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fix(spec): reject metadata IPv4 aliases - #130

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senamakel merged 195 commits into
tinybox-27-loopback-policyfrom
tinybox-27-metadata-ip-alias
Oct 23, 2026
Merged

senamakel merged 195 commits into
tinybox-27-loopback-policyfrom
tinybox-27-metadata-ip-alias

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@senamakel

@senamakel senamakel commented Oct 23, 2026 •

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Reject legacy numeric IPv4 spellings that normalize to the known cloud metadata addresses, using the existing parse_legacy_ipv4 helper. Regression coverage includes octal and hexadecimal aliases.

This PR is stacked on TinyBox PR #127 (tinybox-27-loopback-policy) and includes PR #128's terminal DNS root-dot normalization because both changes touch is_metadata_host. Its diff against #127 therefore includes both #128's root-dot normalization and the metadata IP alias change. No DNS lookup or DNS-answer filtering is added.

Refs #27
Part of tinyhumansai/openhuman#7328

senamakel and others added 4 commits October 23, 2026 13:48
Extend the malformed-host cases to include trailing-dot forms of the
metadata hostnames, ensuring the allowlist validator rejects them as well.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Metadata host matching now strips terminal root dots before comparing, so
names like `Metadata.Google.Internal.` are refused instead of slipping
through the allowlist check. The contract spec was updated to document the
case-insensitive, root-dot-tolerant matching.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
@tinysweeper

tinysweeper Bot commented Oct 23, 2026 •

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Tiny Sweeper review

Findings

No active actionable findings.

Advisory notes

  • medium: Update description to cover Docker egress controller change ((pull request description))
    Problem: The body only says the PR rejects legacy numeric IPv4 metadata aliases and adds terminal-dot normalization, and states "No DNS lookup or DNS-answer filtering is added." The diff ac
    Suggested fix:
    Add a Docker egress enforcement path: a resolver-backed pinning planner (`EgressResolver`, `PinnedEgressPlan`) and an opt-in `NativeLinuxDockerEgressController` that installs default-drop IPv4/IPv6 `DOCKER-USER`/`INPUT` rules on a verified local rootful Linux Engine before `docker run`, plus pinned `/etc/hosts` mappings and a container-local `127.0.0.1` DNS upstream. Add a `HostExecutionLocation` capability so the controller can require an explicitly local host, and wire `DockerSandbox::with_egress_controller` through create/destroy/rollback so allowlists clean up correctly. The default sandbox still refuses allowlists. Also keep the metadata IPv4-alias rejection and terminal-root-dot normalization in `is_metadata_host`. Update the spec docs (`contract-1-19.md`, `tinybox-runtime.md`) to reflect the new backend status. No general-purpose firewall claim is made; enforcement is TCP-only and limited to the disposable Linux Docker job.
    

Verdict: Incomplete · Priority: medium
Coverage: Reviewed 8 of 27 files; not reviewed: Cargo.lock; not reviewed (large PR): crates/tinybox-c…, crates/tinybox-c…, and 16 additional unreviewed files.

Diagnostics and supporting details

Full summary

Pull request purpose (title): fix(spec): reject metadata IPv4 aliases. The whole-pull-request diff ships far more than its title and body describe. It adds an opt-in Docker egress enforcement stack: a resolver-backed planning module (`plan_egress_allowlist`, `PinnedEgressPlan`, `EgressResolver`), a `DockerEgressController` lifecycle trait with a `NativeLinuxDockerEgressController` that verifies a local rootful Linux Engine, `iptables`/`ip6tables` `DOCKER-USER`/`INPUT` chains and bridge visibility, resolves and pins destinations, rejects loopback/metadata/IPv6-link-local and in-subnet targets, and installs default-drop filters before the workload starts. `DockerSandbox` gains `with_egress_controller`, a `ControllerHost` wrapper that pins every Docker command to the rootful socket, and rollback/cleanup bookkeeping retained for retry when egress cleanup fails. Core gains a `HostExecutionLocation` capability (`Local`/`Remote`/`Unknown`, defaulting to `Unknown`) that LocalHost, LimitedLocalHost, JailLocalHost and SshHost implement. Args generation gains pinned `--add-host` entries and a loopback-only `--dns`. The metadata-IP-alias change itself is a small hardening in `EgressAllowlist::is_metadata_host` with terminal-root-dot trimming and a legacy-numeric-IPv4 parse check. The description lane (Answered) reports the PR body still only describes the metadata alias change, so the description must be rewritten.

