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Security: vmingchen/vnfs

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Supported versions

Until VFSI reaches 1.0, security fixes are made on the latest main branch and included in the next release. Older prereleases are not maintained separately.

Recursive removal

The path-taking removal APIs (remove_dir_all, remove_dir_contents, and vremove) are subject to the entry-point TOCTOU described by RUSTSEC-2023-0018: a concurrent actor can replace a path component with a symlink between the caller naming the path and removal starting. A no-follow preflight check does not eliminate that race. Only remove directories the application intentionally owns, using trusted ancestor paths; path-based removal is not a security sandbox or a transaction. Names are resolved for each call and do not retain object identity across renames or path replacement.

The NFS path remover retains directory filehandles internally while traversing the tree. This does not pin the initial pathname between separate application calls, and other backends' traversal guarantees may differ. Explicit retained-directory workflows use Vfsi::vopen_dirs and vremove_dir_contents on backends with genuine handles; even opening such a handle does not secure attacker-controlled ancestors. See recursive removal and races.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please use a private GitHub security advisory. Do not open a public issue for suspected credential exposure, authentication bypass, path confinement failure, memory-safety issue, or remotely triggerable denial of service.

Include affected versions, backend/server details, impact, reproduction steps, and any proposed mitigation. Remove live credentials and sensitive production data. You should receive an acknowledgement within seven days; disclosure and release timing will be coordinated through the advisory.

There aren't any published security advisories