ice-2026-10-23T18_31_29-185076.txt new file mode 100644 index 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x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu \ No newline at end of file From e8023a0cb3b8ff8fa5eabcd0fd1580a6ea4a7739 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:32:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 178/184] test(egress): cover rollback failure when owned network removal fails Add a test that makes the owned network removal fail after an ambiguous create, verifying the cleanup error is retained and the network is inspected twice. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 38 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 384a14ea..f7dcbe92 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ struct PreparedNativeHost { no_matching_hooks: bool, #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] fail_chain_delete_once: Mutex, + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] + fail_network_remove_once: Mutex, network_owner: String, network_scope: String, network_attempt: String, @@ -176,6 +178,8 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { no_matching_hooks: false, #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] fail_chain_delete_once: Mutex::new(false), + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] + fail_network_remove_once: Mutex::new(false), network_owner: id.to_string(), network_scope: names.owner_token.clone(), network_attempt: names.attempt_token.clone(), @@ -550,6 +554,40 @@ async fn uncertain_network_create_removes_only_the_verified_owned_network() -> R Ok(()) } +#[tokio::test] +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] +async fn ambiguous_create_retains_cleanup_error_when_owned_network_removal_fails() -> Result<()> { + let id = BoxId::new("box-create-remove-fails")?; + let namespace = "test"; + let names = NetworkNames::for_box(namespace, &id); + let mut host = PreparedNativeHost::new(&id, &names); + host.network_create_behavior = NetworkCreateBehavior::HostErrorAfterSideEffect; + *host + .fail_network_remove_once + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) = true; + let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); + let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); + + assert!(matches!( + controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await, + Err(Error::Backend { + operation: "roll back egress network setup", + ref message, + .. + }) if message.contains("owned egress network rollback failed") + )); + assert_eq!( + host.commands() + .iter() + .filter(|argv| argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "inspect") + && argv.iter().any(|arg| arg.contains("{{.Id}}"))) + .count(), + 2 + ); + Ok(()) +} + #[tokio::test] #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] async fn ambiguous_create_preserves_same_box_network_from_an_older_attempt() -> Result<()> { From a2566e92927460ce62586472b547b035c4e1ce88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:32:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 179/184] test(egress): inject one-shot network removal failure Add a fault injection hook to the prepared native host so a single `docker network rm` invocation can be made to fail, letting tests exercise the cleanup path when network removal errors out. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index f7dcbe92..3ff61872 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -227,6 +227,22 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { )); } if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "network") { + if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") + && *self + .fail_network_remove_once + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) + { + *self + .fail_network_remove_once + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner) = false; + return Ok(ExecOutput::new( + 1, + Vec::new(), + b"injected network removal failure".to_vec(), + )); + } if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "create") { if matches!( self.network_create_behavior, From ff5bbd6aba26a61cb6565b26c4ca1bf2cf0098c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:32:30 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 180/184] test(egress): report prepare result and commands on rollback failure The ambiguous create rollback test now binds the prepare result and includes it along with the recorded commands in the assertion message, so a failure shows what the controller actually returned instead of only the mismatch. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- .../src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 21 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 3ff61872..c16f5946 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -585,14 +585,19 @@ async fn ambiguous_create_retains_cleanup_error_when_owned_network_removal_fails let controller = NativeLinuxDockerEgressController::new(Arc::new(Resolver)); let allowlist = tinybox_core::EgressAllowlist::new(["service.test"], [443]); - assert!(matches!( - controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await, - Err(Error::Backend { - operation: "roll back egress network setup", - ref message, - .. - }) if message.contains("owned egress network rollback failed") - )); + let result = controller.prepare(&host, namespace, &id, &allowlist).await; + assert!( + matches!( + result, + Err(Error::Backend { + operation: "roll back egress network setup", + ref message, + .. + }) if message.contains("owned egress network rollback failed") + ), + "{result:?}; commands={:?}", + host.commands() + ); assert_eq!( host.commands() .iter() From a7daa817d178f90b9a6f5ec956e3541ee660a053 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:32:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 181/184] test(egress): match simulated lost response in rollback assertion The ambiguous create test now asserts on the simulated lost command response message instead of the owned egress network rollback failure, so the assertion matches the error the test actually injects. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index c16f5946..bf8d2a42 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ async fn ambiguous_create_retains_cleanup_error_when_owned_network_removal_fails operation: "roll back egress network setup", ref message, .. - }) if message.contains("owned egress network rollback failed") + }) if message.contains("simulated lost command response") ), "{result:?}; commands={:?}", host.commands() From aece4b6f962d4fd46d5c765a5623550c4421f089 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:35:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 182/184] test(egress): gate network removal assertion to linux The test now compiles the network-removal assertion only on Linux, since the behaviour it exercises is platform-specific and broke builds elsewhere. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index bf8d2a42..10e02644 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { )); } if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "network") { + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && *self .fail_network_remove_once From 3bd7f10bd450adcbab7ecba63d533d2eb5d7d168 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:35:22 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 183/184] test(egress): fix indentation of linux cfg attribute Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index 10e02644..aabbccef 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ impl Host for PreparedNativeHost { )); } if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "network") { - #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] if docker_args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "rm") && *self .fail_network_remove_once From 1923fefc18cb5c2fbae9bca28a4eb9687a8f6c3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Enamakel Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:35:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 184/184] test(egress): gate no_matching_hooks field to linux The no_matching_hooks field and its initializer are now behind a cfg(target_os = "linux") attribute, matching the other Linux-only fields in PreparedNativeHost. This avoids an unused-field warning on other platforms. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla --- crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs index aabbccef..ef867f94 100644 --- a/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs +++ b/crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct PreparedNativeHost { missing_final_drop: Option, empty_network_create: bool, fail_chain_marker: bool, + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] no_matching_hooks: bool, #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] fail_chain_delete_once: Mutex, @@ -175,6 +176,7 @@ impl PreparedNativeHost { missing_final_drop: None, empty_network_create: false, fail_chain_marker: false, + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] no_matching_hooks: false, #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] fail_chain_delete_once: Mutex::new(false),