Unreviewed paths

  • Cargo.lock
  • crates/tinybox-core/src/lib.rs
  • crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/mod.rs
  • crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md
  • crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs
  • crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs
  • crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs
  • crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs
  • crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs
  • crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed_tests.rs
  • crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs
  • crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod_tests.rs
  • crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs
  • crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod_tests.rs
  • crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs
  • crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs
  • docs/specs/contract-1-19.md
  • docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md
  • rustc-ice-2026-10-23T18_31_29-185076.txt

Partial review reasons

  • critique: crates/tinybox-core/src/lib.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • security: crates/tinybox-core/src/lib.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/mod.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • security: crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/mod.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • security: crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • security: crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • security: crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • security: crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • security: crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed_tests.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • security: crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed_tests.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • security: crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod_tests.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • security: crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod_tests.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • security: crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod_tests.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • security: crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod_tests.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • security: crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • security: crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: docs/specs/contract-1-19.md — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md — not selected by the large-review budget
  • critique: rustc-ice-2026-10-23T18_31_29-185076.txt — not selected by the large-review budget

Review snapshot

Change surface Files Review signal Count
Production 12 Active findings 0
Tests 10 Noted findings 1
Documentation 3 Resolved findings 0
Configuration 1 Pending checks/questions 50

Completeness: Incomplete
Test assessment: Test coverage is assessed from changed tests and lane evidence; execution is not claimed without trusted check data.

Features

  • Modified — Legacy numeric IPv4 metadata-alias rejection in `EgressAllowlist::is_metadata_host`: Octal and hexadecimal IPv4 spellings that normalize to the known metadata addresses are refused at validation time, closing the alias bypass while preserving the existing literal and IPv4-mapped matching. (crates/tinybox-core/src/spec/types.rs impl EgressAllowlist {, crates/tinybox-core/src/spec/types.rs pub enum NetworkPolicy {)
  • Modified — Terminal root-dot and case normalization for metadata-host matching: `is_metadata_host` trims trailing dots before case folding and bracket removal, so fully qualified metadata names with a terminal root dot are matched like their dotless forms. (crates/tinybox-core/src/spec/types.rs impl EgressAllowlist {)
  • Added — Host implementations report execution location: `LocalHost`, `LimitedLocalHost` and `JailLocalHost` report `Local`, and `SshHost` reports `Remote`, allowing the egress controller to gate on real locality rather than a host registration name. (crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs impl Host for LocalHost {, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs impl Host for LimitedLocalHost {, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs impl Host for JailLocalHost {, crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs impl Host for SshHost {)
  • Added — Resolver-backed egress allowlist planning and pinning: `plan_egress_allowlist` resolves each distinct hostname once, normalizes IPv4-mapped answers, and rejects the whole plan when any answer is empty, metadata, or loopback, or when an IPv6 link-local target would lose its scope; private addresses remain allowed because the policy does not forbid them. (crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs pub use oneshot::{)
  • Added — `DockerEgressController` trait and `NativeLinuxDockerEgressController`: The native controller verifies a local rootful Linux Engine, required firewall chains and the Docker `FORWARD` hook ordering, creates a labeled per-box bridge, confirms it lies outside pinned destinations' subnets, installs default-drop IPv4/IPv6 `DOCKER-USER` and `INPUT` chains permitting only pinned IP/port pairs, and verifies the final drop before returning. (crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs impl DockerSandbox {)
  • Added — Per-box egress lifecycle wiring in `DockerSandbox`: Allowlist specs require an installed controller (otherwise refused as Unsupported), the egress network is prepared before `docker run`, and destroy removes it after the container stops. Cleanup failures are retained as failed-create attempts so the box record survives for a later retry. (crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox {, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs pub const NAME: &str = "docker";, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs pub(super) fn run()
  • Modified — Pinned host mappings and loopback-only DNS in workload args: For an allowlist box, run arguments attach the prepared network, set its only DNS upstream to `127.0.0.1`, and add `--add-host` entries for each pinned name/address pair (IPv6 bracketed), so approved names never depend on host DNS. (crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs use tinybox_core::{, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs pub(super) fn run()
  • Added — New `ipnet` and `sha2` dependencies: `ipnet` parses Docker-assigned CIDRs so pinned destinations inside a network subnet are rejected, and `sha2` produces collision-resistant ownership tokens for firewall chains. (crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml publish = false)
  • 2 additional supported feature(s) omitted by the configured limit.

Tests

  • unit — The allowlist rejection test now also covers octal and hexadecimal aliases of the metadata addresses plus dotted, case-mixed and bare `metadata.` names, pinning each new accepted spelling of the rejection parameter list.: No execution or pass result is claimed here. (crates/tinybox-core/src/spec/mod_tests.rs fn allowlist_validation_rejects_malformed_and_metadata_hosts() {)

Before merge

  • Complete the critique review for crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs, rustc-ice-2026-10-23T18_31_29-185076.txt, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md, docs/specs/contract-1-19.md, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-core/src/lib.rs, docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md.
  • Complete the security review for crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-core/src/lib.rs.
  • Review uncovered paths: crates/tinybox-core/src/lib.rs, crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md, crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs, docs/specs/contract-1-19.md, docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md, rustc-ice-2026-10-23T18_31_29-185076.txt.
Agent review details

critique

  • Conclusion: Neutral
  • Scope reviewed: incomplete; unanswered files: crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs, rustc-ice-2026-10-23T18_31_29-185076.txt, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md, docs/specs/contract-1-19.md, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-core/src/lib.rs, docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md
  • Lane summary: Reviewed 6 of 24 files — 18 not reviewed. Reviewed 6 files; 3 findings. 18 files were omitted: not selected by the large-review budget.

security

  • Conclusion: Neutral
  • Scope reviewed: incomplete; unanswered files: crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs, crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-core/src/lib.rs
  • Lane summary: Reviewed 6 of 20 files — 14 not reviewed. Reviewed 6 files; 0 findings. 14 files were omitted: not selected by the large-review budget. 4 files were not security-reviewed: crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md (prose or tabular data), docs/specs/contract-1-19.md (prose or tabular data), docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md (prose or tabular data), rustc-ice-2026-10-23T18_31_29-185076.txt (prose or tabular data).

tests

  • Conclusion: Success
  • Scope reviewed: all assigned evidence
  • Positive: The tests lane is Answered and reports the `is_metadata_host` hardening is well covered, with each new accepted spelling and the legacy forms for both metadata IPv4 addresses pinned by failing-on-regression assertions.
  • Lane summary: The diff under review is the metadata-host hardening in `EgressAllowlist::is_metadata_host` (case/root-dot normalization and legacy numeric IPv4 spellings), and it is well covered: `allowlist_validation_rejects_malformed_and_metadata_hosts` pins every new accepted spelling plus the two legacy forms for both `169.254.169.254` and `169.254.170.2`, and the loopback suite already covers `parse_legacy_ipv4`'s arithmetic. I found no defect in this change; the broader egress-controller work in the same commit series is not part of the hunks I was asked to review.

commits

  • Conclusion: Success
  • Scope reviewed: all assigned evidence
  • Positive: The commits lane is Answered and reports no sensitive content in committed files.
  • Lane summary: No sensitive content in committed files.

description

  • Conclusion: Success
  • Scope reviewed: all assigned evidence
  • Positive: The description lane is Answered and reports that the PR body needs to be replaced: it describes only the metadata IPv4 alias rejection while the commit ships the Docker egress controller, `HostExecutionLocation`, `with_egress_controller`, DockerSandbox lifecycle changes, new dependencies and spec doc updates. This observation is not counted as a positive in isolation; it is the lane's reported conclusion.
  • Lane summary: The commit under review is a large egress-enforcement change (new Docker egress module, host execution-location capability, controller wiring in DockerSandbox), but the pull request body describes only the metadata IPv4 alias rejection from the earlier spec diff. Nothing in the body mentions the new Docker egress controller, `HostExecutionLocation`, `with_egress_controller`, `DockerSandbox` lifecycle changes, new `ipnet`/`sha2` dependencies, or the spec docs updates — so the description needs to be replaced to match what it actually ships.
Evidence and run details
  • Models: ladder/vectors-oai3, deepseek-v4.1-flash
  • Spend: $0.001793
  • Tokens: 1251998 input · 13217 output · 291328 cached · 801 embedding
  • Updated: 2026-10-23T18:55:52Z
  • Continuity: summary cache chain restarted at the storage ceiling.
Head State Pass summary
de107513d912 ready for maintainer review 0 active finding(s), 0 resolved finding(s) (at 2026-10-23T13:59:57Z)
b49713019fb7 incomplete 0 active finding(s), 0 resolved finding(s) (at 2026-10-23T18:55:52Z)

tinysweeper 0.1.2

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tinysweeper[bot]
tinysweeper Bot previously approved these changes Oct 23, 2026

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tinysweeper found nothing blocking. Approving.

Diagnostics

Total spend: $0.0053

@tinysweeper tinysweeper Bot added the priority: p3 Whenever. Cosmetic, a nicety, or a cleanup with no user visible effect. label Oct 23, 2026
senamakel and others added 3 commits October 23, 2026 14:15
Expose an egress module that resolves and pins allowlist targets so sandbox
network access can be planned against stable addresses. The new types and
plan_egress_allowlist are re-exported from the crate root for callers.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
senamakel and others added 17 commits October 23, 2026 14:28
Hostname normalization no longer strips the trailing root dot, so absolute
names such as "service." stay distinct from their relative counterparts
instead of collapsing into the same allowlist entry. Tests were extended to
cover the absolute-name case and to disambiguate Result from the crate's
Error type.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Adds tests asserting that IP literal allowlist entries are pinned without
resolution and that forbidden literals are rejected, plus a test that resolver
failures surface as backend errors. The existing hostname test now also checks
that both configured ports are retained.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Add assertions for the execution_location accessor on the local and SSH
hosts, and on the SSH host's inner host, so the new reporting behaviour
is exercised for local, remote, and unknown cases.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Introduce a HostExecutionLocation enum and an execution_location method on the Host trait so security-sensitive controllers can determine whether a host runs commands locally or remotely instead of inferring it from the host's registration name. Custom hosts default to Unknown until they explicitly attest to their locality.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Implement execution_location on LocalHost so callers can tell that
commands run on the local machine rather than a remote host.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
SshHost now implements execution_location and returns Remote, so callers can
tell that commands run on the far machine rather than locally.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Add tests that verify the egress controller prepares the allowlist before the container starts and cleans up after destroy, and that a controller failure rolls back the box record before it is dropped.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Register the new egress_enforcement module and re-export
DockerEgressController and NativeLinuxDockerEgressController so callers can
enforce egress policy through the native Linux backend.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The Docker sandbox now accepts an optional egress controller that can rewrite
docker argv before execution, letting callers install per-box allowlist
filtering. Without a controller the sandbox keeps refusing
NetworkPolicy::Allowlist as before.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The remove_container helper now passes its argv straight to run_docker instead of wrapping it with docker_argv, since the caller already supplies the full command. This removes a redundant layer of argument construction with no change in behaviour.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Add a validate_host method to the DockerEgressController trait with a
default no-op implementation, and have the native Linux controller check
that the host is supported, the target is Linux, and the engine and
firewall are available. Also skip forcing the local rootful docker env
prefix when the command already starts with env.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Wrap the host in a ControllerHost that rewrites docker argv through the
egress controller before execution, so observed hosts and sandboxes with a
controller attached get the same egress handling as the primary host.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The docker sandbox now installs an egress filter through the egress
controller when a box requests an allowlist network policy, instead of
refusing the policy outright. The controller validates the host and
prepares the default-drop filter before the container starts, and any
failure during create tears the egress state back down so no filter is
left behind.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Reformat the egress enforcement and sandbox modules to satisfy rustfmt, wrapping long argument lists and error strings and collapsing short ones. No behaviour changes.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The firewall output helper now converts the lossy stdout to an owned value before returning it, so the result no longer borrows from the command output.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Failed container creates now run a shared rollback path that tears down
egress rules and records the attempt for later cleanup when that teardown
itself fails, instead of silently discarding the failure record. Egress
enforcement also installs allowlist rules only on the forward chain and
drops all host-origin traffic on the input chain, so allowlisted
destinations no longer apply to traffic originating from the host.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
…identity

Add a test asserting that the native Linux egress controller refuses to
create a sandbox when the host has no explicit local identity, returning
ConstraintNotEnforced for the network constraint without issuing any
host commands.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
senamakel and others added 24 commits October 23, 2026 18:21
…reates

The ownership check used by ambiguous network create reconciliation now also
compares the attempt label, so a network left behind by an earlier create
attempt for the same box is no longer mistaken for this attempt's network.
Inspection and verification both parse the extra label and treat a mismatch
as a foreign network to leave alone.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Add a Linux-only test asserting that when a network create fails after
its side effect, cleanup inspects the attempt label and leaves a network
belonging to an older attempt untouched instead of removing it.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The attempt-label assertion now spells out the full label string instead of
relying on the shared constant, and two prepared native hosts are bound as
mutable so the tests can adjust their state.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Two test bindings had the wrong mutability, so the host is now declared mutable where its fields are assigned and immutable where they are not.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Two test bindings had the wrong mutability, so the first now declares the
prepared host as mutable and the second no longer does. This keeps the tests
compiling without changing what they exercise.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The README now documents that each attempt gets a fresh random token stored on
the Docker network and folded into chain names, and that chains are created
exclusively before receiving their owner marker. It also explains the
reclaim rules for unmarked chains after a restart and that ambiguous orphans
fail closed.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The fake host now records which chains have rules added and reports
missing rules for -C checks, so the egress enforcement tests can
exercise the rule verification path.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The test host now resolves the iptables or ip6tables binary once per
invocation and reuses it for the marked-chain and chains-with-rules
bookkeeping, instead of re-deriving it inline at each call site. A
chains_with_rules removal was also added to the -D path so deletions
stay consistent with insertions.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The test host now clones the firewall identifier for the marked-chains
removal and reuses the original value for the chains-with-rules removal,
instead of re-deriving it from argv. This keeps both removals keyed on the
same firewall value.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Reformatted the egress enforcement module and its tests to satisfy rustfmt, wrapping long call chains and assertions and collapsing short conditions onto single lines. No behaviour changed.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The firewall binary lookup was computed twice in a row, so the first
binding was dropped and the second reused. The remaining binding is now
cloned at the insertion site to keep the value available.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The cleanup test now also records the forward and input chains as having
rules and carrying the owner marker, so the refusal path is exercised
against chains that look genuinely owned by another instance.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Rename the test to make clear it covers rollback of both the created
chain and the network when the owner marker install fails.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Add a Linux-only test asserting that cleanup succeeds and issues only the
two expected chain-existence probes when the box network is already absent
and no matching hooks remain, without running any delete, flush, or remove
commands.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The cleanup test asserted exactly two `-S` invocations, which is brittle
against extra read-only listing calls. It now checks that at least two
occur, keeping the intent while tolerating additional chain inspections.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Add a test that makes the owned network removal fail after an ambiguous
create, verifying the cleanup error is retained and the network is
inspected twice.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Add a fault injection hook to the prepared native host so a single
`docker network rm` invocation can be made to fail, letting tests
exercise the cleanup path when network removal errors out.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The ambiguous create rollback test now binds the prepare result and includes
it along with the recorded commands in the assertion message, so a failure
shows what the controller actually returned instead of only the mismatch.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The ambiguous create test now asserts on the simulated lost command
response message instead of the owned egress network rollback failure,
so the assertion matches the error the test actually injects.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The test now compiles the network-removal assertion only on Linux, since the
behaviour it exercises is platform-specific and broke builds elsewhere.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
The no_matching_hooks field and its initializer are now behind a
cfg(target_os = "linux") attribute, matching the other Linux-only fields in
PreparedNativeHost. This avoids an unused-field warning on other platforms.

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish
Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>
feat(docker): enforce pinned Linux egress allowlists
feat(docker): add pinned egress planning seam
@tinysweeper
tinysweeper Bot dismissed their stale review October 23, 2026 18:56

tinysweeper could not review the latest push, so its earlier approval no longer speaks for this pull request.

@tinysweeper tinysweeper Bot left a comment

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tinysweeper could not complete coverage (18 unanswered item(s)), so this is not an approval.

Diagnostics

Total spend: $0.0018

@tinysweeper tinysweeper Bot added priority: p2 Soon. Real but survivable — a rough edge, a gap, a thing that will bite later. and removed priority: p3 Whenever. Cosmetic, a nicety, or a cleanup with no user visible effect. labels Oct 23, 2026

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💡 Codex Review

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Reviewed commit: b49713019f

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Comment thread crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs
@senamakel
senamakel merged commit e7bc505 into tinybox-27-loopback-policy Oct 23, 2026
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priority: p2 Soon. Real but survivable — a rough edge, a gap, a thing that will bite later.

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